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3215584	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Stati Uniti</p>La Coca-Cola accontenta Trump e lancia una nuova versione “Diet”La Coca-Cola prodotta negli Usa è realizzata con sciroppo di mais ad alto contenuto di fruttosio, un ingrediente che il segretario alla Salute dell’amministrazione Trump, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., ha duramente osteggiato nel corso del suo mandato<p><time>22 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/23/Immagini/Ritagli/2025-07-22T105952Z_941121254_RC2LRFALSWHB_RTRMADP_5_COCA-COLA-RESULTS-U87468883111LFI-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.JPG?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p>FOTO DI FILE: Un camion della Coca-Cola si fa strada nel centro di Los Angeles, California, Stati Uniti, 24 ottobre 2018. REUTERS/Mike Blake/File Photo<p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>La Coca-Cola ha confermato che lancerà una nuova versione autunnale della celebre bibita con zucchero di canna. Il presidente degli Stati Uniti, Donald Trump, aveva anticipato la notizia sostenendo di aver convinto l’azienda a sostituire lo sciroppo di mais, ad alto contenuto di fruttosio, con “vero zucchero di canna”. Il Ceo del gigante delle bibite, James Quincey, ha confermato la decisione di lanciare in autunno un’offerta “dolcificata con zucchero di canna statunitense” come parte della sua gamma di prodotti. Lo rivela la Cnn.</p><p>Determinanti i “suggerimenti” presidenziali</p><p>“La ricetta principale della Coca-Cola non cambierà. Continueremo a usare molto dello sciroppo di mais che utilizziamo ora”, ha rassicurato il colosso statunitense che ha aggiunto in un comunicato: “Questa variazione è pensata per integrare la gamma dei prodotti principali e offrire una scelta più ampia per ogni occasione e preferenza”. L’amministratore delegato Quincey ha ammesso che l’entusiasmo del presidente Trump per il marchio e i suoi “suggerimenti” sono stati determinanti nella decisione di lanciare sul mercato la nuova opzione “light”. Il presidente degli Stati Uniti è un assiduo consumatore di Diet Coke, ne beve circa 12 lattine al giorno, scrive il The Guardian che rivela la curiosa installazione di un pulsante rosso “Diet Coke” vicino alla sua scrivania, che “può premere per chiamare un membro dello staff con la bevanda”.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>Sciroppo di mais nel mirino</p><p>La Coca-Cola prodotta negli Stati Uniti è realizzata con sciroppo di mais ad alto contenuto di fruttosio, un ingrediente che il segretario alla Salute e ai Servizi Umani dell’amministrazione Trump, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., ha duramente osteggiato nel corso del suo mandato definendolo “formula per renderti obeso e diabetico”. Eppure, secondo gli esperti di salute, sostituire lo zucchero di canna con lo sciroppo di mais non ridurrebbe alcun rischio per la salute umana. “Per rendere più sana la catena alimentare statunitense, l’amministrazione Trump dovrebbe concentrarsi sulla riduzione dello zucchero, non su zuccheri diversi”, ha dichiarato alla Cnn Eva Greenthal, ricercatrice del Center for science in the public interest, organizzazione no-profit per la difesa dei consumatori.</p><p>Sebbene il consumo di zucchero negli Stati Uniti sia superiore alla produzione nazionale di zucchero di canna, Quincey ha assicurato che Coca-Cola “ne ha a sufficienza” per lanciare la linea. “Con il tempo, se ci sarà più domanda, pianteranno più ettari ma siamo fiduciosi che l’approvvigionamento non sarà un problema”, ha detto.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>Hub digitale 160</p><p>Tutte le iniziative dedicate ai 160 anni del Sole 24 Ore</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>2 mesi di prova a 1,00 €</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>I timori della filiera del mais</p><p>Le ragioni che avrebbero convinto lo storico brand a utilizzare lo sciroppo di mais rispetto allo zucchero sarebbero principalmente economiche: negli Stati Uniti, infatti, l’immensa produzione di mais gode di consistenti sussidi agricoli che lo rendono più conveniente rispetto al classico zucchero. L’industria del mais non aveva gradito le dichiarazioni del tycoon, scrive il Washington Post.</p><p><p></p></p> La Coca-Cola accontenta Trump e lancia una nuova versione “Diet” - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 4713	24小时太阳报	2025-07-22 23:52:00 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215583	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>La sentenza</p>Mike Lynch, patrimonio in bancarotta: Hp ottiene 700 milioni dopo il naufragio e la causa su AutonomyIl tribunale di Londra conferma il maxi-risarcimento. La vedova non riceverà nulla dall’eredità del fondatore di Autonomy, morto a bordo del Bayesian il 19 agosto 2024<p><time>22 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/23/Immagini/Ritagli/2025-07-21T160337Z_1387112837_RC23RFADCHW9_RTRMADP_5_AUTONOMY-HP-LYNCH-U53460218612TsD-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.JPG?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p>L’imprenditore inglese Mike Lynch arriva al Tribunale dei Magistrati di Westminster, a Londra, l’11 febbraio 2021. REUTERS/Henry Nicholls/File Photo<p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>Il patrimonio di Mike Lynch è ufficialmente in bancarotta. Una sentenza dell’Alta Corte di Londra ha stabilito che Hewlett-Packard (Hp) ha diritto a un risarcimento di oltre 700 milioni di sterline dall’eredità del defunto imprenditore, ex fondatore del colosso software Autonomy e una delle figure simbolo della tech britannica, e del suo ex direttore finanziario, Sushovan Hussain, a causa di una frode legata alla vendita della società al colosso californiano nel 2011.</p><p>La decisione arriva a quasi un anno dalla tragedia avvenuta al largo della Sicilia, quando Lynch perse la vita insieme alla figlia diciottenne Hannah nel naufragio del suo superyacht, il Bayesian. Nella sciagura, avvenuta il 19 agosto 2024, persero la vita altre cinque persone, tra cui il presidente di Morgan Stanley International, Jonathan Bloomer, e sua moglie Judy. La vedova di Lynch, Angela Bacares, è sopravvissuta al disastro, ma non riceverà nulla dal patrimonio del marito, a meno che non venga accolto un eventuale appello.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>La causa, iniziata anni fa, si è concentrata sull’acquisizione di Autonomy da parte di Hp per 8 miliardi di sterline. Meno di un anno dopo, il valore dell’azienda venne svalutato di 6,5 miliardi. HP accusò Lynch e Hussain di aver gonfiato artificiosamente i conti per trarre profitto dalla vendita. Nel 2022, un giudice diede ragione a HP, ma l’ammontare del danno è arrivato solo ora, con la condanna a oltre 700 milioni: 646 per la differenza tra il prezzo pagato e il reale valore della società, 52 per inganno personale e 35 per danni ad altre aziende del gruppo.</p><p>Lynch, spesso descritto come il “Bill Gates britannico”, si è sempre dichiarato innocente, sostenendo che la colpa fosse di HP per non aver saputo integrare Autonomy. Negli Stati Uniti era stato assolto dalle accuse penali e stava valutando un appello contro la sentenza britannica prima della tragedia.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>2 mesi di prova a 1,00 €</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>Novità</p><p>Nasce Radio24-IlSole24OreTV. Guardala sul canale 246 o al link sotto</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>Nel frattempo, proseguono in Italia le indagini sulla tragedia del Bayesian. Il relitto, recuperato a giugno con un’operazione complessa che ha coinvolto 70 esperti e l’uso di droni sottomarini, è ora sotto la custodia delle autorità italiane. La mastodontica struttura è stata sollevata con uno dei più potenti pontoni galleggianti d’Europa e posizionata su supporti in acciaio per evitare danni ambientali.</p><p>Riproduzione riservata ©</p><p><p></p></p> Mike Lynch, patrimonio in bancarotta: Hp ottiene 700 milioni dopo il naufragio e la causa su Autonomy - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 3975	24小时太阳报	2025-07-22 22:12:55 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215582	无图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Fisco</p>Via libera della Camera al decreto fiscale. Dalla sanatoria ai controlli Gdf: ecco tutte le novitàIl decreto si inserisce nella più ampia strategia dell’Esecutivo per razionalizzare il sistema fiscale: favorire l’adempimento spontaneo, alleggerire i carichi pendenti, e garantire una maggiore trasparenza nei rapporti tra fisco e contribuente<p>di Martina Amante</p><p><time>22 luglio 2025</time></p><p></p>Concordato preventivo biennale: cosa cambia dopo le modifiche del correttivo<p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>I punti chiaveRavvedimento speciale collegato al concordato biennaleMaggiori garanzie nei controlli fiscaliAltre disposizioniIter parlamentare e prossimi passaggi</p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>È arrivato il voto definitivo sul disegno di legge di conversione del decreto-legge 17 giugno 2025, n. 84, recante «disposizioni urgenti in materia fiscale». Il provvedimento, che aveva già ottenuto il via libera in Commissione finanze con alcune modifiche di rilievo, introduce una serie di misure mirate a semplificare il rapporto tra fisco e contribuenti, con particolare attenzione al mondo delle partite Iva e al nuovo istituto del concordato preventivo biennale.</p><p>Ravvedimento speciale collegato al concordato biennale</p><p>La novità più significativa riguarda il ravvedimento speciale per gli anni d’imposta 2019-2023, riservato ai soggetti che aderiscono al concordato preventivo biennale. La misura consente una regolarizzazione agevolata degli omessi o insufficienti versamenti, applicando sanzioni ridotte e imposte calcolate secondo i parametri degli Isa (Indici sintetici di affidabilità fiscale). L’obiettivo è duplice: da un lato incentivare l’adesione al concordato, dall’altro contenere il contenzioso e favorire l’emersione spontanea di basi imponibili pregresse. Secondo quanto previsto, l’Agenzia delle entrate emanerà un provvedimento attuativo per disciplinare termini, modalità operative e criteri di calcolo.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>Maggiori garanzie nei controlli fiscali</p><p>Altro punto centrale del decreto è l’introduzione dell’obbligo, per l’Amministrazione finanziaria e per la Guardia di finanza, di motivare in modo circostanziato ogni accesso presso la sede del contribuente, anche in caso di verifiche “a sorpresa”. La finalità è rafforzare le tutele procedimentali e ridurre i margini di discrezionalità negli accessi ispettivi, soprattutto nei confronti di piccoli contribuenti e studi professionali.</p><p>Altre disposizioni</p><p>Il testo contiene inoltre nuove scadenze e rateizzazioni per il versamento delle imposte sui redditi; misure di semplificazione per autonomi e imprese minori; interventi sul reverse charge e sullo split payment, in linea con gli orientamenti Ue; razionalizzazione delle attività di riscossione.</p><p>Iter parlamentare e prossimi passaggi</p><p>Il testo passerà al Senato per la seconda lettura, con l’obiettivo di completare l’iter entro la fine di luglio, in tempo utile per la scadenza dei 60 giorni dalla pubblicazione del decreto. Nonostante l’importanza delle misure fiscali in gioco, i lavori parlamentari si stanno svolgendo in un clima di bassa tensione politica.</p><p>Riproduzione riservata ©</p><p><p></p></p> Via libera della Camera al decreto fiscale. Dalla sanatoria ai controlli Gdf: ecco tutte le novità - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 3629	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 01:11:11 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215581	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Mobilità</p>Cambia il Telepass: arriva «Grab&Go» senza canoneIl dispositivo si può acquistare a scaffale e non ha costi fissi di abbonamento<p>di Marco Morino</p><p><time>22 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/23/Immagini/Ritagli/GrabGo%20nella%20GDO_1-U03561642600Gnj-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.jpg?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><p>3" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>3" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>Luca Luciani, amministratore delegato di Telepass, società del gruppo Mundys attiva nel telepedaggio e nella mobilità integrata, insieme ad Aldo Agostinelli, Chief Consumer Revenues Officer di Telepass, annunciano il nuovo modello destinato a innovare la fruizione del telepedaggio e della mobilità in Italia: Telepass Grab&Go.</p><p>Oggi Telepass copre circa il 75 % del valore del transato autostradale italiano e, solo in Italia, ci sono 9,6 milioni di dispositivi Telepass che consentono il pagamento automatico del pedaggio e l’accesso ad altri servizi per la mobilità urbana. Si stimano però altri 20 milioni di viaggiatori autostradali non ancora “convertiti” al telepedaggio: viaggiatori occasionali, stranieri in visita, lavoratori “fuori sede” che tornano nella casa d’origine poche volte l’anno. A questo pubblico si rivolge Grab&Go, il primo Telepass on demand pensato per chi viaggia in auto occasionalmente, ma non vuole rinunciare alla comodità di Telepass, senza pagare canoni mensili.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>Grab&Go è un passo fondamentale in questa direzione: si può acquistare a scaffale e non ha costi fissi di abbonamento. Il costo d’acquisto del dispositivo è di 29,90 euro. Si paga un euro al giorno solo nei giorni di effettivo utilizzo del telepedaggio e un euro al giorno nel caso di utilizzo degli altri servizi; nessun costo viene addebitato quando il dispositivo non è utilizzato. Si attiva in pochi secondi dall’App grazie alla tecnologia Nfc dello smartphone.</p><p>Il nuovo dispositivo consente di utilizzare i principali servizi Telepass: oltre al telepedaggio su tutta la rete nazionale, il pagamento dei parcheggi convenzionati, delle strisce blu e dei traghetti per lo Stretto di Messina. Tramite app sarà possibile gestire digitalmente gli spostamenti, attivare coperture assicurative, ricevere notifiche di transito, promemoria e alert e, infine, abilitare fino a due targhe contemporaneamente. Questa novità rappresenta la porta d’ingresso più semplice all’ecosistema Telepass. Si tratta di un cambio di paradigma, in linea con una strategia di lungo termine di Luca Luciani che punta a rendere questo servizio uno strumento inclusivo, flessibile tanto in ambito autostradale quanto in ambito urbano.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>Hub digitale 160</p><p>Tutte le iniziative dedicate ai 160 anni del Sole 24 Ore</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>2 mesi di prova a 1,00 €</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>Con il lancio di Grab&Go l’azienda segna una rivoluzione strategica e culturale: il dispositivo simbolo dell’autostrada italiana esce dai canali tradizionali, diventa di proprietà del cliente e si posiziona nel mondo del retail, sugli scaffali e pronto all’uso dopo la sua attivazione. Il nuovo dispositivo può essere acquistato nella grande distribuzione organizzata (MediaWorld, Unieuro, Esselunga), nella consumer electronics e nella accessoristica moto. Una rete di distribuzione con un piano di espansione ambizioso, che include, tra gli altri, anche stazioni di servizio ed e-commerce (Amazon), con l’obiettivo di raggiungere i mille punti vendita con una copertura capillare sul territorio nazionale e oltre confine entro l’anno, e fino a 6mila punti a tendere. Intanto Cellularline, azienda quotata su Euronext Milan (Segmento Star), annuncia la firma di un accordo con Telepass per supportare la distribuzione del nuovo prodotto Grab&Go in Italia e in Europa.</p><p><p></p></p> Cambia il Telepass: arriva «Grab&Go» senza canone - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 4532	24小时太阳报	2025-07-22 20:50:00 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215580	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Quirinale</p>Oggi Mattarella compie 84 anni: gli ultimi 10 anni passati al ColleIl Capo dello Stato sta già preparando al Quirinale il discorso del Ventaglio che terrà durante la tradizionale cerimonia dello scambio di saluti con la stampa parlamentare il 30 luglio<p>di Redazione Roma</p><p><time>23 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/23/Immagini/Ritagli/89662-1753201881-U04811118254TVF-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.jpg?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p>IL PRESIDENTE DELLA REPUBBLICA SERGIO MATTARELLA<p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>Un compleanno col record: ben 3.823 giorni, cioè 10 anni e oltre sei mesi di permanenza al Quirinale e 84 anni ben portati per il presidente siciliano. Sergio Mattarella festeggia oggi il suo anniversario senza derogare dagli impegni di lavoro. Solo in serata si riunirà in famiglia per una cena con i figli ed i suoi amati nipoti. Come di consueto nel periodo che precede la pausa estiva, Mattarella sta già preparando al Quirinale il discorso del Ventaglio che terrà durante la tradizionale cerimonia dello scambio di saluti con la stampa parlamentare il 30 luglio. Poi le vacanze: probabilmente prima qualche giorno di decompressione nella tenuta presidenziale di Castelporziano quindi la pausa più lunga a Villa Ausserer, nel comune di Castelrotto, in Alto Adige, luogo peraltro già scelto in passato dal presidente Carlo Azeglio Ciampi.</p><p>Un anno complesso</p><p>In effetti è stato un anno complesso per il presidente alle prese con le crescenti tensioni internazionali, dall’Ucraina a Gaza, fino all’avvento di Donald Trump e lo spinoso problema - ancora tutto in piedi - dei dazi americani. Ma non solo, Sergio Mattarella ha dovuto affrontare un problema cardiaco che lo ha portato ad un ricovero di due giorni, lo scorso aprile, all’ospedale romano Santo Spirito. Tutto risolto senza problemi con l’installazione di un pacemaker che gli ha permesso di rientrare al lavoro in tempi rapidissimo: da allora sembra in perfetta forma.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>La rielezione</p><p>Mattarella è il secondo presidente ad essere stato rieletto al Colle dopo Giorgio Napolitano che però dopo due anni si dimise. Mattarella ha invece già abbondantemente superato il terzo anno dalla rielezione che è avvenuta all’inizio del 2022 dopo che le forze politiche non riuscirono a trovare convergenza su un’altra personalità e furono bruciati nomi su nomi nei voti del Parlamento in seduta congiunta. Un fallimento della politica che gli ha imposto di mettersi ancora a disposizione anche se, lo ha detto lui stesso più volte, «avrebbe avuto altri piani» per la sua vita. Basti pensare che nel suo regno ha visto susseguirsi ben sei governi: Renzi, Gentiloni, Conte I, Conte II, Draghi e Meloni. Amatissimo dalla gente - anzi dai suoi concittadini, come ama dire - Mattarella resta un punto di riferimento essenziale per il Paese. Il suo equilibrio, i toni pacati e la figura paterna che ha conquistato l’immaginario del Paese lo hanno portato ad incarnare un ruolo di cerniera tra politica e cittadini frenando almeno un po’ il vento dell’antipolitica che sta dominando non solo l’Italia ma il mondo intero.</p><p>Inviti alla coesione</p><p>Anche quest’anno più volte, ad esempio nel discorso di fine anno, ha invitato alla coesione, a smussare gli angoli del confronto e a far scendere i decibel del dibattito politico, anche sulla rete: «proprio sui social corre troppo odio, troppa rabbia, con una tendenza a identificare avversari o addirittura nemici. Verso i quali - sottolineò la sera di capodanno parlando agli italiani - praticare forme di aggressività. Tutte modalità che distraggono o aggravano la difficoltà di occuparsi efficacemente dei problemi e delle emergenze quotidiane di cittadini e famiglie: dal lavoro che manca alle differenze di retribuzione, alle disparità». Un appello al bene della Repubblica che, siamo sicuri, sarà anche la cifra del prossimo anno nella guida anche morale del Paese.</p><p>Riproduzione riservata ©</p><p><p></p></p> Oggi Mattarella compie 84 anni: gli ultimi 10 anni passati al Colle - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 4489	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 13:31:57 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215579	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Medio oriente</p>Carestia di massa a Gaza, la denuncia di 100 ong. Onu: cecchini sparano sulla folla, Israele: sono di Hamas “Lo schema di distribuzione della Ghf è una trappola mortale sadica - ha denunciato il capo dell’Unrwa (l’agenzia Onu per i rifugiati palestinesi), Philippe Lazzarini. I cecchini sparano a caso sulla folla, come se avessero licenza di uccidere»<p><time>23 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/24/Immagini/Ritagli/2025-07-22T113425Z_831745599_RC2MRFATRS3J_RTRMADP_5_ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS-GAZA-HUNGER-U81816716867pPQ-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.JPG?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p>Un bambino piange mentre i palestinesi si riuniscono per ricevere cibo da una cucina di beneficenza, in mezzo a una crisi della fame, nella città di Gaza, 22 luglio 2025. Reuters/Dawoud Abu Alkas<p><p>4" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>4" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>Oltre 100 organizzazioni umanitarie hanno denunciato che una “carestia di massa” si sta diffondendo nella Striscia di Gaza e che anche i loro operatori stanno soffrendo gravemente a causa della carenza di cibo. In una dichiarazione, i 111 firmatari, tra cui Medici Senza Frontiere (Msf), Save the children e Oxfam, hanno avvertito che “i nostri colleghi e coloro che assistiamo stanno morendo”. “Mentre l’assedio del governo israeliano affama la popolazione di Gaza, gli operatori umanitari si uniscono alle stesse file per il cibo, rischiando di essere colpiti solo per sfamare le loro famiglie”, si legge nella dichiarazione.</p><p>Le ong chiedono un cessate il fuoco “immediato e negoziato”, l’apertura di tutti i valichi di frontiera e il libero flusso di aiuti attraverso i meccanismi guidati dalle Nazioni unite. Ieri le Nazioni unite hanno affermato che le forze israeliane hanno ucciso più di 1.000 palestinesi che cercavano di ottenere aiuti alimentari da quando la Fondazione umanitaria per Gaza, sostenuta da Stati Uniti e Israele, ha iniziato le operazioni a fine maggio, mettendo di fatto da parte l’attuale sistema guidato dalle Nazioni Unite. Israele afferma che gli aiuti umanitari sono autorizzati a entrare a Gaza e accusa Hamas di sfruttare le sofferenze dei civili, anche rubando cibo per venderlo a prezzi gonfiati o sparando a chi è in attesa di aiuti.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>«A Gaza orrore senza precedenti»: l’ira di Onu e Ue</p><p>I palestinesi di Gaza sono alla fame. La malnutrizione uccide, quasi quanto il fuoco israeliano aperto contro chi rischia la vita per procurarsi quel po’ di cibo per sé, ma soprattutto per i propri figli. Ci sono almeno 21 bambini tra le vittime della carestia da domenica, denunciano tre ospedali nella Striscia, uno di loro era un neonato di appena 40 giorni. Il bilancio di morte si aggiorna di ora in ora, tra chi non sopravvive alla fame e chi viene ucciso dai raid dell’Idf: nelle ultime ore sono almeno 43 persone, di cui 18 in un attacco al campo di sfollati di al-Shati, a Gaza City, e sette mentre attendevano gli aiuti.</p><p>A Gaza “si consuma un orrore senza precedenti nella storia recente. La malnutrizione sta esplodendo. La carestia bussa a ogni porta”, è l’allarme del segretario generale dell’Onu Antonio Guterres, con il numero delle vittime della guerra scoppiata il 7 ottobre 2023 che ha superato, secondo i dati di Hamas, i 59.000 morti.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>2 mesi di prova a 1,00 €</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>Novità</p><p>Nasce Radio24-IlSole24OreTV. Guardala sul canale 246 o al link sotto</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>Secondo l’Unrwa, l’agenzia Onu per i rifugiati palestinesi, da quando la Gaza humanitarian foundation - la controversa organizzazione sostenuta da Usa e Israele - ha cominciato a distribuire aiuti al posto di ong e Nazioni unite a maggio scorso, almeno “1.000 persone affamate sono state uccise” mentre cercavano cibo.</p><p><p></p></p> Carestia di massa a Gaza, la denuncia di 100 ong. Onu: cecchini sparano sulla folla, Israele: sono di Hamas - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 4500	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 14:10:00 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215578	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Energia e sanzioni</p>Diesel, nuove tensioni dallo stop Ue all’impiego di greggio russoNel mirino soprattutto le forniture da India e Turchia. Il mercato dovrà (di nuovo) riorganizzarsi, anche per le importazioni di jet fuel, per cui l’Europa è molto dipendente dall’estero, con un probabile impatto sui costi. Saranno avvantaggiati Usa e Arabia Saudita<p>di Sissi Bellomo</p><p><time>23 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/23/Immagini/Ritagli/Imagoeconomica_22027-U70247270412Uxm-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.jpg?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p>RAFFINERIA LUKOIL <p><p>4" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>4" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>L’allarme scatenato dalle tensioni in Medio Oriente si è appena attenuato. E sul mercato dei carburanti già si affacciano nuovi timori per le forniture europee: diesel e jet fuel in particolare, per cui il Vecchio continente – che continua a perdere capacità di raffinazione – ha un’accentuata e crescente dipendenza dall’estero.</p><p>Ad avere riacceso una spia rossa è un provvedimento dell’Unione europea, che con il diciottesimo pacchetto di sanzioni contro la Russia ha deciso di mettere fine ad una clamorosa ipocrisia: l’importazione – alla luce del sole – di grandi quantità di carburanti da Paesi che riescono a produrli a basso costo grazie al greggio russo comprato a prezzi scontati proprio per via dell’embargo e di altre misure imposte circa tre anni fa dal G7 per punire l’invasione dell’Ucraina.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>Sfruttando (in piena legalità) il cosiddetto “refining loophole”, la scappatoia della raffinazione, l’India soprattutto, ma in parte anche Turchia e Cina, sono diventati importanti fornitori del Vecchio continente, cruciali insieme agli Stati Uniti e ad alcuni Paesi del Golfo Persico nel consentirci di sostituire gli acquisti (diretti) dalla Russia, da cui fino al 2022 arrivava circa il 40% delle nostre importazioni di diesel.</p><p>Una situazione oggettivamente imbarazzante - e nota da tempo - cui si è deciso di porre rimedio con il divieto per qualsiasi operatore Ue di importare, acquistare o trasferire prodotti petroliferi derivati dal greggio russo, qualunque sia il luogo di raffinazione. La misura spingerà ad una nuova riorganizzazione delle catene di rifornimento, con probabili ripercussioni sui prezzi.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>STRUMENTI</p><p>Calcola il tuo preventivo online per l’assicurazione della tua auto, moto e motociclo</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>1 anno di abbonamento al Sole a 49€!Accesso illimitato al sito de Il Sole 24 Ore</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>Per il diesel in particolare c’è già stato qualche segnale di tensione sul mercato, per quanto non acuto come in giugno, quando si temeva un blocco dello Stretto di Hormuz.</p><p><p></p></p> Diesel, nuove tensioni dallo stop Ue all’impiego di greggio russo - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 3436	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 14:54:05 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215577	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Trimestrali</p>Unicredit, ricavi core a 5,9 miliardi nel secondo trimestre 2025Il gruppo bancario mette a segno un primo semestre record, con un utile di a 6,1 miliardi di euro. Il risultato del secondo trimestre è di 3,3 miliardi sopra le stime<p><time>23 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/24/Immagini/Ritagli/imagoeconomica-611129-1752167782-U54313011170jpU-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.jpg?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><p>1" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>1" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>Unicredit mette a segno un primo semestre record con un utile di a 6,1 miliardi di euro. Il risultato del secondo trimestre è di 3,3 miliardi sopra le stime. L’attesa degli analisti era oltre i 2,5 miliardi di euro. I ricavi core sono aumentati anno su anno a 5,9 miliardi di euro.</p><p>Orcel: «Risultati eccellenti con secondo trimestre record»</p><p>«UniCredit ha conseguito risultati finanziari eccellenti, con un secondo trimestre da record che contribuisce al miglior primo semestre nella storia della banca». Così l’amministratore delegato di Unicredit, Andrea Orcel, commenta i risultati finanziari del secondo trimestre e del secondo.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>«Abbiamo riportato un utile netto trimestrale - aggiunge - di 3,3 miliardi e un robusto Rote del 24,1%, con i ricavi core che sono aumentati anno su anno a 5,9 miliardi. Siamo protetti per il futuro poiché il nostro basso costo del rischio, l’elevata qualità degli attivi e un livello di overlay senza eguali ci difendono contro potenziali recessioni macroeconomiche. Abbiamo chiuso il trimestre con un rapporto Cet1 pro-forma di 16,2% (pro-forma per il Danish Compromise). Conseguire questi risultati nell’attuale ambiente macroeconomico rende questo un traguardo ancora più significativo per il team, del quale sono immensamente orgoglioso, e il quale continua a superare le aspettative anche quando non dovrebbe essere possibile farlo».</p><p>«UniCredit - conclude Orcel - si trova decisamente nella fase di accelerazione di UniCredit Unlocked, che sta producendo risultati superiori al piano e al contempo rafforzando e proteggendo la nostra banca per il futuro».</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>STRUMENTI</p><p>Calcola il tuo preventivo online per l’assicurazione della tua auto, moto e motociclo</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>1 anno di abbonamento al Sole a 49€!Accesso illimitato al sito de Il Sole 24 Ore</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>Riproduzione riservata ©</p><p><p></p></p> Unicredit, ricavi core a 5,9 miliardi nel secondo trimestre 2025 - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 3130	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 13:30:00 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215576	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>La giornata dei mercati</p>Tokyo chiude +3,5% dopo l’accordo sui dazi Usa-Giappone. Future europei positiviLe Borse cinesi sono positive, Hong Kong +1,2%<p><time>23 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/24/Immagini/Ritagli/RIALZOandamentoAdobeStock_414273088-U71545077240LHi-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.jpeg?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>Vola la borsa di Tokyo dopo l’accordo sui dazi tra Usa e Giappone: alle 8,40 ora italiana l’indice Nikkei 225 ha chiuso con un rialco del +3,51%. La notizia dell’accordo con gli Usa per dazi al 15% dal 25% previsto, ha spinto il Nikkei che ha chiuso a +3,51%, a 41.171,32 punti, 1.396,40 punti in più rispetto alla precedente chiusura. L’intesa comprende anche il settore auto, uno dei principali per l’export verso gli Usa.</p><p>Future europei positivi</p><p>Le borse europee si apprestano ad avviare le contrattazioni in rialzo galvanizzate da un lato dai nuovi record dell’indice americano S&P (mentre il Nasdaq ha chiuso in calo in attesa dei conti delle Big Tech) ma soprattutto dall’accordo commerciale, raggiunto nella notte, tra Stati Uniti e Giappone che include tariffe del 15% sulle merci giapponesi in arrivo nel Paese. La notizia ha messo le ali all’indice Nikkei che al momento registra un rialzo del 3,8%.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>Gli investitori sperano che sia preludio di una intesa anche sul fronte europeo dove, nonostante le diplomazie siano al lavoro da tempo, non si registrano al momento significativi passi avanti sul raggiungimento di un accordo in vista della scadenza del primo agosto. Così i future dell’Euro Stoxx viaggiano in rialzo dell’1,14%, Milano dell’1,75%, Parigi e Francoforte rispettivamente dell’1%. A livello macro, giornata scarica di dati, mentre l’attenzione si focalizzerà sul meeting della Bce di domani e la consueta conferenza stampa della presidente Christine Lagarde. Non si attendono variazioni sul taglio dei tassi che dovrebbe avvenire invece a settembre.</p><p>A Piazza Affari sotto i riflettori ancora una volta i titoli bancari; in particolare Unicredit dopo la decisione di ritirare l’Ops su Banco Bpm e la diffusione dei conti del primo semestre che hanno visto un utile record a 6,1 miliardi, sopra le stime degli analisti.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>STRUMENTI</p><p>Calcola il tuo preventivo online per l’assicurazione della tua auto, moto e motociclo</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>1 anno di abbonamento al Sole a 49€!Accesso illimitato al sito de Il Sole 24 Ore</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>Sul valutario, l’euro è stabile a 1,1732 dollari (alla vigilia 1,1734), la moneta unica si rafforza sullo yen a 172,56 yen (171,88), mentre il cross dollaro/yen è a 147,08 (146,48). In leggero rialzo il petrolio, con il Wti a 65,42 dollari al barile (+0,17%) e il Brent a 68,68 dollari (+0,15%). Sale anche il gas naturale scambiato ad Amsterdam a 44,42 euro al megawattora (+0,94%).</p><p><p></p></p> Tokyo chiude +3,5% dopo l’accordo sui dazi Usa-Giappone. Future europei positivi - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 3653	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 13:22:00 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215575	有图 <p>Servizio<p>ServizioContenuto basato su fatti, osservati e verificati dal reporter in modo diretto o riportati da fonti verificate e attendibili.Scopri di più</p>Commercio</p>Dazi, accordo Stati Uniti-Giappone: tariffe al 15% e Tokyo investirà 550 miliardi negli UsaDestinate ad aumentare le importazioni di riso americano. Nikkei in forte rialzo. Secondo la stampa nipponica il premier Ishiba si dimetterà a breve<p>di Marco Masciaga</p><p><time>23 luglio 2025</time></p><p><img src="https://i2.res.24o.it/images2010/S24/Documenti/2025/07/24/Immagini/Ritagli/2025-07-23T025612Z_735354233_RC21SFA27VXX_RTRMADP_5_USA-TRUMP-TARIFFS-JAPAN-U67706543685vXd-1440x752@IlSole24Ore-Web.JPG?r=650x341" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p>L’edizione straordinaria dello Yomiuri Shimbun con la notizia dell’accordo commerciale tra Stati Uniti e Giappone<p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p>I punti chiaveIl nodo del risoIshiba verso le dimissioni</p><p><p>Ascolta la versione audio dell"articolo</p><p><p>2" di lettura</p>English Version<p><p>Translated by AI.</p><p>For feedback, please contact english@ilsole24ore.com</p></p><p></p><p>Dal nostro corrispondente</p><p>NEW DELHI - Dopo mesi di intensi negoziati, Stati Uniti e Giappone hanno siglato nella notte un accordo commerciale che taglia drasticamente dal 25 al 15% le tariffe volute dal presidente americano Donald Trump contro il proprio principale alleato asiatic0. Nell’accordo è incluso anche il settore dell’automotive, che da solo vale un quarto dell’export nipponico verso gli Usa ed uno dei principali driver del suplus commerciale giapponese verso gli Stati Uniti.</p><p>Loading...</p><p>In cambio, Tokyo ha annunciato che finanzierà investimenti negli Stati Uniti fino a un massimo 550 miliardi di dollari. Illustrando i contenuti dell’accordo, il primo ministro giapponese Shigeru Ishiba ha spiegato che «il pacchetto include prestiti e garanzie da parte di istituzioni affiliate al nostro governo per consentire alle aziende giapponesi di costruire catene di approvvigionamento resilienti in settori chiave come i prodotti farmaceutici e i semiconduttori».</p><p>Il nodo del riso</p><p>In cambio della riduzione dei dazi applicati al settore auto e minacciati sul tutto il resto dell’export giapponese, ci sarà un aumento delle importazioni di prodotti agricoli americani. Tokyo importerà più riso dagli Stati Uniti, ma all’interno della quota esente da dazi già esistente, ha dichiarato mercoledì Ishiba.</p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>ABBONAMENTO</p><p>2 mesi di prova a 1,00 €</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p><img src="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/static/images/placeholders/art/258x258.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p><p>Novità</p><p>Nasce Radio24-IlSole24OreTV. Guardala sul canale 246 o al link sotto</p><p>Scopri di più</p></p><p>In base alle regole stabilite nel 1995 in sede Wto, il Giappone importa circa 770mila tonnellate di riso ogni anno senza dazi doganali. Nell’ultimo anno fiscale, gli Stati Uniti hanno rappresentato il 45% del totale.</p><p><p></p></p> Dazi, accordo Stati Uniti-Giappone: tariffe al 15% e Tokyo investirà 550 miliardi negli Usa - Il Sole 24 ORE	查看 3208	24小时太阳报	2025-07-23 13:07:00 2025-07-23 14:43:27	word
3215574	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>Miles sits down with Tory Bruno, chief executive officer of United Launch Alliance, an organization dedicated to pioneering technologies that support humanitarian, national security, and commercial space-based initiatives. They discuss the importance of strategic space policy and security under the ever-evolving United States–China strategic competition dynamic; where the US stands in relation to Chinese satellite technology, development, and infrastructure; and what strategies the US and its allies should prioritize to counter China’s efforts to dominate the space domain.</p><p>China Insideris a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute’s China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow,Dr. Miles Yu,who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.</p><p>Episode Transcript</p><p>This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the Hudson Institute’s China Center. I am Miles Yu, Senior Fellow and Director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threats, and their implications to the US and beyond.</p><p>Welcome to China Insider Interviews, a podcast from the Hudson Institute’s China Center. I’m Miles Yu, Senior Fellow and Director of the China Center. In this segment of China Insider Interviews, I’m thrilled to welcome Tory Bruno, President and CEO of United Launch Alliance (ULA) to discuss the importance of space policy and security under the ever-evolving umbrella of US-China strategic competition. For our listeners, ULA is a premier space launch company focused on heavy class payloads and the most exotic orbits and [is] a mainstay of US national security establishment working to expand the commercialization of space. Let me introduce our guest of honor today.</p><p>Over the course of a 40-year career, Tory has developed and fielded dozens of advanced aerospace systems. He’s a rocket scientist with expertise in space rocketry, hypersonics, and the director energy capacities, holding multiple related patents. He also has considerable expertise in nuclear deterrence, missile defense and space launch programs. Tory is an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Honorary fellow, a member of the DOD Defense Innovation Board Space Advisory Committee, and the National Academy of Engineering, as well as serving as a member of the National Space Council Users Advisory Group. Tory is also an awardee of the Van Brown Trophy, a holder of the van Karman Medal, and a member of the space and satellites professionals and the San Diego Air and Space Museum International Halls of Fame. Tory, it’s a pleasure to have you on Insider Interviews and thank you for being here with us today.</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Oh, Miles, it’s my pleasure.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Let me - just for the benefit of our listeners - could you tell [us] a little bit about your company, United Launch Alliance, about its history and its mission?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Yeah, I’d love to. So, ULA was formed back in 2006 primarily to support the United States government, both national security and NASA. At that time, there was sort of an emerging potential crisis in space where the national security assets that were on orbit were well past their design life. The replacements were really next generation technology, which was really, really cool, but also, they were technically challenged and really late and it was expected there would be gaps in coverage places without GPS, whether forecasting really degraded that kind of thing. ULA was stood up, to go support that need with the mission of failure [being] much less often that is traditional in the launch industry, because these assets are precious. And I know we told you, the government told you, what we were going to fly when, but hey, if something is late and something else is on time or early, whatever shows up to the launchpad, you get it to space. So that was sort of our background for probably about 10 years, ULA was the only domestic provider and that was the mission. Then the industry grew up a little bit, competition was possible and new people joined in. I came about that time to ULA to help move it from that sole source environment to one that still supported all those very exotic government missions, but in a competitive environment and moving technology in ahead to try and meet these new challenges the country is facing right now.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Great. So, the title of the company has the word “alliance” in it. “Alliance” implies [that] there’s members. So, what are the core members of this alliance?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Right. ULA is owned by Boeing and Lockheed in a 50-50 share, and when the company was originally set up, it was part of a consolidation in order to make it more efficient. So, all of the people who worked on the Delta launch vehicle program at Boeing quit working for Boeing and were rehired by the new company ULA. The same thing happened over at Lockheed Martin, where all of the Atlas team resigned from Lockheed were rehired into ULA, the company inherited both of those rockets and started flying them. Today of course we have retired the Delta Rocket, we’re still flying out Atlas 13 to go, and we have developed a brand new rocket called Vulcan that takes on the job of both and replaces the Atlas’s venerable Russian RD-180 rocket engine that powered its first stage and was sort of a key element of international policy at a time. We didn’t want the Russian rocket scientists wandering off to North Korea, Iran looking for employment, but those days have passed. They really went away with the initial invasion of Crimea, and so we moved off of that platform as well.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>That’s great. So, it’s often been said that one unique feature of the American system is that government and the private enterprises are separate, and in this case it’s a very good example of this kind of joint effort by a private company such as yours and the government mission. When we say “space program,” most countries are basically government run [in that] it’s a national space program. In this sense, I think there is this private entrepreneurship and private expertise, and you have a unique model of operation that space stresses on efficiency and innovation. Obviously today when we hear about this kind of government-private space cooperation, people talk about the SpaceX that’s under Elon Musk, but obviously ULA also occupies a very unique portion of that. How do you compare your company and SpaceX for example?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Yeah, that’s a great question and your lead into that is so true. That is the great power of our system, that we are able to have these private companies with their innovation and entrepreneurship work in partnership with the government to support their needs. We are of course SpaceX’s primary competitor in this heavy lift marketplace. We both support the United States government and NASA. SpaceX has opened the market up into this so-called low latency, high speed internet in low earth orbit with their Starlink constellation and we are now populating its primary competitor, Amazon’s Kuiper. So, that’s really splitting that marketplace and providing competition which drives investment and innovation. In terms of the respective places you occupy, because you never want, even in a competitive environment, sort of two carbon copy services that are not differentiated in any way because when you have that, it’s not the most healthy market environment.</p><p>You end up just two companies that copy everything each other does. They drive costs down, which feels good at first, but over time they stop investing in technology, and then eventually you have this race to the bottom and you end up with less choices or less capabilities for the government. That’s not what we have here. This is a very healthy environment. SpaceX specializes in rockets that are optimized to deliver their payloads at low earth orbit (LEO), as is the other new players in our marketplace. Blue Origin with its New Glenn that is just about to start servicing customers and even Aireon in Europe. So, the spacecraft itself might go beyond LEO, but the rocket is done in LEO, and that dictates a certain design and architecture of the rocket. We, on the other hand, specialize in these exotic, primarily government orbits, and so our new rocket Vulcan is really designed with that in mind.</p><p>So we stage, for example, the first stage, we burn that out at a much, much higher altitude and velocity all the way into space so that our upper stage is dropped off still full of propellant so that it can fly beyond LEO all the way out to say a direct injection into a geosynchronous orbit. We’re 12 hours later instead of half an hour later, we then drop off that spacecraft. And so, we both have overlap in both spaces, but we’re kind of optimized in one place or another, which is kind of the healthiest form of competition.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>That’s an excellent, excellent explanation. And from what I’ve known, it is the space assets we have at a much higher altitude that really form the crown jewel of the US defense system. So Tory, let me ask you another question. What are some of the key programs or technologies ULA is currently working on that contributes to US national security and the resilience in the space domain? Now of course, this is only relevant to the area of knowledge that you could share in public.</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Yes, of course. Yeah, we’ll keep this all very unclassified because I don’t look all that great in orange, so we’ll restrict our comments there. The things that we are able to do and really sort of invest capabilities in at ULA involve orbits that obfuscate what the payload is and that destination is to make the job of an adversary, say China for example, who are fielding in space anti-satellite weapons that much more difficult. And we’re doing a lot of investment right now in both extending the endurance of this very powerful, very fast high energy upper stage so that it can maneuver through space much more robustly after it’s been deployed and potentially even do missions that aren’t done today like relocation of satellites or the servicing of satellites and god forbid, interfering with attacks and space as they’re developing. So, that’s been a major thrust for us.</p><p>At the same time, we are developing reusability technologies in order to help facilitate an even higher launch rate. Those also help with the expense of the launch system, but really you also see an immediate impact on your ability to turn vehicles. Now, our kind of reusability is different than flying boosters back like SpaceX does, because of the architecture of the rocket flying twice as high, three times as fast, ten times as down range, means you can’t really save propellant and fly home with it. You have to use a different technique like dropping off engines and recovering them, that sort of thing. And even that is a very unique set of technologies that wasn’t possible 10 years ago but is now.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>That’s a very good answer, thank you very much once again. Now in our earlier conversation we talk about [how] you also would like to commercialize your space program. When you say commercialization, that probably means a lot of LEO and geo-synchronization assets like what SpaceX is doing. My sense is that since you do the heavy payloads and the extremely high altitude launches, would you say that your customer in a commercial sense it would be the government?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>No, actually, in this case our LEO commercialization is in fact Amazon. And what we’ve had to do is do some clever systems engineering to make that high energy orbit injection rocket competitive down in that marketplace. One of the, sort of, rules when you develop a launch vehicle is you pick your orbit you want to be most efficient at, you can do others, but you’re most efficient at that one, design it around it and then you’re stuck with it. You have the rocket you built; satellites get bigger, smaller, they go higher and lower, but there you are. And so, we cheat that rule a little bit. We have a basic liquid-fueled rocket like everybody else has, but then we can add to it solid rocket motors literally bolted on zero, two, four, six. We also have different versions of the upper stage and what that does is it really flattens out levels out in a way the performance curve over the orbits.</p><p>So, when you look at a LEO optimized rocket at a purely O rocket, it does a great job at low earth orbit in terms of not just its affordability, but its mass. It can deliver there, but then as you go to these higher orbits, it falls off pretty abruptly. And then, the high energy orbit rocket would do the opposite. But by using this technique, it’s as if we have four different first stages and two different upper stages, and what it does is it flattens it all out so that we can reach down into that LEO orbit space and do a good job for Amazon on their Kuiper systems as well. But, having said that, again, the beauty of this type of capital marketplace is that you’re always in competition, so you have to keep investing in your technology and improving your product and making it more versatile, which now that we’re flying Vulcan we’ll continue to do</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>So. From what you just said, I assume that Amazon is a part of your alliance as well?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Amazon is our primary commercial customer.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Oh, I see. Okay. Yeah, I got it. Now, let me switch the gear a little bit to a different direction. Now we all know that US-China [relations] now is locked in what the United States calls “strategic competition.” China has a different term for that, and in China’s case it’s a life and death struggle. That’smuch more serious. Now, I remember that in 2019 in the spirit of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the moon landing by the United States, IPSOS and the CSPAN conducted a joint public opinion poll. The question was, “would you still support the United States to resume the moon landing program?”</p><p>The people who were polled responded very lukewarm. Only 11% said yes, and most of them said, this is a waste of money. The same question was asked, but add one proviso, that is, would you just support US government spending money to resume the moon landing if China is trying to get land on the moon, ahead of us. The answer (yes answer) went up to 49% immediately. So, that means the nation is on course with what the national consensus said, [which is] that China is our leading national security threat even particularly in space. Tory, can you outline the current state of US-China’s strategic competition in the space domain, particularly regarding satellite technology and infrastructure. In particular, in your assessment, what are the key advancements China has made in this space capabilities that pose challenges to US interests?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Yeah, you bet. Well, I’ll start with the underlining technologies where the US still has a substantial advantage, but then we’ll turn that over to what you do with them, which is where we have challenges as we face into China. The basic launch vehicle technology, for example in China, is about two generations behind. So, you could think of that manifesting in terms of less energetic and less capable propellants that are being used, and rockets that are less efficient in terms of what we call the inner mass or the mass that is neither fueled nor payload. And so, that means that they can take roughly 25 to 30% less mass to orbit, all things else being the same. And when we look at the spacecraft they lift, they are reflective of that. The other thing I’ll point out on that side of the ledger is what most people look at and are daunted by in terms of its volume, and its extensive nature in China, [such as] launch sites, vehicles, all of that.</p><p>But I look at it a little bit differently. So, when you look at the US’s infrastructure, you see really two heavy class launch providers, two launch sites and maybe 25,000 people working, [or] 30,000 people working in this industry depending on how you count them. When we look over to China, there’s about three dozen rockets, not two or three, and there’s half a dozen launch sites or more, one of them sea based, not two. And they’ve got eight providers depending on how they’re counted. And against our 25 or 30,000 people, they’ve got 200,000 people involved just in the launch industry part. And, on the one hand, like I said, a lot of people see that, and they’re daunted to buy it. So, now I’ll flip around a little bit, and I’ll say yes, it is pretty extensive, but by the same token it’s very, very inefficient.</p><p>And one of the reasons there are so many different types of launch vehicles is because every time there is a new satellite (type of satellite) there is almost always a rocket to go with it, which is very inefficient. And the same is true with all the other infrastructure I described. When I look at that, I see a system that is economically brittle. So, on the one hand, yeah, they’ve got a lot of breadth, but on the other hand, if they head into a prolonged period of economic stress, you can’t afford all of this and there’ll be a retrenchment or a collapsing back. So, that’s all the good news in terms of being in the United States and thinking you’re facing into a peer competition. On the other side of that coin though, is what they are doing with those technologies, which I’ll argue are, like I said, a generation or two back.</p><p>Well, they’re investing antisatellite weaponry and capabilities both in space, antisatellite weapons as well as terrestrial based weapons to reach into the space environment. That’s something the US has really not invested in for decades, never really had any substantial way to begin with, and they’re far, far ahead of us there, and they’re putting us in a position of disadvantage. That’s significant because the US no longer looks at space as something that is an enabler of sort of a force multiplier, making our troops more effective. The way it is today, we are completely dependent on space. We really cannot conduct basic military operations in the absence of space, and what that gives us for communications, situational awareness and so on. And China knows that. And so, they are investing so that if a terrestrial conflict were to be contemplated, it would open in space now. They’d attack first in space to level that playing field to be able to have the confidence to take on the United States Navy and other forces here on earth. So, that puts us in a difficult position because we’re not deterring them in nearly as robust a way. We have to catch up and we have to catch up pretty fast.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>You are absolutely right. I remember this, China is not just a few years ahead of us. 18 years ago in 2007, China launched the long march rocket and shut down one of its old satellites in high altitude, and that is a weaponization of space. And I think that, in the space industry, that probably is one of the Sputnik moments at the time. But it [took] us many, many more years to actually realize the severity of the competition, and you’re absolutely right on that. Now, could I ask you about the US national security space strategy that emphasizes resilience in space with three specific objectives: strengthening safety, stability and security in space and maintaining an enhanced existing strategic advantages in the space domain? What did you think about that?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Well, I think those are the right objectives, but the resiliency strategy itself, the thing to acquire resiliency is really only half of a strategy. Because when the government says, “Hey, I want a resilient space architecture,” what they’re really saying is “I want to have assets and space that can be attacked and take some amount of damage and continue performing their mission more or less, albeit perhaps degraded, but still fighting through it.” In other words, we’re going to fight through being attacked. And that’s a good strategy and it’s absolutely required, but it’s only half of it. The other half is you need to make them stop shooting at you at some point, because you’re never going to build more targets than there are bullets. And if you allow the attack to just progress unchecked, eventually they are going to degrade your space capability and take it away from you. Now, under the current administration, that prohibition against what we would call counterforce capabilities in space has been lifted, so that we would be also able to defend ourselves in space, not just have vast distributed networks trying to be able to take this degradation for a while, and now we have to catch up. We’ve got to go fast because we’re not going to get through this challenge, and we’re not going to deter China with half a strategy. We need the whole thing.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>You’re right. And [it has been] a long time in my memory, that we finally have a president who understands the importance of space. It was under Trump’s first administration [that] he created a new military service branch called the Space Force. So that’s all there. Lemme just ask you another question about space, which is very interesting because about 15 years ago I was writing a column for a newspaper here in DC and at the time the column was mostly about canvassing with Chinese open-source material. And I read about what’s going on on the other side of the Pacific, and one of the most discussed topics was China’s ambition, in open discussion, about creating a monopoly of the space station. Because the calculation was that the International Space Station operated by Russia is scheduled to come down in 2020. So, this is 15 years ago, China was talking about this. And ever since, they have launched the Tiangong (天宫) and several other spacecraft, in the hope that the ISS will come down and China will become the only space station operator. Obviously, is there any such plan for the US to sort of build its own space station in replacement of the aging ISS?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Well, not yet. And there’s an awful lot of voices right now under this administration saying that would be a really bad situation for China to have a human presence in LEO, and for the US and the West at large not to have that at all. So, there’s more than a little bit of scrambling. And it’s also worth appreciating that it is not only the moral value of showing technological prowess in space by doing this much like the first Cold War, but it is also practical in terms of military application. China does not only conduct peaceful science experiments in their space station, but they also fabricate exotic materials that can only be made in microgravity. And some of these materials have important applications. As we lean forward into this deterrent environment, we need to be doing the same thing. We should not de-orbit our International Space Station until there is another space station already in orbit. There should be zero gap, and it may be more than one space station so that we can both continue to do peaceful scientific research as well as fabricate exotic materials both for commercial applications and potentially military applications as well.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Yes. Now I think the key part of the International Space Station is that it’s international, so China doesn’t go that route at all. China wants to monopolize or run it by its own government. So, I noticed that in recent years space programs of different countries are also coming up quite robustly. You talk about India, talk about Japan, even South Korea, and of course the European Union has its own space program. So, well, is there any prospect of the United States leading the way to create a coalition of willing in space programs to create a new, much more updated, a much larger International Space Station part two?</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Absolutely, and I think that is fundamental to what we ought to be doing in the future. Again, one of the great advantages we have had over the decades is being a catalyst and a leader to bring the Western community together, and now the many allies we have in Asia into a coalition to do these great things like the research that happens in space on the International Space Station, as well as alliances that help keep the peace. The objective of all of these alliances is not to go fight a war and win it, it’s to make war unthinkable and to have peace. And that’s how we do it, by building that community, collaborating together in space, collaborating together here terrestrially, hundred percent agree with that, Miles. That’s the way to go,</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Great. Speaking of time, we are coming to the end very quickly. Let me ask you one more question, which is something you mentioned just now - war. Obviously the most imminent hotspot is over Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea with regard to Taiwan and a potential Chinese invasion. A topic that frequently comes up in space policy debates is the advanced warning capabilities, just how much the US and regional allies can help Taiwan to extend their current warning window. And I know there is some kind of a line-based radar, that kind of stuff, but ultimately early warning probably can best come from space.</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Yes. The best early warnings come from space because it is regional, if not global in nature. And honestly, I look at space as the padlock on that door that prevents the invasion of Taiwan by China, because they will not contemplate that unless they have the confidence to overcome our naval forces in the region, which they would gain by taking space away from us and blinding us in the way that we just talked about being so advantageous. So, on the one hand space might be thought of as an asymmetric threat from China, but on the other hand, it’s the one thing we can make robust and protect that will stop them from contemplating that action.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Tory Bruno, President and CEO of United Launch Alliance, it’s a pleasure to discuss with you on this very important matter of national security, and to that matter, national survival. Thank you very much and looking forward to further engagement with your company.</p><p>Tory Bruno:</p><p>Yeah, me too. This was a great conversation. Thank you very much, Miles, thoroughly enjoyed it.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>You’re welcome.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Technology Defense Strategy </p> China Insider Interview \| Tory Bruno, CEO of United Launch Alliance \| Hudson Institute	查看 29663	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215573	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>This week, U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins announced a nationwide ban on farmland sales to Chinese nationals and other foreign adversaries. At the same joint press conference, Defense Sec. Hegseth added that the Department of Defense would also work specifically to restrict the sale of other properties near American military bases.</p><p>As a former Army intelligence captain, this week’s announcement doesn’t just bring welcome news—it delivers a sigh of relief. After four years of weakness under the Biden administration, we finally have a commander-in-chief who isn’t afraid to confront the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) dangerous moves on American soil.</p><p>In recent years, Chinese nationals expanded their ownership of U.S. land to 265,000 acres. Even worse, Chinese entities have strategically purchased properties near 19 key military installations, including Fort Bragg and Fort Hood. They’ve also bought control of key industries vital to our food supply lines. In fact, China now controls the import of 70% of crop protection products that our farmers rely on to grow their crops. You don’t need to be an intelligence expert to see the inherent national security vulnerability that arises if we surrender key American industries to Chinese-backed companies.</p><p>Fortunately, several states like Georgia, Florida, and Texas have already stepped up to ban foreign land purchases, especially near military bases within their states. Now, the Trump administration is taking the fight nationally. Officials are cracking down on acquisitions across the country and taking the decisive steps needed to protect both our military infrastructure and American food security.</p><p>These concerns aren’t just hypothetical—they’re playing out in alarming ways.</p><p>Take, for example, the CEO of TP-Link, a Chinese state-sponsored networking company currently under intense federal scrutiny. Jianjun Zhao, a Chinese national, acquired at least two significant agricultural land parcels in California’s Silicon Valley and neighboring Monterey County. This is the same company whose Wi-Fi routers were the subject of a congressional hearing earlier this year, during which a member of Congress warned America not to use their routers and exposed how Chinese state-backed hackers use devices like TP-Link’s to pre‑position for potential cyberattacks on America’s critical infrastructure—our power grids, water systems, telecommunications networks, and more.</p><p>Today, TP-Link controls a staggering 65% of the U.S. home and small-business router market, allegedly achieved through predatory pricing. Now, with Zhao’s land purchases, we may be witnessing a troubling pattern: strategic acquisitions by Chinese nationals tied to entities under intense national security scrutiny, in regions of high infrastructure and economic sensitivity. This is exactly the type of threat the Trump administration’s new policies are designed to address—before it’s too late.</p><p>Make no mistake. President Trump isn’t just taking action against foreign ownership in the agriculture industry. He’s also addressing threats posed by TP-Link head on. Not only has the Trump administration launched a criminal antitrust investigation against TP-Link for alleged predatory pricing enabling it to dominate the US Wi-Fi market, but the administration is also considering banning TP-Link sales in the United States altogether as early as this calendar year as reported by The Wall Street Journal — a critically important step toward improving our national security posture.</p><p>Thankfully, Trump saw threats like this coming and made sure America was ready. During his first term, he had the foresight to establish the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Authorities—a powerful mechanism designed to swiftly root out national security threats – such as those allegedly posed by TP-Link—from America’s internet and communications networks. Today, that bold move is paying dividends.</p><p>Of course, there will be many who still do not see the importance of taking action against Chinese threats. Others have recently adopted the bizarre claim that banning foreign ownership of key industries somehow "weaponizes racism." But no enemy of the United States—whether China or otherwise—has the right to own vast parcels of real estate or control key industriesthat threaten the security of the United States. Yesterday’s press conference sent the message loud and clear to our enemies abroad that the days of American complacency are over.</p><p>Make no mistake, the CCP threat remains high. Their spies are persistent, their hackers sophisticated, and their land purchases calculated. That"s why we must continue investing in counterintelligence, bolstering our cybersecurity, and blocking foreign ownership of strategic assets. President Trump"s leadership and decisiveness is breathing new life into a long-running push by the national security community to counter this threat from the CCP. We must demand vigilance, support policies that prioritize our security, and reject the complacency of the past. The Chinese threat is real and with new leadership in the White House, we"re finally fighting back.</p><p>Read in Fox News.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Foreign Policy National Security and Defense </p> Trump Is Taking the Fight to the CCP. It’s Long past Time We Protected Our Bases and Critical Infrastructure \| Hudson Institute	查看 8088	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215572	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>The rumors that China’s Xi Jinping has been ousted, or is on the verge of losing power, have drawn the attention of China watchers around the world. His downfall has been proclaimed prematurely many times, so some skepticism is in order. Inter-party politics in Communist countries are often, as Winston Churchill once described the Soviet Union, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."</p><p>Whether or not that skepticism is correct, the rumored coup brings attention to one of the most important questions facing this nation: Is the source of America’s problem with China a deep-seated one that transcends individual personalities, or is it all the fault of this one man?</p><p>Many believe he is personally responsible for the friction between Washington and Beijing. From their perspective, the Sino-American relationship has often been a rocky one. But they believe that a brighter future was still visible before Xi. They point out that China’s internal crackdowns, its most threatening military behavior, and its most overt attempts to challenge America’s global position are his signature policies.</p><p>Another camp believes America’s main problem is that the Chinese Communist Party is, well, Communist. They point out that the party has kept a firm hold of its economy and society, which is textbook Leninism. Xi reminds his fellow members they "must uphold the guiding role of Marxism" and claims "writing Marxism onto the flag of the Chinese Communist Party was totally correct."</p><p>There are many kinds of Marxists, from America’s pencil-necked campus radicals to Beijing’s organ-harvesting commissars, but they share a fear and loathing of capitalism. They believe that capitalists are inevitable and implacable foes of worldwide socialism, so they strive to undermine countries like the United States.</p><p>Only extreme threats to national security, such as the Soviet threat to Mao’s China, can push this campaign to the back burner. Indeed, Churchill posited "perhaps there is a key" to understanding Soviet behavior. "That key is Russian national interest." He believed the alliance between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia could not last long because of their conflicting national interests, and he was right. Today, Beijing’s interest in supplanting America’s global leadership fuels the confrontation.</p><p>This is why the China watchers who focus on ideology think Xi is an expression of a larger problem. They note that many programs threatening the United States, such as the military modernization drive, long predate him. He is certainly more brash than his predecessors were, but he mostly throws resources and publicity into initiatives that he inherited.</p><p>These two camps strongly disagree about the possibilities for the Sino-American relationship after Xi. The Xi-centric group believes that after he exits the scene, China could turn away from his aggressive approach toward a kinder, gentler past. The ideology watchers think that, as long as Marxists remain in charge of Beijing, the two superpowers will duke it out for global preeminence. Both acknowledge that a wildcard, such as the emergence of a Chinese Gorbachev, could lead to a more peaceful outcome.</p><p>But the conditions in China are not right for a second Mikhail Gorbachev to emerge. In the middle of the 1980s, the Soviet Politburo could see its massive rust belt was nearing collapse and its empire was falling behind the United States, which, under Ronald Reagan, had survived the oil shocks and was mastering new information technology. Only a gamble on reform could even the odds. Gorbachev strove to revitalize Soviet Communism and accidentally destroyed it.</p><p>An earlier Soviet reformer who felt less need to stay on defense became a menace to global security. Nikita Khrushchev emerged triumphant from the bloody melee to succeed Joseph Stalin, determined to catch up with the United States. He knew his empire was behind, but as he warned the West, "history is on our side. We will bury you!" He instigated a major confrontation over Berlin and, during the subsequent Cuban missile crisis, nearly started a global nuclear war. He saw no contradiction between attempting to put his own house in order and trying to burn down America’s.</p><p>Xi does not appear on the defense right now. The Israeli-American bombing campaign in Iran dealt a heavy blow to the Beijing-led axis of authoritarians, but China is reportedly restocking Tehran’s missile arsenal. (It officially denies the story.) Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told a senior European official that his country, which is officially neutral about Ukraine, would not allow Russia to fail, since that failure would allow Washington to focus on Beijing. Far from backing down, Xi is leaning in.</p><p>China is a powerful country with millions of talented people, and it would prefer to shape the global environment to suit its preferences. America’s interests and values are different though. That contradiction will long outlast Xi, and so will the resulting competition.</p><p>Read in the Washington Free Beacon.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Foreign Policy </p> Waiting for China’s Gorbachev? Don’t Hold Your Breath. \| Hudson Institute	查看 7902	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215571	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>In this week’s episode of China Insider, Miles Yu discusses the Dalai Lama’s ninetieth birthday, and how his succession may affect the future of Tibetan Buddhism, culture, and identity as the people face aggressive Chinese Communist Party interference. Next, Miles unpacks the extended docking of the Shandong carrier fleet in Hong Kong and highlights the significance of the local celebrations hosted by the CCP government in Hong Kong. Lastly, Miles details the preparations for China’s eightieth anniversary of its victory in World War II, and examines the importance of the monthslong celebrations to bolster CCP legitimacy.</p><p>China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute’s China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow,Dr. Miles Yu,who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.</p><p>Episode Transcript</p><p>This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the Hudson Institute’s China Center. I am Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat, and their implications to the US and beyond.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>It is Tuesday, July 15th, and we have three topics this week. First, we discuss the future of Tibet under Chinese occupation as Tenzin Gyatso (丹增嘉措), the 14th Dalai Lama and spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism turns 90. Second, we unpack the significance behind the PLA Navy carrier, Shandong extended docking from Victoria Harbor in Hong Kong, and we look to unpack the significance behind the fleet’s port at the Stonecutters Island Naval base. Lastly, we discussed the CCP’s preparations for the upcoming 80th anniversary of World War II victory and the significance of the annual celebration to CCP leadership and legitimacy. Miles, great to be with you again this week.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Colin. So glad to be with you again this week.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Well, first up this week, the Dalai Lama turned 90 earlier this month and was celebrated by thousands of followers in a week-long event in Dharamsala and Kathmandu in attendance were the democratically elected Tibetan government in exile, as well as several global celebrities and cultural icons. Several state dignitaries such as Indian Prime Minister Nora Modi and Secretary of State Marco Rubio sent wishes to the Tibetan Buddhist leader. Miles, could you start us off with some of the background to the significance of the Dalai Lama in global politics and how the CCP views his role, particularly in Tibetan culture and state affairs?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Dalai Lama, as you said, is a spiritual leader of Tibetan, but he’s not a politician. However, everything related to religion is political in China. China just treats him nothing but a politician, as a separatist. They use all kinds of slurs against him. Dalai Lama is an extraordinary individual. I mean, he is not just [the] leader of [the] Tibetan people. He’s a global phenomenon because he represents something that’s very ecumenical, very universal and cosmopolitan. His advocacy for nonviolent resistance. His advocacy for human compassions. He’s not just shouting. He’s using his power to morally persuade people, politicians, [and] communists alike. He’s a very humble but powerful monk. For that, he is basically a thorn in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party who really, really harbors nothing but hostility toward religions. For decades and decades, China has extraordinary pressure on Tibet and try to eradicate the inference, even the physical image of Dalai Lama, but they failed miserably. That shows you the power of a spiritual uprightness represented here by Dalai Lama. So, happy birthday.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Happy birthday indeed. While the Dalai Lama said he plans to live to 130 at that, his birthday garnered attention from many about his potential successor. In the past, the Dalai Lama claimed his successor would be born in the free world outside of China and would reincarnate as part of the Tibetan Buddhist teachings. The growing concern, however, is that Beijing will look to appoint the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, noting they would reject anyone chosen without their consent. Miles, while this is obviously a matter of spiritual leadership, what is the Dalai Lama’s role in Tibetan Chinese politics and what exactly is the functional authority of the CCP here to interfere in the succession process?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>You see, religious succession is purely a religious matter based upon the ritual tradition and doctrinal description of that particular religion. Buddhism is no exception. Unlike some other religious leaders like the late Pope Francis, Dalai Lama did not bow to Chinese pressure. He would not yield his power and his legitimate power to reincarnate his successor. That’s basically according to Buddhist teaching. It’s the core of a Buddhist teaching and at least the Tibetan version of Buddhism. That’s why Dalai Lama insisted that he and he alone should have the power to reincarnate [and] designate his successor according to Buddhist teachings. The Chinese Communist Party basically is [a] communist party. We have to understand Chinese communism is communism. All communist teachings basically believe that all organized religions such as Buddhism, Catholicism, Judaism, they are the opiate of the people, they are poisons. That’s why I think Dalai Lama right now has made it very clear he’s not going to bow to the Chinese Communist Party’s attempt to eradicate his inference and his legitimacy to designate his successor. That’s very good for the longevity of the Tibetan Buddhism. Dalai Lama did so with great dignity.</p><p>Colin, I grew up in the province right next to Tibet in China, Sichuan province. When I was growing up, from time to time we have visitors from Tibet. The Tibetan people, they’re very culturally, linguistically, and even psychologically, I would say, distinctive from the Han Chinese of which I’m a member. They all treat adversity [and] discrimination with smiling face[s] and with dignity. Dignity and psychological mental ease to deal with adversity and hostility is a hallmark of the power, [the] spiritual power of the Dalai Lama. The amazing thing is the Chinese Communist Party has practiced all kind of draconian measures in Tibet trying to eradicate any reference and inference to Dalai Lama, and they have failed miserably. You will always say Chinese communist indoctrination is powerful and totalitarian. That’s true, but it did not work and has not worked in Tibet.</p><p>This is really interesting because [of] this irony of history. You look at what’s going on inside China, the draconian, really brutal methods of repression in places like Xinjiang and Mongolia, even inner Mongolia, almost all of them, the methods tactics have been first invented and practiced by the CCP in Tibet. You look at Xinjiang’s concentration camps [and] the systematic indoctrination of the Uyghurs. They started the in Tibet. That’s why we should have a shout out to the people of Tibet and particularly to the Dalai Lama, for their resilience, for their really, really unbridled thirst for liberty and freedom. That’s why it is very important to celebrate the birth of Dalai Lama. It’s not just to personal glory is to the spirit of resistance to oppression and repression. I think Dalai Lama is an amazing individual, and I’m a big fan of his.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Absolutely. Like you mentioned, the Dalai Lama and the democratically elected Tibetan government in exile were forced out in 1949, 1950 by Chinese troops and have since spent more than seven decades in exile sustaining the Tibetan culture and identity all during that time. While it doesn’t seem like the current Tibetan struggle for autonomy and opposition of China’s control of Tibetan will change course anytime soon, Miles, what exactly does the future hold here for Tibetans?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Yeah, just a little bit of correction. The Chinese communist troops occupied Tibet pretty much in the winter of 1949 and 1950. For about another 10 years or so, they continued to occupy Tibet. In 1959, Tibetans rebelled against Chinese occupation. They failed and they made a brutal suppression. Dalai Lama led a small fraction of his people and fled to India for safety, and that’s where they stay in Dharamsala, in thefoothillsof Tibet on the Indian side, and the Indian government [was] kindly enough to provide Dalai Lama a sanctuary space, a safe haven for its government in exile since 1959. That’s the reason why China-India [relations] started to become very, very tense because China does not like Indian government’s measure [and] movement to provide help and protection to Dalai Lama.</p><p>You asked about the future of Tibet. I think Dalai Lama is advocating for something called the “middle way”. In other words, he’s not going to advocate for outright independence from Chinese government control. He is advocating for genuine Tibetan autonomy as promised by [the] Chinese government in the 1950s. Tibetan is officially called “Tibetan areas” or called by the Chinese government as [the] “Tibetan autonomous region”. That’s just fake because there’s no real autonomy. Tibet is in the firm grips of the Chinese Communist Party. There’s no independence at all. That’s why Dalai Lama’s advocacy for genuine autonomy poses such a threat to the Chinese government’s narrative because the regime rules China, Tibet, and other regions through lies and falsities. This is one of the very good examples. That’s why Dalai Lama is a very smart guy. He knows how to poke the bubble of the Chinese mendacity.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Turning to our next topic this week, the PLA Navy Shandong carrier fleet made port in Victoria Harbor for an extended five day docking at the Stonecutters Island Naval Base in Hong Kong. During the fleet stay reports indicate roughly 30,000 people visited the naval vessels. The stay concluded, I should say, with a farewell ceremony organized by the Chinese government in Hong Kong, including an appreciation event, photo session, and with locals and student representatives gathering to thank them for their support. Miles, what can we make of this informal fleet week, if you will, for the PLA navy in Hong Kong? And why the pomp and circumstance?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Well, the pomp and circumstance are very typical of the communist pageantry. They do have this habit of presenting something that’s really pompous and very important because they’re good at this is propaganda basically mostly for the consumption of the domestic audience. To be honest with you, I believe this is in response to the large-scale US Filipino naval exercise in the South China Sea. As you can see, there will be very strong and big, I mean even huge, joint exercises in South China Sea among the naval forces of the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. This is very important. China had to respond to this to show itsintransigencyand its defiance. It is a carefully choreographed demonstration of China’s political will. Of course, the flotilla that docked in Hong Kong harbor for a week also [was] led by the Chinese second carrier, the Shandong. The Shandong is a very, very peculiar vessel. It’s basically, mostly a training vessel for the Chinese nascent carrier fleet. It’s not really that [a] big deal, but China makes [it] a huge deal as if China’s carrier capabilities is on par with that of the United States, which is basically the false.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Yeah, I’m glad you brought that up because along with the joint training exercises, we spoke a few weeks ago on the show about the Shandong fleet operations sailing beyond the first island chain in the Indo-Pacific alongside the Liaoning carrier. While both of those have been pivotal to the CCP’s Indo-Pacific maritime strategy and gray zone operations against several Indo-Pacific nations, the Shandong has seemingly become more of the public facing flagship for the PLA and [the] CCP to generate domestic calls for Chinese military nationalism. So, Miles, what is the significance of the Shandong carrier to the PLA Navy and what role does it primarily serve in China’s maritime operations right now?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Well, [the] Shandong Carrier is built as the first Chinese domestically built carrier. That is not entirely true because the first carrier, of course, was a Soviet design and half-finishedVaryagand China called it Liaoning. That was refitted by the Chinese Navy. Basically, Shandong is pretty much the same design. It is a mid-size carrier. It’s designed with a ski jump. The reason why there’s a ski jump [is] because they have limited take of power, lifting power. That’s why you need the ski jump. The aircraft is used basically as a J-15. That is a very heavy aircraft for a ship borne operation. That means several things. Number one, it has a very limited takeoff weight, particularly the payload because it’s so big. Another thing is it’s small and it does not have a sustainable proportion power, which is conventional. The Chinese carriers arenot nuclear [powered]. All US carriers, super carriers, are much bigger than the Chinese [carrier]. All of the 11 US carriers are nuclear-powered, and they can go as long as they want. The Shandong’s operational range is very limited. It burns about 20,000 tons of fuel every five, six days, and it really does not have a long-distance fuel and provision operational capability. That’s why its utility as a fighting vessel is very limited in comparison to the US carrier capability. It’s basically used by the Chinese Navy as a training ship for the future of development. But the Chinese, of course, like all communist regimes, make this such as if it’s a huge deal. It’s not a bad ship, but overall, in comparison to the United States, it’s at least 20 years behind.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>I think that’s important context to keep in mind, especially for the order of battle and as you introduce conversations of naval capacities between the US and China. But turning to the domestic portion of that event, Chinese media coverage of it framed the visit to Hong Kong as a means to allow residents to witness the PLA Navy’s enhanced maritime defense capabilities and its commitment to safeguarding the nation to instill a greater sense of security among the people. The Shandong is a symbol of the PLA Navy as a powerful deterrent, they claim, to any malign foreign influence. Miles, I’d like to ask clearly there’s an intent on behalf of the CCP here to promote the PLA in Hong Kong, specifically. With attention to this matter, what is the effect of these celebrations on Hong Kong and the people?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>In Hong Kong, basically, the city that has gone as an international hub of open commerce and free flow of information. Hong Kong has been taken over by the Chinese Communist Party and it ruined its status as a free port. To save Hong Kong as an international commerce [hub], the Chinese Communist Party basically sent this thing over there to boost Hong Kong as some city that’s in decline but backed by the powerful central government in Beijing. I don’t think that really works to salvage Hong Kong’s reputation because the more Beijing exerts its power, even simple power over Hong Kong, the less likely Hong Kong will recover from its devastating loss to the Chinese Communist Party rule. That’s why I think it’s counterproductive. However, domestically, of course, it will enhance China’s coerced sense of pride and glory. If the Shandong represents the epitome of Chinese naval power, I think that the Chinese Communist Party leadership probably should think twice.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Sticking with the theme of celebrations and military celebrations. As we turn to our last topic for today, the CCP announced earlier this month that preparations were underway for the 80th anniversary of China’s World War II victory. Celebrations stated include dedicated exhibitions at the National Art Museums around the country, including a kickoff event at the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Full museum title there. Besides the exhibitions, a number of films, television dramas, documentaries and online content are stated to be released over the next month of July to commemorate the occasion. If that wasn’t enough, during the entirety of August to October, there will be a series of stage performances with 40 total productions around Beijing as well as planned military parade on September 3rd in recognition of the end of both the second Sino-Japanese War and World War II. So, Miles, why is the CCP so invested in the month-long commemoration of the victory in World War II?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Because it is super sensitive about the legitimacy and [the] very foundation of the Communist Party rule. You see, the Chinese Communist Party lives in lies and false narratives. There’s no bigger lie than Chinese Communist Party’s claim that it was the leading force of resisting against the Japanese vis-a-vis the Nationalist government led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek (蒋介石). It was absolutely falsehood that the CCP was the mainstay fighting force against Japanese. In order to not embarrass itself so wholly and humiliatingly at the anniversary of the end of World War II, the Chinese Communist Party has audacity to perform the act of leading force during World War II against Japan. Now, let me just put this in perspective. The Chinese Communist Party did not fight the Japanese as the main mission during World War II.</p><p>All you have to remember are two critical dates. One is August 24th, 1939. That was the day the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression pact. Hitler and Stalin suddenly became allies. Following that order, the Chinese Communist Party was really, really happy about that. They actually sent cables and the public editorials celebrating the signing because they now know that the Western democracies were facing the two most powerful enemies that was [the] Nazis and the Soviet Communists. The party in Yan’an under Mao (毛泽东) was really happy about that. As a result, because Germany suddenly became Soviet Union’s friend, guess who is German’s friend by treaty? Japan. Under order from Soviet Union, Japan would no longer become the enemy of the Chinese Communist Party, even though Japan had been with war with China, against [the] Chinese and Nationalist government for two years. That’s why the Chinese Communist Party did not fight against Japan at all.</p><p>Now, another date to remember is April 13th, 1941. That was two months before the Nazi betrayal of the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact by launching the operation Barbarossa against [the] Soviet Union. However, on that day, two months before Nazi betrayal, the Soviet Union and Japan signed a neutrality pact. Since April 13th, 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan are non-combatants. They are not supposed to fight against each other. The Chinese Communist Party throughout the entire war since April 1941 has never fought seriously against [the] Japanese. That’s basically because the Soviet Union did not want the Chinese Communist Party to betray the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact. This is basically the big picture.</p><p>Now, Xi Jinping (习近平) went to Yan’an last week and had this really supreme performance of laying the wreath to commemorate the so-called Hundred Regiment campaign, which was launched by the Chinese Communist Party military against the Japanese. It absolutely faked the statistics. It says it eliminated basically 46,000 Japanese troops in northern China. That is a bold-faced lie. According to Japanese own very detailed casualty accounts, not 46,000 as the Chinese Communist Party said, rather is somewhere around less than 500 Japanese were killed and wounded in that so-called Hundred Regiment campaign. I have the exact number here. The Japanese killed 467, 33 [went] missing, and 251 [was] wounded. So, the total casualty suffered by the Japanese [is] about 751. That was the only serious campaign that the Chinese Communist Party fought against Japanese. The rest of the war, 99% of them, were conducted by non-communist forces led by the Chinese Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-Shek, which is officially recognized by the US government. This is absolutely crazy. Now, throughout the entire war, northern China was officially occupied by the Japanese, but also unofficially occupied by the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party fought really hard against any penetration of the Nationalist government in northern China. If [the] Chinese Communist Party and the Japanese occupied forces in northern China both claim occupying that area, there is only one conclusion, that is, they coexisted, [and] they never fought against each other. That is the big picture.</p><p>Colin, I’m a World War II historian and I wrote a book about this many years ago. This is absolutely, really bizarre for Xi Jinping to continue this falsehood that somehow the Chinese Communist Party was the leader of China’s anti-Japanese forces. This is actually very, very appalling. The curious thing is the KMT (Kuomintang) party in Taiwan right now should have the legitimacy, [and they] should have the glory to represent the Chinese forces against Japanese because its former leader Chiang-Kai Shek organized, I say, 99% of the campaign against the Japanese during the war. The KMT right now is very CCP-friendly right now. That’s a tragedy of history. I think KMT, the hardcore KMT members, should really wake up and claim its rightful place in history on this particular matter. I think for Xi Jinping to stage a really pompous September 3rd parade commemorating the defeat of Japan, the signing of the peace treaty, surrender with the Japanese, is really, really interesting because Xi Jinping doesn’t deserve this at all.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Yeah, I’m really glad you brought all that up because no one’s going to sneak any World War II history by you. I’d like to kind of round out today’s conversation by asking, given the significance of this history for CCP legitimacy, it’s clear why they would invest a great deal into these celebrations if only to maintain a strong nationalist discourse domestically, and particularly as it involves Xi Jinping and his both control over the CCP as the party and domestically among the Chinese citizenry, what is at stake here for both him and the party, and is there anything we should be paying attention to over the next few months as we monitor the celebrations?</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Well, we should keep in mind that the Japanese war cost the life about the 20 to 25 million Chinese people during World War II. However, the Chinese Communist Party is responsible for the lives of about 70 to 75 million people in China in peacetime. So, the real tragedy of China on a much larger scale is the repression and brutal dictatorship of [the] Chinese Communist Party. For China to stage such a pretentious, ostentatious celebration of the end of the war in 1945, we should really have a commemoration for the 70 to 75 million souls perished under [the] Chinese Communist Party. That’s the real history, and we should really keep that in mind.</p><p>Now, there’s also another interesting part of that. I think Xi Jinping’s decision to make this such a big deal is really to catch up with what’s going on in Russia because during World War II Russia suffered most casualties. Close to half of the World War II casualties were Russians and Soviet citizens. [The] Putin regime really cleaned its legitimacy on the glory of the defeat of Nazi Germany and also the sacrifice of Soviet citizens in the war. It is legitimate because Russian did fight [the] Nazis and Russia played [a] critical role in the defeat of [the] Nazi regime. Xi Jinping and Putin, they want to get together to celebrate the same kind of defeat, but Xi Jinping has nothing to claim. That’s why he created a new false narrative, organized the entire propaganda machine inside China to push the lie that somehow the Chinese Communist Party was the leading force against Japan during World War II. Again, that was not true.</p><p>Colin Tessier-Kay:</p><p>Well, that’s our time for this week. Thank you very much to our listeners, and thank you, Miles, for another great drilling conversation this week. Looking forward to speaking with you again next week.</p><p>Miles Yu:</p><p>Alright, see you next week.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Religious Freedom Sanctions </p> China Insider \| Dalai Lama’s 90th Birthday, PLA Navy in Hong Kong, China’s 80th Anniversary of WWII Victory \| Hudson Institute	查看 27705	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215570	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>View PDF</p><p>In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.<sup>1</sup> Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.<sup>2</sup> In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.<sup>3</sup></p><p>Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.<sup>4</sup></p><p>Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.<sup>5</sup> Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence.</p><p>Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. ... In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. ... In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent ... [within] five to 10 years.”<sup>6</sup></p><p>Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.<sup>7</sup> But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,<sup>8</sup> and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.<sup>10</sup> With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.</p><p>AI and Robotics: Already, and Not Yet</p><p>Artificial intelligence uses computers to accomplish tasks with some level of human involvement. In the short run, successful AIs will make life easier for humans. ChatGPT, the popular chatbot from OpenAI, has met this objective. It was rapidly adopted across industries and became one of the internet’s most popular websites in 2025.<sup>11</sup> But AI can be used for more than large language model chatbots. Embodied AI can process audio, visuals, and text, make decisions based on this, and act upon the world.</p><p>Americans are familiar with devices like the Roomba, a vacuum that uses sensors to navigate indoor environments. Technologies of this caliber are known as “weak AI.” On the higher end, Swiss company ANYbotics has developed the robo-dog ANYmal, which is optimized to conduct quality inspections of oil rigs and power substations under adverse weather conditions.<sup>12</sup> Unlike a Roomba, which sells for hundreds of dollars, ANYmal costs hundreds of thousands. For large companies, however, the robot’s up-front cost translates into quick savings because it can work around the clock and replace human labor in hazardous environments.</p><p>Between these extremes is AIGEN, an American robotics company that specializes in agriculture.<sup>13</sup> Its robot ELEMENT is designed to weed crop fields in place of human laborers. Multiple ELEMENT robots can communicate with one another and coordinate their movements as they autonomously detect and eliminate weeds, saving time and decreasing labor costs.</p><p>Boston Dynamics’ Spot robo-dog is designed to inspect factories and warehouses, though it can function outdoors. It is also equipped to investigate hazardous situations like bomb threats and chemical, biological, or even nuclear calamities.<sup>14</sup></p><p>Another class of robots, manufacturing robots, is of particular geopolitical importance. Bright Machines, based in San Francisco, designs and builds high-end manufacturing robots powered by proprietary AI models. These machines go beyond automated manufacturing. Their Bright Designer AI software analyzes outputs and offers design recommendations to make automated manufacturing more efficient.<sup>15</sup> This capability is increasingly relevant as the US works to decouple critical supply chains from the PRC.</p><p>Robots will increasingly replace human labor. But they cannot replace human reasoning. Every day humans gain knowledge, solve problems, and make decisions. Each of these acts is an expression of free will. Artificial general intelligence (AGI) could one day enable computers to simulate and ultimately surpass human cognition. AI seeks to replicate that autonomy and ultimately, as IBM puts it, “replace the need for human intelligence or intervention.”<sup>16</sup> That objective is the essence of AGI—the ability to use previously acquired knowledge and skills to autonomously execute new tasks in new contexts.</p><p>Humanoid robots embody the pursuit of AGI. Unlike weak AI robots like ANYmal, Spot, and ELEMENT, which are tailored for specific environments, humanoids are built to adapt to everyday life. Tesla describes the mission of its humanoid Optimus as “performing tasks that are unsafe, repetitive, or boring,” ranging from vacuuming and ironing to stirring food and watering plants.<sup>17</sup> Boston Dynamics intends its humanoid Atlas to be “commonplace” in human life.<sup>18</sup> These aspirations could become reality within the decade. Morgan Stanley projects that humanoids will see a sharp increase in usage in the mid-2030s, and that nearly a billion humanoids could be in commercial or industrial use by 2050. Household adoption could take longer due to high prices, technological roadblocks, government regulations, and societal unease.<sup>19</sup></p><p>Humans are beginning to adjust to the presence of embodied AI. But it has not reached its promised potential. All these robots run on weak AI, learn from human-curated data, and perform a defined set of tasks. If technology companies develop AGI, Musk’s bullish predictions could come to pass.</p><p>Economic Impact of Embodied AI</p><p>AI-enabled robots are already changing the world. As technology improves and production costs fall, adoption of these machines will increase. Robots are already replacing human labor in factories, power substations, oil and gas rigs, and other hazardous environments, decreasing insurance and labor costs. Moreover, the sensors in these robots will work with software to forecast repair schedules more accurately. According to Deloitte, AI-powered predictive maintenance could save companies up to 30 percent on upkeep, extend machine lifespans by years, and reduce energy costs.<sup>20</sup></p><p>Labor shortages are also driving demand for embodied AI. It is not a coincidence that the North American robotics market saw a massive spike when workers were quarantining at home amid the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>21</sup> The end of the pandemic has not brought an end to the labor shortage. According to the International Road Transport Union, there was a global shortage of three million truck drivers in 2024. The International Federation of Robotics noted the same year that warehouses and docks are also struggling to hire enough workers.<sup>22</sup> These trends underscore the connectedness of different kinds of embodied AI. Self-driving trucks and humanoid factory inspectors serve different functions along the supply chain. But both solve the same problem.</p><p>Global population trends are also driving interest in embodied AI. Shortly before the pandemic, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Boston University found “that countries undergoing more rapid aging—measured as an increase in the ratio of workers above 56 to those between 21 and 55—invest more in robotics.” This trend is most prominent in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.<sup>23</sup> Given the broad favorability of robotics and automation among Generation Z employees, this trend will likely continue.<sup>24</sup></p><p>The humanoid robots that periodically make waves on social media are but one small element in the broader suite of embodied AI. Other forms of robots are already changing the manufacturing sector. These robots will continue to transform the global economy as unit production costs fall. The nation that dominates embodied AI in the next decade will have a considerable economic advantage.</p><p>Embodied AI and Great Power Competition</p><p>The Nuclear Example</p><p>Generational leaps in technology also have profound effects on warfare. During World War II, both the US and Nazi Germany recognized the military application of nuclear power. German chemists discovered nuclear fission in 1938, and the race to develop nuclear weapons commenced. In 1939, Albert Einstein sent a letter to warn President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the deadly potential of nuclear technology, as well as Berlin’s intentions. Germany, Einstein cautioned, had placed export controls on uranium in Nazi-occupied territory and was replicating American research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin.<sup>25</sup> The implications were clear: the Nazis were hoarding critical nuclear materials in a race to create an atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project started as a $6,000 research program in 1940 but grew within five years to a $2 billion whole-of-society initiative.<sup>26</sup> Adjusted for inflation, an equivalent program today would have a budget of $24 billion.<sup>27</sup></p><p>A variety of factors precipitated Washington’s victory in the race to the bomb. Despite its hoarding, Germany struggled to maintain a sufficient supply of uranium or heavy water for its reactors. The Nazis also had a talent problem. Many of the scientists they needed for their nuclear program were Jewish and Polish victims of Adolf Hitler’s political persecution. Moreover, Hitler struggled to understand the project and neglected to fund it properly. Most importantly, the German scientists assigned to the effort did not support it. One such scientist, Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, said, “I believe that the reason we didn’t do it was because all the physicists didn’t want to do it, on principle. If we had all wanted Germany to win the war, we would have succeeded.” By 1942, Hitler had cut political support for the program.<sup>28</sup> But that same year, the Soviet Union’s State Defense Committee took its first official steps toward developing the bomb.<sup>29</sup></p><p>Had Moscow achieved the bomb before Washington, the second half of the twentieth century would likely be a story of global totalitarianism. A nuclear monopoly would have allowed Josef Stalin to shape the post–World War II order in Europe in his favor, casting the Soviet Union’s shadow further west. Winston Churchill barely managed to protect the Mediterranean from a non–nuclear armed Stalin’s predations.<sup>30</sup> Such a feat would have been impossible had the Soviets possessed the bomb. Moreover, atomic weapons allowed America to secure Imperial Japan’s surrender without the intervention of Soviet forces, thus strengthening Washington’s hand in postwar negotiations.<sup>31</sup> Winning the race to the bomb by no means guaranteed America’s victory in the ensuing Cold War. But it kept Western Europe free of Soviet influence and curtailed Moscow’s designs in East Asia.</p><p>A Modern Manhattan Project</p><p>This history merits consideration as the US and the CCP race for AI dominance. Unlike Hitler, Xi Jinping understands the military potential of this revolutionary technology. In 2015, Beijing’s Made in China 2025 blueprint identified robotics as a key industry.<sup>32</sup> In 2017, China’s State Council published a directive that underscored AI’s power to “profoundly change human society and life” and declared Beijing’s intent to “build China’s first-mover advantage in the development of AI.” The document recognized AI’s economic impact on multiple industries, from manufacturing and agriculture to logistics and elder care. China would become “the world’s primary AI innovation center” by 2030, Beijing declared.<sup>33</sup></p><p>The State Council is similarly forthcoming with its belief that AI is a critical tool in great power competition:</p><p>AI has become a new focus of international competition. AI is a strategic technology that will lead in the future; the world’s major developed countries are taking the development of AI as a major strategy to enhance national competitiveness and protect national security. ... At present, China’s situation in national security and international competition is more complex, and [China] must, looking at the world, take the development of AI to the national strategic level with systemic layout, [and] take the initiative in planning ... to create new competitive advantage, opening up the development of new space, and effectively protecting national security.</p><p>Understanding the CCP’s approach to AI and robotics begins with grasping its conception of national security. China’s 2015 National Security Law defines national security as “the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state’s power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests.”<sup>34</sup> Whereas America’s traditional approach to grand strategy seeks to mitigate threats, the CCP’s approach seeks to eliminate threats. According to Peter Mattis, president of Jamestown Foundation, this “unlimited view” of national security “pushes the Chinese Communist Party toward preempting threats and preventing their emergence.”<sup>35</sup> It is no surprise, then, that the CCP has already begun to use AI and robotics to eliminate challenges both abroad and at home to its single-party dictatorship.</p><p>China’s Rising Use of Military Robotics</p><p>The China-Cambodia joint military exercise Golden Dragon 2024 featured a robo-dog with an automatic rifle affixed to its back. Beijing incorporated similar systems in exercises with Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam in 2023. It has also armed aerial drones with automatic weapons.<sup>36</sup> A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldier characterized such robots as a replacement for human soldiers in urban reconnaissance and strike missions.<sup>37</sup></p><p>The PLA is integrating embodied AI—specifically, humanoid robots—into its warfighting because it sees three main advantages to robotics in warfare:</p>Versatility. According to Wang Yonghua, a researcher at the Operational Theories and Regulations Department at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, “Compared with other unmanned systems, humanoid robots are closer to humans in shape and structure, can simulate various human activities, better realize human-computer interaction, and are more suitable for replacing humans to complete complex tasks.”<sup>38</sup> Scholars at China’s National University of Defense Technology also noted that twenty-first-century battlefields are increasingly urban and human-centric, which favors humanoid integration.<sup>39</sup>Scalability. As the saying goes, quantity has a quality all its own. In 2023, researchers at the China Association for Science and Technology identified the battlefield impact of humanoid swarms: “The effect and power of a humanoid robot in attacking actions are very limited, but the large-scale use of humanoid robots to form clusters can achieve a leap in attack capabilities.”<sup>40</sup>Survivability.According to PLA Daily’sZhang Yicheng, humanoids can more effectively draw enemy fire away from soldiers and even sacrifice themselves to protect human combatants.<sup>41</sup> The PLA is already weighing this feature’s utility in the context of a Taiwan invasion, wherein casualty-heavy, block-by-block urban warfare is likely. According to another analyst, “The biggest obstacle for China to complete the great cause of reunification in the future is the risk of personnel losses in the street fighting on the island of Taiwan.”<sup>42</sup> Therefore, Beijing may plan to rely on humanoid robots, which are uniquely suited for urban warfare, in the event that blockade operations and amphibious landings are insufficient to subsume Taiwan.<p>The CCP is also integrating embodied AI into its internal security functions. One month after Boston Dynamics’ Atlas showcased its breakdancing moves,<sup>43</sup> China’s leading robotics company, Unitree, announced the world’s first humanoid robot boxing match.<sup>44</sup> The juxtaposition—the American robot dances and the Chinese robot fights—is revelatory. The CCP views robotics the same way it views all technology: as an extension of political power and policing. Mao Zedong infamously observed that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”<sup>45</sup> Robots are merely the party’s newest bullets.</p><p>In Mianyang, a city in Sichuan, humanoid robots help manage rush-hour traffic from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.<sup>46</sup> In Hangzhou and Wenzhou, a spherical robot called the Rotunbot RT-G has accompanied police patrols. According to China Global Television Network, “Its mobility allows it to access areas where traditional patrol equipment cannot reach.”<sup>47</sup> The RT-G can reach speeds of 21 miles per hour in 2.5 seconds and carries equipment, including a net gun. It can operate continuously for 10 hours and is designed to function under hazardous conditions. According to the Global Times, companies in the United Arab Emirates have expressed interest in this robot.<sup>48</sup></p><p>This revelation presents a challenge for US policymakers. Washington and Abu Dhabi recently announced a partnership that would see a massive data center built in the UAE in exchange for Emirati investment in the United States. The deal underscores the Trump administration’s intent to diffuse American AI technology in key nations and regions to box out Chinese competitors. But Washington should expect nations to seek a both/and policy, wherein they aim to benefit simultaneously from American AI compute capacity and Chinese embodied AI capabilities. This likely scenario introduces the concerning possibility that Chinese robots and American AI models will run side-by-side. In many such nations, US officials will not be able to guarantee data security or prevent China from co-opting American advancements.</p><p>China’s indigenous AI systems also merit concern. DeepSeek’s R1 model is programmed to avoid topics the CCP deems sensitive. It censors its own responses to questions about Xi, the party’s zero-COVID policies, Beijing’s position on the Russia-Ukraine War, and China’s authoritarian control over citizens’ internet access.<sup>49</sup> If China globally propagates its compromised AI systems, Beijing will have a stranglehold on discourse about the country and the party. It will also gain the technological high ground to wage information warfare—as it already does with TikTok.<sup>50</sup> A regime that brazenly censors religious texts and conceals its own history cannot be trusted with global AI dominance.<sup>51</sup></p><p>America and China Are Running the AI Race Differently</p><p>The nation that wins the AI race will establish a dominant position in all downstream industries, including robotics and embodied AI. But the US and the PRC are pursuing different innovation strategies, which are premised on competing theories of victory.</p><p>AI advancement is a function of three main factors: (1) access to high-end chips, to increase computing capacity; (2) power generation, to support data centers; and (3) human talent, to build and train models. The US is currently pursuing a simple theory of victory: limit Beijing’s computing capacity by restricting its access to high-end graphic processing units (GPUs). Data centers rely on these chips to run advanced models. Smaller chips developed by NVIDIA and fabricated by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company can run more computations in less time at lower energy costs. The nation with greater access to cutting-edge semiconductors will therefore have a better chance of developing AGI.</p><p>Washington’s export controls have been largely successful. As of June 2025, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft operated 87 AI data centers, compared to 39 centers operated by Tencent, Alibaba, and Huawei.<sup>52</sup> China’s data hubs are generally reliant on US chips, a dependency the Trump administration has exploited by prohibiting NVIDIA from selling select types of semiconductor to the PRC.<sup>53</sup> Thus far, in part due to these export controls, US chipmakers have maintained the upper hand in computation, efficiency, energy, and size.</p><p>Unfortunately, Beijing has an upstream advantage over Washington: China’s monopolization of refined rare earth minerals. NVIDIA chips rely on dysprosium, a mineral used in semiconductor capacitors. The PRC refines 99.9 percent of the global supply of dysprosium, primarily at a facility in Wuxi, China.<sup>54</sup> This gives Beijing the ability to restrict America’s access to this mineral and throttle US chip production. Today, China could not take this step without harming itself significantly because Beijing relies on smuggled chips from companies like NVIDIA. But if the PRC catches up in chip manufacturing, China could exploit this asymmetry.</p><p>In the short run, Beijing aims to compensate for its computation limitations by ensuring Chinese companies deploy AI faster than their American competitors. In 2021, China surpassed America in use of factory robots per 10,000 workers. In 2022, it broke even with Japan. By 2023, the PRC had surpassed Germany. Chinese companies are also on track to account for more than half of global humanoid robot production in 2025.<sup>55</sup></p><p>In contrast to America’s high-energy/high-cost approach to AI innovation, Beijing is pursuing a low-energy/low-cost strategy that prizes diffusion and adoption above computing breakthroughs. Beijing continues to evade US export controls to access the advanced semiconductors needed to develop AGI. But it is more focused on subsidizing its robotics companies to bring innovations to market as quickly as possible.</p><p>This gambit should sound familiar to US policymakers. Beijing used the same strategy in telecommunications: dominate the global market by subsidizing Chinese enterprises to undercut global competition. For example, Huawei acquired Western intellectual property. Then it diffused its technology around the world at artificially low prices, which were made possible by state subsidies.<sup>56</sup> Other PRC companies like the drone manufacturer DJI have achieved similar dominance. The latter case is so severe that local law enforcement agencies across the United States oppose federal efforts to ban future acquisitions from the Chinese company.<sup>57</sup></p><p>Recent decisions from the Trump administration, however, will compound these challenges. On July 14, 2025, US government officials reversed a prior decision to restrict NVIDIA’s ability to sell H20 AI chips to China.<sup>58</sup> These semiconductors are less capable than NVIDIA’s most advanced GPUs, but they are superior to Huawei’s products and possess significant memory capabilities that support AI inference.<sup>59</sup> Deft lobbying from US industry has weakened one of Washington’s greatest advantages over Beijing in the AI race.</p><p>Identifying Embodied AI’s Chokepoints</p><p>In some cases, the PRC’s supply-dominance strategy is succeeding. Agriculture-focused US robotics companies cannot acquire motors, batteries, and solar panels from non-PRC suppliers at acceptable cost.<sup>60</sup> Still, past need not be prologue. The robotics industry is early in its development. In telecommunications, Washington ran into the so-called Huawei problem. Policymakers recognized the threat Huawei’s technology posed to Western democracies only after the PRC firm dominated the industry. This time, the US is working to address supply chain issues before China has established decisive control.</p><p>The West has the advantage in producing two key components in humanoid robot production: ball screws (which convert between rotary and linear motion) and sensors (which enable robot positional and environmental perception). A recent Morgan Stanley report found that European and Japanese companies such as Rollvis, SKF, and NSK dominate high-end ball screw production. Chinese manufacturers like Hengli and Best are growing, but they currently depend on Japanese- and European-produced screws and grinding machines. According to a recent Chinese industry report, ball screws for humanoid robotics are one of China’s most acute Western hardware dependencies.<sup>61</sup> Regarding sensors, US-based ATI (part of Novanta) remains a leader, though Chinese players like Kunwei and Sunrise Instruments are on the rise.</p><p>Western policymakers cannot rely on these advantages indefinitely. China is working to establish domestic sources for humanoid components. Several even have US subsidiaries working on screw and sensor manufacturing. Hengli has a marketing and manufacturing base in Bolingbrook, Illinois. In a 2024 LinkedIn post, Hengli America announced its Chinese parent company’s intent to diversify its product portfolio to include ball screws.<sup>62</sup> An August 2024 report from Chinese company Guolian Securities suggested that Hengli’s ball screws could enter Tesla’s supply chain for its Optimus humanoid once Hengli scales up to mass production.<sup>63</sup></p><p>Sunrise Instruments maintains a subsidiary in Canton, Michigan. The company’s website claims that “machines + sensors will unlock endless human creativity and is [sic] the next stage of industrial evolution.”<sup>64</sup> The company manufactures a joint torque sensor for use in surgical robots, humanoids, and other forms of embodied AI.<sup>65</sup> Introducing sensors manufactured by PRC manufacturers into American robots presents several risks, including intellectual property theft and component sabotage. These risks have always been a factor when working with Chinese firms. But AI innovations like “digital twins,” which use sensors to generate a digital model of a physical asset for predictive maintenance, compound the threat further.<sup>66</sup> PRC-sabotaged sensors could feed false information to US companies to compromise their repair and maintenance schedules. If targeted properly or executed at scale, this long-term sabotage could have serious implications for American supply chains, including those that are critical to national security.</p><p>If US robotics companies rely on PRC-sourced components for their products, Beijing will have another leverage point over Washington in one of the most critical technology sectors of the twenty-first century. This dependency would also open multiple threat vectors for US industry and consumers, essentially inviting the Chinese Communist Party into American factories, farms, and living rooms.</p><p>Policy Recommendations</p><p>US policymakers face a variety of challenges along the embodied AI value chain, particularly amid great power competition against a motivated adversary. Allowing China to dominate this transformational technology or permitting CCP-controlled robots to enter US supply chains threatens the safety of Americans, the competitiveness of US companies, and the security of Washington’s allies and partners. Failing to address dependencies on PRC components could leave American and Western robotics companies at the mercy of Chinese suppliers and allow the CCP to create backdoors into critical systems.</p><p>The race to dominate AI and robotics is still in its early stages, and the US and its allies could still prevail. But doing so will require Congress and the administration to make a sustained, bipartisan commitment to enacting industrial policy that hobbles China’s technological advancements and boosts Western competitiveness.</p><p>Policymakers in Washington should adopt the following lines of effort:</p><p>1. Promote US and allied industry.</p>Decouple America’s rare earth mineral supply chain from China. So long as Beijing dominates rare earth minerals refining, the CCP will possess significant upstream leverage over America’s AI and robotics industries. China’s monopoly also gives Beijing political leverage over Washington, as shown by recent tariff negotiations.<sup>67</sup> The US will struggle to implement several of the following recommendations unless it breaks free of its rare earths dependence on China. MP Materials operates one of the only US-based rare earths supply chains, with a mine in Mountain Pass, California, and a refining facility in Texas. Washington should insulate MP Materials and other US companies involved in similar work from China’s predatory pricing and ensure their resilience by committing to long-term government contracts. The recently announced Department of Defense investment in MP Materials is an excellent start.<sup>68</sup> Elected officials in Washington will need to sustain this support over multiple years in a bipartisan fashion. Policymakers should also revise the authorization for the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to allow the corporation to invest in developed countries that have considerable rare earth mineral deposits, like Canada.<sup>69</sup>Revise equipment subsidy policies for robotics companies. Manufacturers already benefit from tax exemptions, particularly when purchasing heavy machinery. Washington can help US robotics companies by broadening these exemptions. Companies expend significant capital on robotics software, which often involves an expensive subscription. Policymakers should expand subsidies to help defray these costs.Build on prior US government efforts to support domestic battery manufacturers. Reliance on Chinese-produced batteries threatens US companies across sectors, including in robotics. Washington has begun to succeed at unraveling this dependency. In 2022, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced a $107 million loan to Australia’s Syrah Resources to stand up a graphite production facility in Louisiana.<sup>70</sup> In 2023, the DFC approved a $150 million loan to Syrah for its Balama graphite mine in Mozambique.<sup>71</sup> The following year, the DOE awarded a $220 million grant to the Louisiana plant. These investments helped position Syrah as the only large-scale, vertically integrated graphite producer outside China.<sup>72</sup> Even so, automotive companies in America have been slow to certify Syrah batteries for use. China has historically overproduced critical components to price Western competitors out of the market, most notably Solyndra during the Obama administration.<sup>73</sup> The US should protect its indigenous companies—and its public investments—from China’s predatory pricing by prohibiting American companies from purchasing PRC-made batteries.Strategically deploy public and private capital. Venture capital (VC) has been instrumental in fueling America’s AI boom. But manufacturing companies often find themselves in a bind with VC funding: high valuations that exceed early revenues. Private equity firms expect a high rate of return, and manufacturing firms often cannot meet those expectations. Government investing bodies, particularly the Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), can play an important role by providing up-front financing to robotics companies at a lower interest rate. Congress should increase funding for OSC to boost support for America’s manufacturing and robotics industries that lie downstream from AI investments.Waive tariffs on key allies and partners that are part of the global robotics supply chain. Tariffs can be a powerful negotiating tool to bring manufacturing capacity back to the United States. But they can also increase domestic prices for foreign components. The Trump administration should waive tariffs on any critical robotics inputs that do not come from the PRC.<p>2. Insulate the US homeland from PRC robotics.</p>Ban the purchase and deployment of CCP robots in the United States. Members of Congress have already introduced legislation along these lines. Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) authored the Decoupling America’s Artificial Intelligence Capabilities from China Act of 2025, which would ban US companies from engaging with the PRC on AI technology imports or exports.<sup>74</sup>Prohibit US companies from purchasing PRC components for robotics and other AI applications. Policymakers should block Chinese components from entering the United States. In the short term, inputs like sensors and actuators will be easier to replace. Building a de-risked supply chain for batteries and solar panels may require a longer time horizon. But Congress should lock in those prohibitions promptly and send a demand signal to non-Chinese suppliers.Protect energy generation that supports AI models. Reuters found that the US is heavily reliant on PRC-produced inverters to connect solar and wind energy to the power grid. These components are a material threat to America’s critical infrastructure. According to the report, hostile agents could “skirt firewalls and switch off inverters remotely” and “trigger widespread blackouts.”<sup>75</sup> For obvious reasons, a CCP-controlled off-switch to the US power grid endangers the American people. But the possibility China will target energy infrastructure that supports AI data centers adds another layer of risk amid the critical technology race. Policymakers should ban US electric companies from purchasing PRC-made inverters and work to rip and replace existing components across the US.Ban PRC-based firms from establishing AI or robotics subsidiaries in the United States. The US government needs to protect American companies from China’s predatory pricing and state-backed intellectual property theft. Allowing Chinese robotics companies to operate within America increases both risks. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should block all future mergers and acquisitions involving PRC AI and robotics companies.Force Chinese parent companies to divest from all robotics firms operating in the United States. Congress should pass legislation modeled on the 2024 TikTok legislation and mandate that PRC-owned companies divest from subsidiaries operating in the US.<sup>76</sup><p>3. Deny PRC access to critical US technologies.</p>Strengthen US export controls on semiconductors. In 2024, DeepSeek Chief Executive Officer Liang Wenfeng confirmed the effectiveness of US export controls: “Money has never been the problem for us; bans on shipments of advanced chips are the problem.”<sup>77</sup> In 2025, Tencent Vice President Wang Qi reiterated this challenge: “The most severe problem is the [limited] resources of [graphics] cards and computing resources.”<sup>78</sup> Despite the broad success of export controls, the CCP has successfully smuggled advanced semiconductors into China through front companies and transshipping. The Trump administration should retain and strengthen existing export controls. But Congress also needs to pass new legislation mandating trackers on AI chips to identify and crack down on problematic actors. Representative Bill Huizenga (R-MI) and Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) have introduced the Chip Security Act, which would mandate location verification mechanisms on GPUs within 180 days of enactment.<sup>79</sup> More fundamentally, the Trump administration should reapply export controls on H20 semiconductors and other advanced chips. Equipping the adversary is an elementary mistake in grand strategy, and it is telling that private sector actors like NVIDIA, not national security professionals, advocated for this policy. America’s superior computation power is its greatest advantage over China in the AI race. Policymakers should protect this asymmetry jealously.Levy export controls on humanoid robot supply chain chokepoints. The United States and its allies should capitalize on the PRC’s reliance on Western components for its embodied AI systems. But time is limited, as China is working to eliminate these dependencies. Washington should control exports of vital components like ball screws and sensors and work to gain the support of key allies like Japan and Germany.Work with partners on AI while protecting US technology from Chinese smuggling or theft. Washington’s AI partnership with Abu Dhabi could give China access to America’s high-end chips. The UAE approved the construction of a Chinese military facility at its Khalifa port in 2021.<sup>80</sup> And, as mentioned earlier, the UAE is interested in acquiring PRC-made robots for law enforcement purposes. US policymakers need to ensure America’s AI partners are not allowing PRC entities to access or steal advanced GPUs.Supplement export controls with financial sanctions. Multiple US administrations have failed to enforce export controls. The problem is so grave that law firms routinely advise their clients to violate these laws. The US government should consider levying steeper penalties to incentivize compliance with export controls, including financial sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.<sup>81</sup><p>4. Blunt China’s robotics technology export scheme.</p>Levy primary and secondary sanctions on AI and robotics companies with known links to the CCP and PLA. In February 2025, General Motors (GM)and Mercedes-Benz both announced they would integrate DeepSeek’s R1 reasoning model into vehicles coproduced with Chinese companies. GM also indicated it would integrate ERNIE Bot, an AI chatbot developed by Chinese firm Baidu.<sup>82</sup> In April 2025, BMW made a similar announcement.<sup>83</sup> The United States should work to prevent automakers outside China from adopting CCP-controlled AI. Policymakers should levy primary sanctions on DeepSeek, Baidu, and other Chinese-developed AI models to prevent US automakers from integrating them. Washington should also consider implementing secondary sanctions to discourage foreign firms like BMW and Mercedes from integrating this technology into European cars. Policymakers in Berlin may bristle at these measures. After all, Volkswagen constructed and operated an assembly plant and two test tracks in Xinjiang, the region of the CCP’s ongoing genocide of Uyghurs, for twelve years.<sup>84</sup> The willful blindness of Germany and other wealthy allies underscores the necessity of American leadership. Without Washington’s sustained initiative, the free world will lose the AI race.<p>This policy memo was updated to reflect the Trump administration’s decision to allow NVIDIA to sell H20 chips to China.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Information Technology Technology </p><p> <p>References (84)</p> <svg></svg> <p> <p><sup>1.</sup></p><p>Dov Lieber and Andrew Dowell, “How Israel’s Mossad Smuggled Drone Parts to Attack Iran from Within,” The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-israels-mossad-smuggled-drone-parts-to-attack-iran-from-within-633516a9.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>2.</sup></p><p>Mike Collet-White, Prasanta Kumar Dutta, and Mariano Zafra, “How Ukraine Pulled Off an Audacious Attack Deep Inside Russia,” Reuters, June 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ukraine-crisis/drones-russia/mypmjzayyvr/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>3.</sup></p><p>David Ingram, “Why Waymo Cars Became Sitting Ducks During The LA Protests,” NBC News, June 14, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/waymo-cars-set-fire-sitting-ducks-la-protests-rcna212426.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>4.</sup></p><p>Janis Mackey Frayer, Dawn Liu, and Peter Guo, “China’s Robots Race Against Humans—and Their US Counterparts,” NBC News, April 23, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-robots-race-humans-half-marathon-rcna195586.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>5.</sup></p><p>Frank Bajak, “US-China Competition to Field Military Drone Swarms Could Fuel Global Arms Race,” Associated Press, April 12, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/us-china-drone-swarm-development-arms-race-e5808a715415d709f466da00cdeab10f.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>6.</sup></p><p>Ted Cruz, host, Verdict, podcast, episode 216, “Elon Uncut—the Complete Interview,” YouTube, March 22, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMcmuKTfr54.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>7.</sup></p><p>Jonah Goldberg, “The AI New Wave,” The Dispatch, July 2, 2025, https://thedispatch.com/newsletter/gfile/millenarian-panic-artificial-intelligence-aspen/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>8.</sup></p><p>Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi, “Investigation Findings: The CCP’s Role in the Fentanyl Crisis,” House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, April 16, 2024, https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/investigations/investigation-findings-ccps-role-fentanyl-crisis.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>9.</sup></p><p>Michael Sobolik, “Stop Giving Beijing an Advantage Through TikTok,” Hudson Institute, May 9, 2025, https://www.hudson.org/technology/stop-giving-beijing-advantage-through-tiktok-michael-sobolik.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>10.</sup></p><p>Michael Sobolik, “China Targets US Citizens with Biowarfare Weapons,” The Spectator World, June 17, 2025, https://thespectator.com/topic/china-targets-us-citizens-biowarfare-weapons/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>11.</sup></p><p>Dorothy Neufeld, “Ranked: The Most Visited Websites in the World,” Visual Capitalist, May 6, 2025, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/most-visited-websites-in-the-world/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>12.</sup></p><p>“ANYmal,” ANYbotics, June 16, 2025, https://www.anybotics.com/robotics/anymal/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>13.</sup></p><p>“AI Generated Agriculture,” Aigen, accessed July 7, 2025, https://www.aigen.io/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>14.</sup></p><p>“Government,” Boston Dynamics, February 21, 2025, https://bostondynamics.com/industry/government/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>15.</sup></p><p>“Products,” Bright Machines, accessed July 7, 2025, https://www.brightmachines.com/products/#smart-robotics.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>16.</sup></p><p>Cole Stryker and Eda Kavlakoglu, “What Is Artificial Intelligence (AI)?,” IBM, August 9, 2024, https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/artificial-intelligence.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>17.</sup></p><p>Tesla Optimus (@Tesla Optimus), “A general purpose, bi-pedal, humanoid robot capable of performing tasks that are unsafe, repetitive or boring,” X bio, accessed July 10, 2025, https://x.com/tesla_optimus?s=21.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>18.</sup></p><p>Loz Blain, “Boston Dynamics Shows Off Another Major Leap in Humanoid Mobility,” New Atlas, March 19, 2025, https://newatlas.com/ai-humanoids/boston-dynamics-atlas-athletic/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>19.</sup></p><p>“Humanoids: A $5 Trillion Market,” Morgan Stanley, May 14, 2025, https://www.morganstanley.com/insights/articles/humanoid-robot-market-5-trillion-by-2050.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>20.</sup></p><p>“Predictive Maintenance and Beyond: How Digital Twins Are Redefining Building Operations,” Twinview, January 18, 2024, https://www.twinview.com/insights/predictive-maintenance-and-beyond-how-digital-twins-are-redefining-building-operations.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>21.</sup></p><p>“Q3 Robot Orders Put 2021 on Track for Biggest Year Yet,” Association for Advancing Automation, November 12, 2021, https://www.automate.org/robotics/news/q3-robot-orders-put-2021-on-track-for-biggest-year-yet.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>22.</sup></p><p>“AI-Equipped Robots Help Logistics Industry to Fight Labor Shortages,” International Federation of Robotics,March 13, 2024, https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/ai-equipped-robots-help-logistics-industry-to-fight-labor-shortages. See also Farah Stockman, “Why Factories Are Having Trouble Filling Nearly 400,000 Open Jobs,” New York Times, June 23, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/23/business/factory-jobs-workers-trump.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>23.</sup></p><p>Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo, Demographics and Automation (MIT Press, 2019), 3, https://legacy.iza.org/en/papers/28268_24112020.pdf.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>24.</sup></p><p>“How Robots Are Addressing the Labor Shortage in Manufacturing,” Mecademic (blog), https://mecademic.com/blog/robots-addressing-labor-shortage/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>25.</sup></p><p>Letter from Albert Einstein to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, August 2, 1939, The Manhattan Project: An Interactive History, US Department of Energy, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Resources/einstein_letter_photograph.htm#1.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>26.</sup></p><p>Gero Schlies, “The A-Bomb ‘Changed the Entire World,’” Deutsche Welle, August 6, 2015, https://www.dw.com/en/the-a-bomb-changed-the-entire-world/a-18632095.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>27.</sup></p><p>Fred Schwaller, “Why Didn’t the Nazis Beat Oppenheimer to the Nuclear Bomb?,” Deutsche Welle, August 15, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/why-didnt-the-nazis-beat-oppenheimer-to-the-nuclear-bomb/a-66540463.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>28.</sup></p><p>Schwaller, “Why Didn’t the Nazis Beat Oppenheimer.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>29.</sup></p><p>“Short History of the Russian Nuclear Industry,” Rosatom, https://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/short-history-of-the-russian-nuclear-industry/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>30.</sup></p><p>Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties, Revised ed. (Harper Collins, 1991), 432–34.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>31.</sup></p><p>Negar Nasrkhani, “The Atomic Bombing and Soviet Union’s Expansion in the Far East,” Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History 12, no. 1, https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=aujh.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>32.</sup></p><p>“Robots at Center of China’s Big Strategy to Leapfrog Its Rivals,” China Daily, October 31, 2016, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2016-10/31/content_27224252.htm.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>33.</sup></p><p>“State Council Notice on the Issuance of the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” trans. Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Elsa Kania, and Paul Triolo, New America Cybersecurity Initiative, July 20, 2017, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>34.</sup></p><p>“National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China,” trans. Jeremy Daum, China Law Translate, July 1, 2015, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2015nsl/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>35.</sup></p><p>“National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>36.</sup></p><p>“National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>37.</sup></p><p>Brad Lendon and Nectar Gan, “China’s Military Shows Off Rifle-Toting Robot Dogs,” CNN, May 28, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/28/china/china-military-rifle-toting-robot-dogs-intl-hnk-ml.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>38.</sup></p><p>Josh Baughman and Peter W. Singer, “China’s Military Aims to Harness the Coming ‘ChatGPT for Robotics,’” Defense One, April 24, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/04/chinas-military-aims-harness-coming-chatgpt-robotics/404811/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>39.</sup></p><p>Baughman and Singer, “China’s Military Aims to Harness.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>40.</sup></p><p>Baughman and Singer, “China’s Military Aims to Harness.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>41.</sup></p><p>Baughman and Singer, “China’s Military Aims to Harness.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>42.</sup></p><p>Baughman and Singer, “China’s Military Aims to Harness.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>43.</sup></p><p>Victor Tangermann, “Bonkers Video Shows Boston Dynamics Robot Breakdancing,” Futurism, March 21, 2025, https://futurism.com/boston-dynamics-humanoid-robot-breakdancing-cartwheels.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>44.</sup></p><p>Phong Ngo, “China’s Unitree to Livestream World’s First Humanoid Robot Boxing Match,” VN Express,April 14, 2025, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/tech/enterprises/china-s-unitree-to-livestream-world-s-first-humanoid-robot-boxing-match-4873836.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>45.</sup></p><p>Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of War and Strategy,” originally published November 6, 1938, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, available via Marxists.org, revised 2004,https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>46.</sup></p><p>“China Robot Cop Launch: AI-Powered Policing Hits the Streets in 2025,” Hiverlab, May 5, 2025, https://hiverlab.com/china-robot-cops-launches-ai-powered-policing/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>47.</sup></p><p>“China’s High-Tech Spherical Security Robot Enhances Policing in Crowded Wenzhou Streets,” China Global Television Network, December 14, 2024, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-12-14/China-s-spherical-security-robot-aids-Wenzhou-policing-1zkEJQCjWMM/p.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>48.</sup></p><p>Du Qionfang, “Hangzhou-Developed Spherical Patrol Robot Ventures into Overseas Markets,” Global Times, February 26, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329130.shtml.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>49.</sup></p><p>Vivian Wang, “How Does DeepSeek’s AI Chatbot Navigate China’s Censors? Awkwardly,” New York Times, January 29, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/29/world/asia/deepseek-china-censorship.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>50.</sup></p><p>Sobolik, “Stop Giving Beijing an Advantage Through TikTok.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>51.</sup></p><p>Mike Gallagher, “The Chinese Communist Party Is Rewriting The Bible,” Fox News, July 17, 2023, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/chinese-communist-party-rewriting-bible.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>52.</sup></p><p>Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The Global AI Divide,” New York Times, June 21, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/23/technology/ai-computing-global-divide.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>53.</sup></p><p>Michael Shepard and Edward Ludlow, “US to Keep China Chip Curbs, Spurning Nvidia’s Call for Relief,” Bloomberg, May 21, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-21/us-to-keep-china-chip-curbs-spurning-nvidia-s-call-for-relief.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>54.</sup></p><p>Keith Bradsher, “China Tightens Its Hold on Minerals Needed to Make Computer Chips,” New York Times, October 26, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/business/china-critical-minerals-semiconductors.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>55.</sup></p><p>“China’s Startups Race to Dominate the Coming AI Robot Boom,” Bloomberg, May 30, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2025-china-ai-robots-boom/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>56.</sup></p><p>Michael Sobolik, “Mend the Gap: 5G, the US-UK Split over Huawei, and National Security Implications,” American Foreign Policy Council, March 20, 2020, https://www.afpc.org/uploads/documents/Defense_Technology_Briefing_-_Issue_19.pdf.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>57.</sup></p><p>Drew Andre, “Washington Farmers, First Responders Worry over Looming Ban on Chinese Drones,” NBC King 5, December 24, 2024, https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/chinese-made-drones-concerns/281-9b44c2c0-0647-4087-931a-04b0f991b882; Laura Sandlin, “Local Educators, Law Enforcement Upset at Possible DJI Drone Ban,” WTOL11, August 12, 2024, https://www.wtol.com/article/news/local/educators-law-enforcement-upset-at-possible-dji-drone-ban/512-d3120b45-27a9-424e-9ec8-05da92f1e59c; George Hunter, “Michigan Police Expand Drone Use to First Responders, but New Federal Rule Prompts Worries,” Detroit News, February 25, 2025, https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2025/02/25/michigan-police-expand-drone-use-first-responders-taylor-new-federal-rule-chinese-prompts-worries/78023796007/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>58.</sup></p><p>Mackenzie Hawkins, “Nvidia, AMD to Resume Some AI Chip Sales to China in US Reversal,” Bloomberg, July 15, 2025,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-15/nvidia-expects-license-to-sell-h20-ai-chip-to-china-again.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>59.</sup></p><p>Tripp Mickle, “Nvidia Says US Has Lifted Restrictions on AI Chip Sales to China,” New York Times, July 14, 2025,https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/14/technology/nvidia-ai-chip-sales-china.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>60.</sup></p><p>Author conversation with industry.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>61.</sup></p><p>“Blue Paper on the Development of China’s Humanoid Robot Industry in 2025,” Qianzhan Industry Research Institute,December 20, 2024, https://bg.qianzhan.com/report/detail/2412201031186886.html#read.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>62.</sup></p><p>Hengli America, “Hengli Breaks New Ground in Electric Motor Technology,” LinkedIn post, May 2024, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/hengli-america_hengli-breaks-new-ground-in-electric-motor-activity-7193373512147857409-tRNH.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>63.</sup></p><p>“Guolian Securities: Domestic Substitution for Lead Screw Is Imminent, Humanoid Robots May Become a New Explosive Growth Point for Planetary Rollers,” Futubull, August 15, 2024, https://news.futunn.com/en/post/46558291/guolian-securities-domestic-substitution-for-lead-screw-is-imminent-humanoid?level=1&data_ticket=1751159046202399.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>64.</sup></p><p>“About Us \| Company Profile,” Sunrise Instruments, https://www.srisensor.com/about-us/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>65.</sup></p><p>“About Us \| Company Profile,” Sunrise Instruments.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>66.</sup></p><p>Jeffrey Voas et al., Security and Trust Considerations for Digital Twin Technology (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2025), 13, https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=957183.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>67.</sup></p><p>Keith Bradsher, “What to Know about China’s Halt of Rare Earth Exports,” New York Times, June 3, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/03/business/rare-earth-metals-china.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>68.</sup></p><p>MP Materials, “MP Materials Announces Transformational Public-Private Partnership with the Department of Defense to Accelerate US Rare Earth Magnet Independence,” news release, MP Materials, July 10, 2025,https://mpmaterials.com/news//mp-materials-announces-transformational-public-private-partnership-with-the-department-of-defense-to-accelerate-u-s-rare-earth-magnet-independence/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>69.</sup></p><p>Christopher Hernandez-Roy and Henry Ziemer, “Canada May Be the United States’ Best Hope for Minerals Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 12, 2025,</p><p>https://www.csis.org/analysis/canada-may-be-united-states-best-hope-minerals-security.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>70.</sup></p><p>Jeff St. John, “DOD Backs US Battery Materials Production with $107M Loan,” Canary Media, April 18, 2022, https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/batteries/doe-backs-us-battery-materials-production-with-107m-loan.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>71.</sup></p><p>Emiliano Tossou, “US Provides $150 Million Loan for Africa’s Largest Graphite Mine,” Ecofin Agency, October 31, 2024, https://www.ecofinagency.com/mining/3110-46094-u-s-provides-150-million-loan-for-africas-largest-graphite-mine.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>72.</sup></p><p>“Louisiana Sustainable Projects Funded by DOE Grants,” Louisiana Clean Fuels, November 20, 2024, https://louisianacleanfuels.org/blog/id/674.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>73.</sup></p><p>Joe Stephens and Carol Leonnig, “Solyndra Solar Company Fails After Getting Controversial Federal Loan Guarantees,” Washington Post, August 31, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-solar-company-fails-after-getting-controversial-federal-loan-guarantees/2011/08/31/gIQAB8IRsJ_story.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>74.</sup></p><p>Decoupling America’s Artificial Intelligence Capabilities from China Act of 2025, S. 321, 119th Cong. (2025), https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/321/text.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>75.</sup></p><p>Sarah McFarlane, “Rogue Communication Devices Found in Chinese Solar Power Inverters,” Reuters, May 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/ghost-machine-rogue-communication-devices-found-chinese-inverters-2025-05-14/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>76.</sup></p><p>National Security Act 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-50, 138 Stat. 958, Division H, https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ50/PLAW-118publ50.pdf.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>77.</sup></p><p>Jordan Schneider et al., “DeepSeek: The Quiet Giant Leading China’s AI Race,” ChinaTalk (blog), November 27, 2024, https://www.chinatalk.media/p/deepseek-ceo-interview-with-chinas.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>78.</sup></p><p>Coco Feng, “China’s Lack of Advanced Chips Hinders Broad Adoption of AI Models: Tencent Executive,” South China Morning Post, May 16, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3310656/chinas-lack-advanced-chips-hinders-broad-adoption-ai-models-tencent-executive.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>79.</sup></p><p>Chip Security Act, H. Res. 3447, 199th Cong. (2025), https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3447/text.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>80.</sup></p><p>Gordon Lubold and Warren Strobel, “Secret Chinese Port Project in Persian Gulf Rattles US Relations with UAE,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/us-china-uae-military-11637274224.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>81.</sup></p><p>International Emergency Economic Powers, Pub. L. No. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter35&edition=prelim.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>82.</sup></p><p>“General Motors, Mercedes-Benz Among First Global Automakers to Integrate DeepSeek AI Models,” Technode, February 12, 2025, https://technode.com/2025/02/12/general-motors-mercedes-benz-among-first-global-automakers-to-integrate-deepseek-ai-models/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>83.</sup></p><p>“BMW to Integrate DeepSeek AI in Its New Vehicles in China Later This Year,” Reuters, April 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/bmw-integrate-deepseek-ai-its-new-vehicles-china-later-this-year-2025-04-23/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>84.</sup></p><p>See Keith Bradsher, “Volkswagen to Exit China’s Xinjiang Region After 12 Years,” New York Times, November 27, 2024,https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/27/business/volkswagen-xinjiang-saic.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p> </p> Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier \| Hudson Institute	查看 65287	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215569	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>On School of War, Aaron MacLean and Bryan Clark discuss how a war with China could play out.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> National Security and Defense Foreign Policy </p> The Coming Sensor War with China \| Hudson Institute	查看 2917	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215568	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>India’s multi-alignment approach has helped it navigate the geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges stemming from the unpredictable policies of the United States President Donald Trump’s second administration. Although under pressure from the White House regarding trade, India remains critical to the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy.</p><p>The South Asian nation also maintains long-standing ties with Russia and is a prominent member of non-Western groupings such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Moreover, it has forged robust economic and security partnerships with countries across Europe, the Middle East and Asia.</p><p>China remains India’s long-term rival, but so far, New Delhi has managed its relationship with Beijing with diplomatic subtlety and strategic foresight. Indian leaders emphasize engaging with the world as it is and view the country’s growing economy as a crucial factor in its pursuit of global recognition. As the post-Cold War global order continues to shift and transform, India will need to juggle its various relationships with greater dexterity, all in pursuit of its national interests.</p><p>The quiet giant</p><p>India is currently the fastest-growing emerging economy globally, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $4 trillion. In terms of military capability, the country ranks fourth on the Global Firepower Index, which measures a nation’s defense capacities. It has become a preferred partner for both Western countries and those in the Global Majority.</p><p>With a labor force of 600 million and an average age of 29, India is a lucrative market that many businesses worldwide are eager to access. In recent years, there has been growing talk about India emerging as a potential alternative to China as the factory of the world.</p><p>Since the start of the Cold War, New Delhi has adhered to its doctrine of strategic autonomy, carefully steering clear of security alliances with any major global power. By doing so, it has maintained a significant presence in the geopolitical landscape. This includes participation in U.S.-led minilateral forums, such as the Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and its West Asian counterpart, I2U2, which comprises India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.</p><p>The U.S. and its allies consider India vital to their strategies to counter the economic, military and technological rise of China. However, New Delhi also remains deeply integrated within forums such as BRICS and the SCO, where Chinese interests play a major role. Despite its rivalry with China, including periodic violent incidents like the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, relations between the world’s two most populous nations have remained functional. China is one of India’s top trading partners, and in October 2024, the two countries signed an agreement to manage their border conflict, which has so far proven effective.</p><p>How multi-alignment boosts India’s global influence</p><p>For the past 78 years, India has effectively maintained its policy of multi-alignment and multilateralism. However, the factors that have historically benefited it now appear to be on the verge of change. During the Cold War, both the U.S. and Soviet Union courted India’s favor without encroaching on its South Asian sphere of influence. This dynamic allowed India to punch above its weight in the bipolar world order.</p><p>At the end of the Cold War, the U.S., as the dominant global power during a distinct unipolar phase, viewed India’s rise through the lens of strategic altruism. Since 1993, successive American administrations have supported the nation’s growth on diplomatic, economic and military fronts, integrating it into their vision of the global security architecture. Several factors, particularly the need to counter China’s rise, drove the alignment between one of the world’s oldest and largest democracies.</p><p>Beijing’s ambition to replace the U.S.-led global order with a China-led one poses a challenge to India’s influence in the Indian Ocean. China’s efforts to reframe the rules, institutions and alliances in the region are being pursued relentlessly through economic statecraft and the use of dual-purpose infrastructure like ports and logistics hubs. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) acts as a key driver for promoting China’s interests in the Indian Ocean.</p><p>China has become an economic, technological and military powerhouse that India is struggling to match. In 1989, the difference between the GDPs of India and China was only $50 million. By 2012, China’s GDP was six times larger, with a defense budget three times that of India. Today, China is the largest trading partner for all of India’s neighbors and claims the Indian Ocean region as part of its orbit of power. Moreover, it has made significant inroads into South Asia, particularly in Pakistan.</p><p>Concerns about China have ensured that, despite closer alignment with the U.S., India will continue to maintain strong relations with Russia. While the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy focuses on maritime issues and on the Asian landmass, Moscow has consistently served as New Delhi’s continental counterbalance to Beijing. From India’s perspective, even a diminished Russia holds geopolitical advantages: It remains a key member of the United Nations Security Council with veto power, a reliable supplier of arms and a crucial source of energy. Its engagement with Russia is not merely a relic of Cold War nostalgia; it is a deliberate hedge.</p><p>Nevertheless, India has never depended solely on the global powers of the day. Instead, it has fostered strong relationships with various middle powers and smaller nations, whether through the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War or current alliances within the Global Majority. Particularly since the 1990s, New Delhi has built upon its historical connections with countries in Southeast Asia, East Asia and the Middle East, enhancing cooperation in economic, energy, technological and security sectors. This strategy of balancing and hedging has paid off over the decades.</p><p>Challenges in a shifting global order</p><p>The post-Cold War order, led by a confident U.S. with unmatched economic and military strength and no real peer competitor, gave India several advantages. It fostered an atmosphere conducive to globalization, allowing several middle powers to flourish economically. India’s economic liberalization, along with the flow of labor and capital, benefited considerably from American and allied support. The favorable international environment enabled India to pursue economic reform while preserving its strategic autonomy.</p><p>All of this rested on a globalized world, where supply chains crisscrossed land and sea boundaries. However, the Covid-19 pandemic and the rise of populism have led to a resurgence of protectionism. India will need to adapt to this new, more protectionist global reality. For instance, while India has the third-largest reserves of rare earth minerals in the world, it has only tapped into a small portion of these resources and continues to rely heavily on countries like China. It also depends on global partners for trade, access to energy, markets, technology and capital.</p><p>A U.S. administration that prioritizes building American industrial capacity, especially at the cost of open trade and access to cutting-edge technology, risks narrowing the very foundation of the India-U.S. partnership. This approach may compel New Delhi to seek other mutually beneficial alliances.</p><p>Since gaining independence in 1947, the Indian state has sought a multipolar world order. Although achieving this goal has been difficult, especially during the Cold War and in the years that followed, India has adeptly maintained its role as a pivotal middle power. Historically, its ability to navigate global upheaval relied on an engaged U.S., a robust Soviet Russia and a relatively weaker China. Today, India faces serious challenges in preserving its strategic autonomy, securing its borders and sustaining its ascent in a world with a disengaged America, a weaker Russia and a stronger China.</p><p>India’s key risk is that for the first time in 78 years, it has a territorial dispute with one of the two current global powers and a likely future hegemon, China. Beijing not only claims part of New Delhi’s sphere of influence but is also attempting to strategically encircle the nation. This development coincides with the current global superpower, the U.S., appearing to step back from its traditional role as the guarantor of international order, with its diplomatic focus often wavering.</p><p>Shaping the evolving multipolar world to suit India’s needs is more difficult than it was before, when the U.S., Europe and Japan viewed India’s rise as a key pillar of their own strategies.</p><p>Scenarios</p><p>Highly likely: India doubles down on its doctrine of strategic autonomy</p><p>Indian diplomacy faces a multifaceted challenge from an unpredictable American presidency, an aggressive China and a world in flux. While India will remain a significant partner even for a transactional U.S. administration, the lack of trust or assurance of support in the economic, military and diplomatic realms means that New Delhi is likely to revert to its default approach of multi-alignment.</p><p>For New Delhi, Washington’s response to the April-May 2025 India-Pakistan skirmishes was disappointing. India, a nation that fiercely guards its strategic autonomy, has always resisted third-party interference in its bilateral disputes, especially with neighbors like Pakistan or China. Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, sharply dismissed the U.S. public claims and repeated assertions of mediating the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. The Modi administration is also wary of Washington seemingly re-hyphenating the two nations after two and a half decades, suggesting an equal treatment of India and Pakistan.</p><p>A less engaged America, or one that equates the two South Asian nations, risks reviving Cold War-era skepticism of the U.S. within India and will have an impact on economic and security ties.</p><p>The high likelihood that the Trump presidency will bring about continuous disruptions in the global order means that India is more likely to reinforce its traditional approach of strategic autonomy, rather than shifting closer to the U.S.</p><p>The Modi government will also assess whether actions by the second Trump administration are merely tactical maneuvers or signal a deeper, more lasting change in the U.S. strategic posture. That distinction could determine the limits of India’s engagement.</p><p>If it is the former, then India is likely to overlook public rhetoric and continue its current strategy of aligning with the U.S. while maintaining relations with Russia, balancing China and preserving ties with key partners in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. However, if sanctions are imposed on India for purchasing military equipment from Russia, the ramifications for India’s defense interests would be substantial.</p><p>A weakened Russia, facing further sanctions, will become increasingly dependent on China and lose its credibility as a continental counterweight; any loss of Moscow’s strategic independence will accelerate China’s influence across Eurasia. This also means India will struggle to purchase energy affordably and obtain supplies and spare parts for its Russian-made defense equipment.</p><p>Least likely: U.S. actions prompt India to revert to Cold War strategy</p><p>The least likely scenario would occur if actions with long-term consequences take place. This includes a U.S.-China trade deal that harms India’s economy or statements from Washington that seem to signal a retreat from Asia or a turn inward. If that also leads to a weakened U.S.-Indo-Pacific policy – whether due to deliberate shifts or domestic priorities – then minilateral groups such as the Quad could gradually lose their relevance.</p><p>Without sustained American initiative and resolve, the Quad risks becoming merely a diplomatic formality, returning the Indo-Pacific region to an arena of unmediated rivalry. The Indian state has always believed it can only rely on itself, a conviction rooted in its instinctive response to external vulnerability. U.S. actions harmful to Indian interests, even if temporary, would reaffirm India’s historical preference for protectionism and indigenization in economic and defense matters.</p><p>India is also likely to revert to its Cold War strategy of hedging its bets in the economic realm by strengthening ties with other middle powers to shield itself from the turbulence of a volatile global order. The pushback against threats from China is fraught with structural asymmetries and geopolitical entanglements that do not lend themselves to simple solutions.</p><p>The main challenge is that, unlike a global power such as the U.S., the willingness and capacity of other middle powers to either counterbalance or support Beijing will depend on their interests, which may or may not align with India’s.</p><p>Read in GIS Reports.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Foreign Policy </p> India’s Multi-Alignment and Rising Geopolitical Profile \| Hudson Institute	查看 16005	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215567	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>View PDF</p><p>Executive Summary</p><p>As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strengthens its regime and pursues global dominance, it faces significant and complex structural challenges. Domestically, Chinese economic growth is declining drastically under misguided policies while an aging population and declining birth rates affect the country’s labor supply, consumption, and social security system. The housing market is in crisis as millions of apartments remain unsold and real estate developers go bankrupt, and high youth unemployment creates further instability. Political corruption in the CCP, bureaucratic inefficiency, and other waste also hinder economic progress and public trust.</p><p>Internationally, trade tensions with the United States and other Western nations threaten exports and foreign direct investment. And Beijing’s coercive policies complicate relations with the Global South, where countries often owe debt to China. Diplomats and other officials at international organizations are increasingly skeptical of the China’s global influence, making foreign policy more difficult.</p><p>While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has weathered crises before, a sudden regime collapse in China is not entirely unthinkable. Policymakers need to consider what might happen and what steps they would have to take if the world’s longest-ruling Communist dictatorship and second-largest economy collapses due to its domestic and international troubles.</p><p>With chapters written by experts in military affairs, intelligence, economics, human rights, transitional justice, and constitutional governance, this report examines the initial steps that should be taken in the immediate aftermath of the CCP regime’s collapse and the long-term trajectory China might take after a stabilization period. Drawing on historical analysis, strategic foresight, and domain-specific expertise, this anthology describes these challenges as an exercise in possibilities. The different chapters explore how a single-party system collapses in key sectors of the country and how political institutions transform, as well as China’s unique political, economic, and social situation. Taken together, they assess the daunting tasks of stabilizing a long-repressed country after it has collapsed, in addition to the forces shaping China’s future. In so doing, the authors hope to offer policy recommendations for managing the risks and opportunities of a transition.</p><p>The chapter “OSS in China Again: The Role of US Special Operations Forces after CCP Collapse,” written by an author outside Hudson Institute, describes US operations in China during World War II and suggests that US special operations forces (SOF) can help stabilize a post-CCP China. It envisions SOF aiding provisional authorities, protecting critical infrastructure, and facilitating the peaceful emergence of a new government while working “by, with, and through” local actors. The chapter also underscores the cultural importance of narratives, historical memory, and symbolic legitimacy in a post-Communist transition.</p><p>In the second chapter, “Targeting Bioweapons Facilities with Precision after a CCP Regime Collapse,” Ryan Clarke assesses the CCP’s bioweapons infrastructure and warns that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) dual-use biological research poses a strategic threat. He outlines three options for neutralizing bioweapons labs, with an emphasis on simultaneous operations, control of facility perimeters, and safe extraction or destruction of hazardous materials. The chapter argues for completely disabling the programs to prevent proliferation and catastrophe.</p><p>Clarke then advocates for overhauling the Chinese economy by recapitalizing the country while a new government repudiates illegitimate debts, privatizes state assets, and implements decentralization in “Restructuring the Chinese Financial System after CCP Collapse.” He emphasizes that CCP policies have constrained China’s economic potential and argues that a liberalized financial architecture is essential for both domestic prosperity and integration with global markets.</p><p>In the chapter “Securing China’s Assets in America,” Gordon G. Chang advises Washington to “get American businesses and citizens out of China” and to remove PRC entities from important sectors of the US economy. It highlights vulnerabilities of engaging with Beijing and describes what America should do with PRC assets in the US.</p><p>Rick Fisher in “Securing and Restructuring the PLA, PAP, and People’s Militia” outlines a post-CCP demobilization and professionalization plan for China’s vast security apparatus. It recommends retaining a leaner, more accountable military force focused on national defense and disaster relief while disbanding units associated with political repression. A Chinese military force without hegemonic ambitions can then help a new government integrate into peacekeeping operations and space exploration partnerships.</p><p>The chapter “Spy Versus Spy Versus Spies: The CCP’s Security and Espionage Apparatus in the Absence of Central Authority” explores the potential fragmentation of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and local Public Security Bureaus (PSBs). It draws lessons from European political transitions, particularly in dismantling secret police networks and opening archives for public scrutiny.</p><p>In “China’s Autonomous Regions and Human Rights,” Nina Shea discusses the importance of protecting human rights during a transitional period. According to her, the US should intervene to prevent ethnic violence, civil wars, and political retribution, with a special focus on China’s five autonomous regions— Guangxi, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia. She also highlights the need for measures to alleviate the grievances of other groups, including religious minorities like Christians and the Falun Gong.</p><p>The author of “How to Initiate a Truth and Reconciliation Process in China” describes how China can only move beyond past evils through the investigation and public disclosure of those crimes. The chapter recommends establishing a national truth and reconciliation commission modeled after South Africa’s, and argues that peacefully transitioning to democracy will be difficult without forgiveness and reconciliation.</p><p>The final chapter, “A Constitutional Convention Plan,” focuses on how a post-Communist China can establish a constitutional democracy and draft a new constitution. It addresses how a constitutional convention would work, whether the boundaries of certain regions should be redrawn, how China’s relationship with Taiwan should change, and what the new country’s name should be.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Politics and Government Corruption </p> China after Communism: Preparing for a Post-CCP China \| Hudson Institute	查看 9536	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215566	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>Anthony Albanese says he will use Australian power and influence to advance peace and security in the region rather than be dictated to by any great power.</p><p>They seem to be sensible words that most Australians would agree with. There is nothing wrong with the Prime Minister visiting China, prioritising the pursuit of peace and security or insisting that Australia will choose its own path.</p><p>But even using Albanese’s own metrics for success, loose facts and wrong assumptions are leading him to failure.</p><p>There is a narrative forming that Albanese seems happy to encourage: while the Australian government is pursuing a stabilisation agenda with China, the Trump administration is up-ending global trade and demanding loyal allies such as Australia offer unrealistic guarantees that it will use US-made nuclear-powered submarines to join a hypothetical defence of Taiwan.</p><p>False or unbalanced narratives lead to poor assessments and responses. Consider one of Albanese’s key positions that he is a champion of free and fair trade.</p><p>The championing of the latter has arisen largely because of Donald Trump’s predilection for tariffs. Back in April, Albanese admonished the US that imposing tariffs on Australia was not the “act of a friend”. I can’t remember Albanese saying the same thing about the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which will affect Australia and impose a carbon tariff on certain goods imported into the EU from countries with lower carbon reduction emission standards.</p><p>Put aside the measures China imposed on Australian exporters several years ago that were explicitly for coercive purposes to change our domestic and foreign policy settings. Although scathing of Trump’s tariffs, Albanese has never admonished China for its industrial policies that are far more distortive than any Trumpian economic policy.</p><p>For example, a recent OECD report on industrial subsidies, covering almost 500 of the world’s largest manufacturing companies from more than 50 countries, found that Chinese subsidies given to local firms surpassed the assistance other governments offered by a considerable margin.</p><p>In many cases, Chinese subsidies in sectors considered critical to national prosperity and strength, and in which global competition was fiercest, exceeded 15 per cent of revenue. The companies that made the largest gains in market share in key manufacturing sectors since 2005 were all heavily subsidised Chinese firms.</p><p>The point is that Albanese has accepted without contestation the false narrative that Trump’s America, and not China, is the greater threat to economic peace and stability in the world.</p><p>This misrepresentation is even more apparent in strategic and military matters.</p><p>The highly relevant and parallel issue is reporting that the Americans want to know what Australia’s response will be if there is a war over Taiwan and the US is involved.</p><p>This is being assessed as part of a review of AUKUS. The Labor government’s reaction is to resent the question as an imposition. China still may be identified formally as the strategic threat, but Albanese seems to be relieved that Beijing is not forcing Australia to make impossible choices.</p><p>As mentioned, false narratives lead to poor responses. Trump is not the most serious disruption to the strategic order. China’s Xi Jinping comfortably holds that title.</p><p>Albanese may be technically correct that Chinese live-fire exercises are within the letter of international law. The question is why China is doing it.</p><p>The US, Japan, The Philippines, Australia and other countries do not conduct exercises to perfect the seizure of Taiwan, the occupation of Japanese-owned islands or to consolidate the occupation of illegal artificial islands in the South China Sea. Only China does that.</p><p>When the US wants to know what we will do in a Taiwan crisis, it is a matter of due diligence. If Australia sold a regional power some of our most potent military weapons that we believe will be needed in a possible contingency, would we not inquire what they intend to do with those weapons?</p><p>Albanese is free to decide what he thinks is the best policy for the country. But alldecisions have consequences. Australia has every right to define and limit the extent to which it will be involved in a Taiwan contingency in terms of the joint infrastructure we offer to allies and our sovereign military assets we offer to the fight.</p><p>We also have the right to remain tight-lipped about what we might, let alone will, do in the event of war. But the US has every right to react to subsequent assessments about our intentions and capabilities (or lack of it) as it sees fit.</p><p>It is hardly fair to label Trump as the troublemaker. It is Xi who will be the harbinger of disruption and possibly destruction.</p><p>This is the problem with Albanese’s visit to China and his willingness to meet Xi halfway but not Trump. The US is responding to instability created by China and is not the cause or agent of it.</p><p>Albanese’s visit to China is troubling because he is ignorantly or willingly reaffirming false facts and narratives.</p><p>Read in The Australian.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Politics and Government Foreign Policy </p> Donald Trump Isn’t the Troublemaker, PM—That’s China’s Xi Jinping \| Hudson Institute	查看 8043	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215565	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>View PDF</p><p>Takeaways</p>Though not a mutual defense alliance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) remains the most important multilateral security structure in Central Asia that includes both Russia and China.Participating in SCO exercises provided the Chinese military with some of its first opportunities to rehearse power projection capabilities.The SCO has ceased holding its large Peace Mission series of exercises; other drills occur but less regularly.Despite differences regarding the SCO and the organization’s declining relative importance to Russia and China, the two countries have sustained a robust security partnership within the organization and in Central Asia.<p>Executive Summary</p><p>Though the SCO is not a traditional mutual defense alliance,many Sino-Russian military exercises with Central Asian partners have occurred under its auspices. These drills helped develop contacts, improve operational proficiency, enhance interoperability, and demonstrate deterrence capabilities to external observers. The SCO also established the first military confidence-building measures and multilateral counterterrorism networks among the Russian, Chinese, and Central Asian governments. Yet, since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the SCO has ceased holding its biannual Peace Mission series of large multinational military exercises while continuing other drills on an irregular basis.</p><p>The Russian government welcomes the SCO as a prominent non-Western multinational structure that can advance its regional diplomatic, economic, and security goals. Participating in the SCO elevates Russia’s diplomatic status, helps it pursue economic integration in Asia, and supports its advocacy for a Eurasian security system independent of the West.Through the SCO,the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can pursue its intertwined economic and security objectives in Central Asia within a cooperative multilateral structure that does not disrupt its other regional initiatives.</p><p>During the SCO’s early evolution, Russia was the most important contributor to its security activities. Russian contingents have subsequently participated in most SCO-related drills, and manyother members’ armed forces employ Soviet/Russian military equipment. In the economic domain, Russia has made progress in encouraging SCO governments to use more non-Western financial instruments, which are less vulnerable to international sanctions. However, members have not yet established a separate SCO payment system ora Greater Eurasian Partnership.</p><p>Beijing has been the driving force behind the SCO’s evolution outside the security realm. PRC discourse emphasizes the congruence of Chinese-SCO values and takes pride in how the so-called Shanghai Spirit animates the organization. More concretely, China can use the SCO to advance its priority programs and challenge Western influence in Central Asia. The organization accomplishes this goal without overtly threatening Russian interests by characterizing its activities as SCO rather than PRC projects.In the defense domain, participating in SCO exercises gave the Chinese military some initial opportunities to rehearse power projection missions, though thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA)has since prioritized other geographic contingencies. The PRC has set forth an ambitious agenda for the SCO during its current chairmanship.</p><p>The Russian and Chinese governments have pursued conflicting policies regarding the SCO, especially concerning the organization’s economic policies and, more recently, proposed changes to its unanimous voting requirement. Nonetheless, they have successfully managed their divergences within the SCO and kept these differences from damaging their overall partnership.The organization’s enlarging membership will likely decrease its focus on Central Asia but make it a more effective tool for Moscow and Beijing to project influence elsewhere.</p><p>Hudson Institute has produced this paper for the study Russia-China Security Interactions in Central Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Dimensions. This project analyzes the Sino-Russian relationship in Central Asia through three case studies. The first two papers assess Russian and Chinese ties with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which have the largest economies and populations in the region. The third paper evaluates Sino-Russian interactions with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A final paper draws on these three texts and other data to assess Russia’s and China’s overall relationships in Central Asia, project their future interactions in various scenarios, and evaluate the implications for the United States and its partners.Senior Fellow Richard Weitz is the primary author of the paper. Alexiya Mikerina, Marie Mach, Alexander Peris, and Ryan Wright provided research assistance.David Altman, Jack Feise,Mark Melton, Konstantin Shchelkunov, and Hannah Skaggs helped edit the text, while Ian Maready helped with the design. Hudson Institute would like to thank the Russia Strategic Initiative of the US European Command for funding this study.</p><p>This publication was funded by the Russia Strategic Initiative U.S. European Command. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.</p><p>Introduction</p><p>This paper first reviews the history and structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The following section analyzes Russia’s and China’s diplomatic, economic, and security goals regarding the organization. The paper then details how Moscow and Beijing pursue their regional agendas within the SCO framework. The final section assesses how Russia and China have managed their policy divergences concerning the SCO. It also projects how the organization’s evolution could impact the two countries’ influence in Central Asia and other regions.</p><p>Paper Roadmap</p>Executive SummarySCO History and StructureRussian and Chinese GoalsRussian and Chinese Tools of InfluenceRussia-China InteractionsSCO Evolution Scenarios<p>History and Structure</p><p>The SCO is a unique organization—neither a traditional mutual defense alliance nor a multinational economic institution.It is the world’s largest regional organization in terms of population, geography, and combinedeconomic output. It also has a more comprehensive agenda than most regional organizations, encompassing security, economic, and social questions. Though it has a narrower geographic focus than some other groups, the SCO has become one of the most prominent non-Western institutions connecting Russia with the People’s Republic of Chinaand other partners.</p><p>The organization’s original purpose was to regularize relations between China and thefour newly independent countriesthat emerged along its western and northern borders following the Soviet Union’sabrupt dissolution(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the Russian Federation). In 1996, these statesbegan holding annual presidential summits within a so-called Shanghai Five format to discuss select regional issues. In 2001, the five governments established theSCO to institutionalize their interactions. Besides continuing the annual leadership summits, renamed as meetings of the SCO Heads of State Council, theybegan holding regular meetings of their foreign, defense, law enforcement, economic, and other national agencies. They also broadened the geographic scope of their interactions by including Uzbekistan, which does not border China. At their June 2002 summit in St. Petersburg, the SCO governments adopted a charter establishing the organization’s principles, objectives, agenda, and structure.<sup>1</sup></p><p>The SCO pursues many security activities. Early on, its member governments adopted several confidence-building measures regulating military activities along their joint borders. Additionally, they hold recurring meetings among their defense ministers, armed forces chiefs, general staffs, and other security agencies. Some of these sessions occur on the sidelines of bilateral and multilateral interagency summits. Since 2003, the SCO has organized frequent antiterrorist exercises that have involved regular armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and border security personnel. These exercises serve multiple purposes, including developing contacts,improving proficiency, enhancing interoperability, and reassuring member governments.</p><p>Before the Russian military launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the members held large Peace Missionexercises approximately every two years. These drills involved large troop contingents from multiple countries. But the last exercise using that moniker occurred in 2021, at the Donguz training range in Russia’s Orenburg Oblast. Eight SCO members—China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—contributed approximately 4,000 military personnel to Peace Mission 2021, which simulated attacking terrorist targets.<sup>2</sup></p><p>Interestingly, the August 2022 SCO Defense Ministerial stated that the members “decided to hold a joint military counter-terrorist command post exercise Peaceful Mission 2023 in the Russian Federation on responding to new tactics used by international terrorists.” The joint communiqué further observed that “Russia suggested that during this exercise, the interested parties focus on countering unmanned aerial vehicles, ensuring information security, and preventing terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological weapons.”<sup>3</sup></p><p>Though several SCO members, notably China, participated in Russia’s annual strategic command post exercises in 2022 and 2024, the next major SCO exercise, Interaction-2024, did not occur until July 2024. According to the PRC media, this drill in China’s XinjiangUygur Autonomous Region “marks the first time the relevant agencies from all SCO member states have participated in a joint counter-terrorism live drill.”<sup>4</sup> The military and law enforcement personnel from the 10 participating countries rehearsed employing helicopters, armored vehicles, robotic dogs, and aerial drones against terrorist groups.<sup>5</sup></p><p>The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, signed at the organization’s founding 2001 summit, commits the members to countering the three “evil forces” of international terrorism, ethno-separatism, and political “extremism.”<sup>6</sup> The SCO subsequently institutionalized counterterrorist cooperation by creating a Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. Since its official opening in June 2004, the RATS has promoted studies of Eurasian terrorist movements, facilitated data sharing regarding terrorist threats, and exchanged advice on counterterrorism policies. It has also coordinated exercises among SCO security forces and organized efforts to disrupt terrorist financing.<sup>7</sup></p><p>The 2022 Samarkand Summit Declaration reiterated long-standing calls to compile “a unified list of terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations whose activities are prohibited” by SCO members, suggesting the organization has not been able to realize this perennial goal.<sup>8</sup> Following a decade of growing interest in cybersecurity, internet control software, and information-technology-enhanced surveillance, the RATS established “information security” as a priority work issue in 2023.<sup>9</sup> It is currently facilitating the Program of Cooperation between the SCO Member States Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism for 2025–2027.<sup>10-</sup></p><p>SCO leaders consistently deny any intention of creating a Eurasian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Article IV of the SCO friendship and cooperation treaty, signed in August 2007, affirms that “the Contracting Parties shall not participate in alliances or organizations directed against other Contracting Parties and shall not support any actions hostile to other Contracting Parties.”<sup>11</sup> The SCO has officially remained a security organization (i.e., one focused on combating transnational nonstate threats such as terrorism) rather than becoming a collective defense structure like NATO (i.e., one possessing capabilities for waging conventional wars against nonmember countries). Its activities promote confidence-building measures, strengthen border controls, and facilitate law enforcement and intelligence cooperation against transnational threats.</p><p>The SCO’s charter does not authorize collective defense operations, and the organization lacks dedicated military forces, an integrated command structure, or a combined planning staff. Any large multinational military operation that members participate in under SCO’s auspices would have to involve an ad hoc effort by their national militaries.</p><p>During the 2023–24 Kazakhstan presidency, the SCO held 150 events, made Belarus the tenth full member, and signed some 60 strategic documents encompassing primarily energy, economic, and counternarcotics issues. Due to the summit’s decision, the organization now has 10 full members, several formal observer states, and more than a dozen dialogue partners in the SCO Plus framework (see figure 1). The July 2024 Astana summit also launched a new SCO Investors Association to encourage direct and portfolio investment in member countries’ priority sectors.<sup>12</sup> Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Kemeluly Tokayev’s proposal for developing military confidence-building measures for combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism remains under consideration.<sup>13</sup> The members also discussed establishing an SCO anti-drug center in Dushanbe.<sup>14</sup></p><p>Figure 1. SCO Membersand Dialogue Partners</p><p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/styles/16_9_sm/public/2025-07/SCO_Map-01.png?h=1fefb041&itok=DYvcOZ5Y" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Source: Adapted fromBeth Warrington,“Shanghai Cooperation Organization Members and Dialogue Partners in 2023,” in Edward A. Lynch and Susanna Helms, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Military Review (January/February 2024),https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Shanghai.</p><p>Russian Goals</p><p>Moscow’s Objectives Regarding the SCO</p>Promote non-Western international institutionsHighlight Russia’s international prominenceInfluence other members’ policiesCounter terrorism and other transnational threatsEncourage use of non-Western financial instruments<p>The Russian government routinely promotes non-Western multinational structures, such as the SCO, as tools to disrupt the established international order. In July 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the SCO had “firmly established itself as one of the key pillars of a fair, multipolar world order.”<sup>15</sup> He advocated “creating a novel architecture in Eurasia of cooperation, indivisible security, and development ... to replace the obsolete Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models that gave unilateral advantages only to individual states.”<sup>16</sup> The previous month, Putin said Russia aimed to leverage the SCO and other regional institutions to build “a new system of bilateral and multilateral guarantees of collective security in Eurasia” that would work toward “phasing out the military presence of external powers in the Eurasian region.”<sup>17</sup></p><p>The March 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federationadvocates the same institutional integration in the economic realm. It envisages a Greater Eurasian Partnershipthat aggregates the “potential of all the states, regional organizations and Eurasian associations, based on the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union], the SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as the conjunction of the EAEU development plans and the Chinese initiative ‘One Belt One Road’ [later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI] while preserving the possibility for all the interested states and multilateral associations of the Eurasian continent to participate in this partnership and—as a result—establishment of a network of partner organizations in Eurasia.”<sup>18</sup></p><p>Participating in SCO activities allows the Russian government to demonstrate that it is not internationally isolated despite its aggression against Ukraine and its other abhorrent political-military policies. For example, Putin’s attendance at the 2022 SCO summit in Samarkand marked his first in-person foreign meeting with international leaders since Russia invaded Ukraine again in February 2022 (see figure 2). Though no other attending leaders backed Russia’s actions regarding Ukraine, none openly censored them either. Senior representatives of international organizations, including United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in 2024, have also attended recent SCO summits with Putin.</p><p>Russian officials further perceive the SCO as a tool against regional terrorist threats, including as a means to influence other members’ counterterrorism policies. Central Asian nationals were involved in the most severe recent terrorist attack against Russia, the Crocus City Hall concert assault on March 22, 2024. The Islamic State—Khorasan Province (referred to as ISIS-K, ISKP, or IS-Khorasan) group based in Afghanistan orchestrated the attack. Russian officials have also praised the SCO’s contributions to countering narcotics trafficking.<sup>19</sup></p><p>Chinese Goals</p><p>Beijing’s Objectives Regarding the SCO</p>Be an institutional rule-maker rather than rule-takerReassure other members about China’s growing regional presenceSecure China’s western bordersImprove the PRC’s antiterrorism and power-projection capabilitiesAdvance China’s regional economic agendaComplement Beijing’s other international initiatives<p>For Beijing, the SCO is valuable for projecting economic and security influence in Central Asia without infringing on Russia’s traditional role as the region’s primary security provider. China can advance these goals directly through SCO-related measures. It can do so indirectly by leveraging the organization’s diplomatic and economic ties to induce other governments to pursue PRC-favored policies, such as suppressing anti-PRC messaging and embracing Beijing-backed economic initiatives.</p><p>In the security domain, the PRC can leverage the SCO to secure its western borders (which encompass Xinjiang, where the local Uyghur population is resisting Beijing’s assimilation policies). The organization also gives it a means to thwart international terrorist threats (especially from Afghanistan, an operations center for regional terrorist groups) and protect its extensive energy and other economic interests in other members from violent attacks.<sup>20</sup>PRC President Xi Jinpingtold the other SCO leaders in July 2024 that “security is a prerequisite for national development, and safety is the lifeline to happiness of the people. No matter how the international landscape changes, our Organization must hold the bottom line of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.”<sup>21</sup></p><p>China also wants the SCO to complement—or at least not impede—its other economic, security, and ideological foreign policy instruments. These have waxed and waned over the years but have most prominently included the BRI and, more recently, the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative. The PRC has also launched a dedicated China–Central Asia mechanism with leadership summits and a permanent secretariat.<sup>22</sup> The Xiangshan Forum, an annual defense and security conference that the PLA oversees, also regularly includes senior Central Asian and other SCO representatives.<sup>23</sup></p><p>Despite the advent of these more recent instruments, Chinese support for the SCO remains strong. More than half of the approximately 10,000 attendees at the 2024 Astana summit were Chinese nationals.<sup>24</sup> Xi has welcomed the organization’s recent expansion of ties beyond Eurasia, highlighting how the “SCO member states have friends across the world.”<sup>25</sup></p><p>Figure 2. Leaders of SCO Member States at the September 2022 Summit in Samarkand</p><p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/styles/16_9_sm/public/2025-07/SCO%20Meeting%20Sep%202022%20%281%29.png?h=7c24e711&itok=QirdHWvj" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Source: Narendra Modi (@narendramodi), “With SCO leaders at the Summit in Samarkand.,”Twitter (now X), September 16, 2022, https://x.com/narendramodi/status/1570687339713929217.</p><p>Russian Means</p><p>Moscow’s tools of influence concerning the SCO</p>Participate in nearly all SCO projectsEncourage widespread use of Soviet/Russian military equipment and proceduresLeverage other countries’ interest in cooperating with the SCOStrengthen ties with other Moscow-backed regional institutions<p>Russia has contributed critically to the SCO’s security activities throughout its evolution.Russian forces almost always participate in, and sometimes host, SCO-related drills. Many other members use military equipment of Russian or Soviet origin, and Russia is also important to the SCO’s counterterrorism efforts. According to Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Russian government has for several years advocated establishing a unified center, based on the RATS, to address narcotics trafficking, terrorist financing, and other organized crime that can exacerbate terrorist threats.<sup>26</sup></p><p>Putin often praises the SCO’s contributions in his bilateral meetings with Central Asian leaders.<sup>27</sup> Lavrov also regularly mentions its positive role to other member governments.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, Moscow leverages other countries’ interest in joining theorganization. For instance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently requested Putin’s support for his country’s membership aspirations.<sup>29</sup></p><p>In his presentation to the 2024 SCO Astana summit, Putin advocated “creating a new Eurasian architecture of cooperation, indivisible security and development.... to replace the obsoleteEurope-centric and Euro-Atlantic models that gave unilateral advantages only to individual states.”<sup>30</sup> As noted, Russian diplomacy advocates this SCO-related restructuring in both the economic and security domains. According to Putin, the core components of the new Eurasian security system could include a partnership among the Union State of Belarus and Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the SCO.<sup>31</sup> When Putin confirmed he would attend the China-hosted SCO leadership summit in September 2024, he affirmed that the organization “will make further efforts to interconnect the integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Belt and Road Initiative with a view to forming a greater Eurasian partnership in the future.”<sup>32</sup></p><p>Some of Russia’s most important economic partners belong to the SCO. Moscow has sought to enhance mutual commercial ties by encouraging the use of non-Western financial instruments, which are less vulnerable to international sanctions. At the 2024 Astana summit, Putin welcomed the use of national currencies in 92 percent of Russia’s transactions with other members from January to April 2024.<sup>33</sup>This growth, though, is due to the initiative of individual member governments rather than collective efforts within the SCO, which presently lacks intergovernmental financial cooperation mechanisms. The Russian government has repeatedly, if unsuccessfully, proposed establishing a payment and settlement system within the SCO to surmount this impediment.<sup>34</sup></p><p>Russia has also recently tried to polish its green energy credentials through the SCO. In April 2025, it hosted the first SCO Sustainable Development Forum in Omsk Oblast, where participating governments talked about decreasing their carbon emissions, adapting to climate change, and assessing regional and global sustainable development models.<sup>35</sup></p><p>However, the Russian government has cultivated alternative Eurasian institutions as well. China and others have opposed adding an overtly military dimension to the SCO, to which the Russian government has responded by augmenting the CSTO. Unlike the SCO, the CSTO has become a genuine military alliance that can mobilize standing multinational forces against threats. Moscow has also promoted SCO ties with the CSTO and the CIS, which held a one-day joint counterterrorism exercise (Eurasia-Antiterror—2023) with the SCO in September 2023 (see figure 3).<sup>36</sup></p><p>The EAEU has acquired roles that the SCO could have assumed if Sino-Russian disputes had not impeded it. Russian analysts note that, with Belarus’s recent elevation to full SCO membership, four of the five EAEU members (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus) belong to the SCO, while the fifth EAEU member, Armenia, is an SCO dialogue partner.<sup>37</sup> The EAEU has also established a free trade agreement with SCO member Iran.<sup>38</sup> More recently, Moscow has promoted development of the BRICS (a grouping that originally includedBrazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which includes many leading SCO countries but also important extra-Eurasian members such as Brazil and South Africa.</p><p>Chinese Means</p><p>Beijing’s Means of Influence Concerning the SCO</p>Stress congruence of PRC-SCO valuesClaim mutually beneficial win-win outcomesParticipate in SCO exercises and other security engagementsAdvance Chinese economic objectivesCharacterize PRC projects as SCO activitiesStrengthen ties with other Beijing-backed regional initiatives, such as the BRIExpand SCO’s agenda<p>Beijing has been the driving force behind the SCO’s evolution. More established international organizations required the PRC to accept membership on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. However, Chinese officials have arguably driven the SCO’s design and evolution more than any other country—assuming the preferred role of rule-shaper rather than merely a rule-taker. Manifestations of China’s elevated role in theSCO are evident: Shanghai is in the organization’s name, and its headquarters are in Beijing. PRCwritings and statements also emphasize the congruence of SCO and Chinese values and speak of a “Shanghai Spirit of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and pursuit of common development” as “a new driving force for equitable, just and reasonable international political, economic and security order ... welcome from the outside world.”<sup>39</sup>As a vague concept, adherence to the Shanghai Spirit imposes few constraints on specific Chinese policies.</p><p>More concretely, China has found the SCO useful for advancing its programs and challenging Western influence in Central Asia without overtly threatening Russian interests there. Denouncing “the real threat of Cold War mentality” at the July 2024 SCO leadership summit, Xi called on member states to “consolidate the power of unity” to counter “external interference.”<sup>40</sup>Chinese leaders leverage SCO events to promote PRC initiatives regarding other members. For example, Minister of National Defense Dong Juntook advantage of a recent meeting of the SCO Council of Defense Ministers in Astana to engage with Kazakhstan’s defense establishment.<sup>41</sup></p><p>According to one PRC source, “the Chinese military and police personnel had the first regular encounter with their foreign counterparts” through participation in SCO exercises.<sup>42</sup> These drills still provide regular opportunities for the PRC to enhance its regional power projection capabilities, rehearsing “air-ground combat operations in foreign countries, undertaking a range of operations including long-distance mobilization, counterterrorism missions, stability maintenance operations, and conventional warfare.”<sup>43 </sup>The Chinese armed forces have also tested new technology, such as drones, in SCO drills.</p><p>The 2018 Agreement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States on Joint Military Exercises provides an international legal foundation for the PLA to deploy on other members’ territories for SCO drills.<sup>44 </sup>The PRC has leveraged the SCO to expand its professional military education (PME) outreach to Central Asian states, establishing a training institute for SCO officers in 2014.<sup>45</sup> However, during the last decade, the SCO has arguably become less important to the PLA’s development. China’s military has increased its capabilities remarkably in recent years and has developed a robust defense partnership with Russia, conducting many more exercises with the Russian armed forces than with any other foreign military.</p><p>In the economic domain, the PRC’s aggregate trade with all SCO member states, observer states, and dialogue partners reached a record $890 billion in 2024, amounting to 14.4 percent of China’s total exports.<sup>46</sup> The PRC has strived to embed the BRI within the SCO framework to overcome other countries’ concerns about its initiatives.By characterizing its activities as SCO rather than PRC projects, the Chinese government can decrease regional anxieties about them. Yet, thanks to its growing economic primacy in Eurasia, China can bypass the SCO whenever necessary and pursue essentially ad hoc bilateral deals that it couches in the terms of multilateral initiatives.</p><p>The SCO’s economic bodies have held numerous events. However, commercial deals attributable to their activities have been lacking.<sup>47</sup> At the 2023 summit,Tokayev lamented that the SCO had not yet executed a major economic project under its auspices.<sup>48</sup> A Kazakhstani journalist dismissed many of the documents SCO members adopted at the 2024 Astana summit as “aspirational.”<sup>49</sup></p><p>Economic initiatives that Beijing has launched under the SCO’s auspices consist primarily of bilateral deals in which China provides loans, investments, and additional benefits to other members. At the July 2024 Council of Heads of State meeting, Xi said China will provide at least 1,000 training opportunities to SCO-affiliated countries and host some 1,000 youth exchanges relating to digital technology through 2029.<sup>50</sup> Although Beijing takes care to frame these inducements within an SCO framework, the PRC most likely would have pursued these initiatives even if the SCO had not existed. Similarly, China’s economic ties with other SCO members would likely have increased even without the organization due to the proximity between resource-hungry China and its resource-rich Eurasian neighbors.</p><p>In mid-July 2024, China assumed the rotating annual SCO presidency for the first time in seven years. Though some analysts have questioned Beijing’s continuing interest in the organization, the PRC had adopted an ambitious action agenda for the year. Under the slogan “Upholding the Shanghai Spirit: SCO on the Move,” the PRC overtly seeks “deeper SCO cooperation in politics, security, trade, cultural and people-to-people exchange, and mechanism building, among other fields.”<sup>51</sup> In the first three months of this year, China hosted meetings of the SCO border security leaders, the Council of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the SCO International Military Cooperation Organs, and an SCO counterterrorism exercise. Furthermore, the PRC Ministry of National Defense held the first SCO young and middle-aged officers’ exchange on October 20–30, 2024. More than 20 military officers and defense officials from SCO members, observer states, dialogue partners, and friendly countries attended.<sup>52</sup></p><p>The PRC will end its term by hosting the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in the summer or early autumn in the northern city of Tianjin. By this time, the PRC chair aims to hold more than 100 meetings and events within the SCO framework, including some 40 “institutional” meetings, such as a Political Parties Forum, International Investment and Trade Expo, and Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development Forum.<sup>53</sup> The planned economic activities encompass all eight major areas of the PRC Global Development Initiative (climate change and green development, digital economy, connectivity, financing for development, food security, industrialization, poverty reduction, and public health).<sup>54</sup> The PRC is driving the SCO’s political agenda regarding artificial intelligence (AI).In late May, the city of Tianjin hosted the 2025 China–Shanghai Cooperation Organization Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Forum, which “aims to strengthen practical collaboration in AI development and governance among SCO member states.”<sup>55</sup> China is also still trying to establish an SCO Development Bank.<sup>56</sup></p><p>In the security domain, the PRC has convened a RATS session, a meeting of border defense chiefs, and a counterterrorism exercise.<sup>57</sup> It is also organizing activities to expand and improve counterterrorism cooperation within the RATS.<sup>58</sup> In line with Russian proposals, China is transforming the RATS into a more integrated “universal center” for addressing the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.<sup>59</sup> The two main written deliverables that members are likely to consider for approval at the heads of state summit will be a 10-year (2025–35) development strategy and a joint statement on the “80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War” (i.e., the end of World War II).<sup>60</sup></p><p>Figure 3. Eurasia-Antiterror—2023: Joint Anti-Terrorism Drill of the SCO and CIS</p><p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/styles/16_9_sm/public/2025-07/Picture33.jpg?h=70a2072f&itok=f079cVu0" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Source: “Joint Anti-Terrorism Drill of the SCO and CIS: Eurasia-Antiterror—2023,” SCO, September 22, 2023,http://eng.sectsco.org/20230922/-Joint-anti-terrorism-drill-of-the-SCO-and-CIS-Eurasia-Antiterror---2023-959008.html.</p><p>Russia-China Interactions and Implications</p><p>Sino-Russian SCO Exchanges and Effects</p>Russia and China frequently differ regarding the SCO, but Moscow and Beijing have kept these differences from damaging their overall partnership.Both routinely employ non-SCO instruments to complement or circumvent SCO actions.Though the SCO is a weak institution, it provides Russia and China with some low-cost benefits.Membership enlargement will likely decrease the SCO’s Central Asia focus but could allow Moscow and Beijing to more effectively project influence elsewhere.<p>The SCO helps manage Sino-Russian interactions regarding Central Asia despite the two governments’ occasionally sharp disagreementsregarding the organization’s development.The Russian government professessupport for various Chinese economic initiatives in principle. However, in practice, it has exploited the organization’s unanimity rule to block PRC proposals to create an SCO-wide energy club, free trade zone, and robust development bank.<sup>61</sup>Russian-Chinese security differences have also circumscribed the SCO’s potential military role. For instance, the PRC blocked Russian efforts to strengthen ties between the SCO and the Moscow-ledCSTO.<sup>62</sup>More recently, to overcome deadlocks and increase institutional efficiency, some PRC scholars have proposed relaxing the unanimity requirement and allowing a simple majority of members to reach some decisions. Russian representatives resolutely oppose waiving the unanimity rule.<sup>63</sup></p><p>Other factors also weaken the SCO as a regional institution. A fundamental principle of the organization is respect for the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, which exclude intervention in members’ internal security crises. When a terrorist incident occurs in a member country, the organization tends to merely issue statements of support for the attacked governments. Furthermore, “bilateral disputes are not subject to discussion within its institutions.”<sup>64</sup> As a result, the SCO played no role in managing the recent fighting between members India and Pakistan, which could have ended in a nuclear war in the heart of Asia. Manyaccords that member countries adopt under SCO auspices consist primarily of bilateral deals; the organization merely provides a convenient negotiating venue and a multilateral gloss. Russian and Chinese government representatives, including Putin and Xi, have many other opportunities to meet outside the organization’s purview. The SCO, lacking substantial organic resources or authority, depends on its members’ sustained contributions. A resumption of Moscow and Beijing’s historical rivalry for Eurasia would doom the SCO to irrelevance.</p><p>Still, the SCO provides Russia and China with low-cost benefits. For example, the organization regularly adopts multinational declarations that align with Russian and Chinese goals. The July 2024 Astana Declaration embraced “the central coordinating role of the UN” and reiterated “that the unilateral and unrestrained build-up of global ballistic missile defense systems by individual countries or groups of states has a negative impact on international security and stability.”<sup>65</sup> The Twenty-third Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of Member States in October 2024 supported Russian and Chinese opposition to Western sanctions by denouncing “protectionist measures, unilateral sanctions and trade restrictions that undermine the multilateral trading system and hinder global sustainable development.”<sup>66</sup></p><p>The SCO alsoprovides Russia and China with a flexible multilateral framework to manage Central Asian issues.<sup>67</sup> Despite recent membership expansion, Central Asia has always been the organization’s geographic focus.SCO summit declarations regularly affirm that members consider Central Asia the organization’score region.<sup>68</sup> A former SCO secretary-general maintained that “the SCO’s biggest security achievement in the last 20 years” was helping keep Central Asia stable despite all the region’s challenges.<sup>69</sup> Earlier,the PRC perceived the SCO as a means to acquire influence in Central Asia without alarming Moscow, whereas Russia valued how the organization helped monitor and channel that expansion.Moscow and Beijing still benefit from the SCO as a source of mutual reassurance in which they overtly acknowledge one another’s interests regarding Central Asia. Moreover, Sino-Russian differences arguably reassure Central Asians by minimizing the potential for a China-Russia condominium within the SCO.</p><p>During the last few years, the Russian and Chinese governments have collaborated to enlarge the SCO’s agenda and, more recently, its membership beyond Eurasia.<sup>70</sup> In 2023, the SCO elevated Iran from an observer nation to full membership, while in 2024, Belarus received a similar promotion. New so-called dialogue partners—a designation that can lead to eventual observer status or full membership—include more than a dozen countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Though not all the member governments are anti-Western, the organization has essentially become a bloc of non-Western countries with extensive ties to Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing can leverage the SCO as a “geopolitical showcase” of non-Western approaches to international issues.<sup>71</sup> Western sanctions have made the Russian government more acquiescent to China’s economic and security ambitions for the SCO, while Sino-Western tensions have likely decreased Beijing’s resistance to the organization’s adoption of an overtly anti-US stance.<sup>72</sup></p><p>Membership expansion can increase the SCO’s capabilities but also exacerbate disparities in geographic size, economic resources, demography, geopolitical orientation, and military power. The recent priority given to broadening over deepening the organization has complicated internal defense cooperation since the newest members lack the shared Soviet/Russian military legacy of the founding group.Though the SCO’s recent enlargement has diluted its cohesion and historic focus on Central Asia, the expansion has provided Moscow and Beijing with another means of currying favor with governments interested in joining the SCO and an augmented tool to project influence in Europe, the Middle East, and additional areas of Asia.<sup>73</sup></p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Security Alliances Politics and Government </p><p> <p>References (73)</p> <svg></svg> <p> <p><sup>1.</sup></p><p>“Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SCO, June 7, 2002,http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>2.</sup></p><p>“SCO ‘Peace Mission 2021’ Counter-Terrorism Drill Concludes in Russia,” Xinhua, September 25, 2021,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/10093190.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>3.</sup></p><p>“Joint Communique of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Defence Ministers’ Meeting (24 August 2022, Tashkent),” SCO, August 26, 2022,https://eng.sectsco.org/20220826/911015.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>4.</sup></p><p>“SCO Countries Hold First Joint Live Anti-terror Drills with All Member States,” The Hindu, July 24, 2024,https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sco-countries-hold-first-joint-live-anti-terror-drills-with-all-member-states/article68441245.ece.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>5.</sup></p><p>“SCO Members Conduct Joint Counter-Terrorism Live Exercise,” Xinhua, July 23, 2024,https://english.news.cn/20240723/4fe1af5c7cf9431598f532f49720b1c3/c.html; and Liu Caiyu, “SCO’s Anti-terror Body Outlines Future Cooperation on Fighting ‘Three Forces,’” Global Times, September 13, 2024,https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1319780.shtml.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>6.</sup></p><p>“The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,” SCO, June 15, 2001,https://eng.sectsco.org/files/202907/202907.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>7.</sup></p><p>Aiyyna K. Rumyantseva and Komron Kh. Rakhimov, “РольШОСвпротиводействиитерроризмувстранахЦентральнойАзии” [The SCO’s role in countering terrorism in Central Asian countries], Post-Soviet Studies 5, no. 8 (2022): 835–46,https://www.postussr.org/news/news2022/40.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>8.</sup></p><p>“СамаркандскаядекларацияСоветаглавгосударств-членовШанхайскойорганизациисотрудничества” [The Samarkand Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], Kremlin, September 16, 2022,http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5841.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>9.</sup></p><p>Vladimir Norov, “On the Basis of Mutual Trust: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Is Playing an Important Role in Ensuring Regional Security and Stability,” China Daily, January 12, 2024,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202401/12/WS65a07a0ca3105f21a507be2e.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>10.</sup></p><p>“СтраныШОСбудутсотрудничатьвборьбестерроризмом,сепаратизмомиэкстремизмом”[SCO countries will cooperate in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism], TASS, July 4, 2024,https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21272033.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>11.</sup></p><p>“Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SCO, August 16, 2007,https://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7859&lib=tax&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>12.</sup></p><p>Saniya Sakenova, “SCO Investors Association Holds First Meeting in Astana,” Astana Times, March 19, 2025,https://astanatimes.com/2025/03/sco-investors-association-holds-first-meeting-in-astana.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>13.</sup></p><p>Muhammad Asif Noor, “Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship in SCO: Achievements and Future Directions,” Astana Times, July 10, 2024,https://astanatimes.com/2024/07/kazakhstans-chairmanship-in-sco-achievements-and-future-directions.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>14.</sup></p><p>“Interdepartmental Consultations on Establishing an SCO Anti-drug Centre in Dushanbe,” SCO, February 28, 2024,https://eng.sectsco.org/20240228/1287842.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>15.</sup></p><p>Pavel Mikheyev, “Security Group Led by China, Russia ‘Key Pillar’ of World Order, Putin Tells Xi,” Reuters, July 3, 2024,https://ca.news.yahoo.com/putin-arrives-kazakhstan-russia-china-013107274.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>16.</sup></p><p>“Заседание Совета глав государств—членов ШОС”[Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO member states], Kremlin, July 4, 2024,http://special.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74464.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>17.</sup></p><p>Reid Standish, “Xi, Putin Kick Off SCO Summit in Kazakhstan with Belarus Set to Join,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 3, 2024,https://www.rferl.org/a/xi-putin-sco-summit-kazakhstan-china-russia/33019941.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>18.</sup></p><p>“The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” Russian Foreign Ministry, March 31, 2023,https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>19.</sup></p><p>“Вершинин отметил успехи БРИКС и ШОС в борьбе с наркокриминалом”[Vershinin noted the successes of BRICS and the SCO in the fight against drug crime], TASS, March 13, 2025,https://tass.ru/politika/23389677.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>20.</sup></p><p>Bates Gill and Carla Freeman, “What Does Further Expansion Mean for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?,” US Institute of Peace, May 30, 2024,https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/05/what-does-further-expansion-mean-shanghai-cooperation-organization.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>21.</sup></p><p>Xi Jinping, “Joining Hands to Build a More Beautiful Home of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, July 4, 2024,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202407/t20240704_11448344.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>22.</sup></p><p>Nectar Gan, “A Growing Club Led by Xi and Putin to Counter the US Is Adding a Staunchly Pro-Russia Member,” CNN, July 2, 2024,https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/02/china/china-russia-belarus-full-member-sco-summit-intl-hnk/index.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>23.</sup></p><p>Mei Changwei, “Chinese Defense Minister Meets Foreign Military Guests Attending 11th Beijing XiangshanForum,” China Military Online, September 13, 2024,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16338258.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>24.</sup></p><p>Nikola Mikovic, “SCO Summit: A Battle for Influence in Central Asia,” Times of Central Asia, July 8, 2024,https://timesca.com/sco-summit-a-battle-for-influence-in-central-asia.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>25.</sup></p><p>Xi, “Joining Hands.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>26.</sup></p><p>“Лавров:центрпоборьбесновымиугрозамимогутсоздатьсучастиемстранШОС” [Lavrov: A center for combating new threats could be created with participation of SCO countries],TASS, January 14, 2025,https://tass.ru/politika/22876053.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>27.</sup></p><p>See, for example, “СовместноезаявлениеПрезидентаРеспубликиКазахстаниПрезидентаРоссийскойФедерацииобуглублениистратегическогопартнерствавусловияхновогоглобальногопорядка” [Joint statement of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the president of the Russian Federation on deepening strategic partnership in the context of the new global order], President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, November 28, 2024,https://www.akorda.kz/ru/sovmestnoe-zayavlenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-i-prezidenta-rossiyskoy-federacii-ob-uglublenii-strategicheskogo-partnerstva-v-usloviyah-novogo-globalnogo-poryadka-2810110; and “ПутинзаявилоблизостипозицийРФиТаджикистанапоглобальнымвопросам” [Putin declared that the positions of Russia and Tajikistan on global questions are close],TASS, March 17, 2025,https://tass.ru/politika/23422591.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>28.</sup></p><p>See, for example, “О переговорах Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова с Министром иностранных дел Киргизии Ж.М.Кулубаевым” [On the negotiations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V.Lavrov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan J.M.Kulubaev], Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 22, 2025, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/sanhajskaa-organizacia-sotrudnicestva-sos-/1992503.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>29.</sup></p><p>Kathrine Frich, “Turkey Seeks Permanent Membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Dagens.com, July 12, 2024,https://www.dagens.com/world/turkey-seeks-permanent-membership-in-shanghai-cooperation-organization.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>30.</sup></p><p>Kremlin, “Meeting of the Council of Heads of State.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>31.</sup></p><p>“ОроссийскойинициативеБольшогоЕвразийскогопартнерства” [On the Russian Greater Eurasian Partnership initiative], Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2023, https://www.mid.ru/ru/activity/coordinating_and_advisory_body/head_of_subjects_council/materialy-o-vypolnenii-rekomendacij-zasedanij-sgs/xxxvi-zasedanie-sgs/1767070.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>32.</sup></p><p>“Putin: We Will Be Glad to Attend SCO Summit in China in Sept,” Interfax, May 12, 2025,https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/111326/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>33.</sup></p><p>“ВыступлениеПрезидентаРоссиинасаммитеШОС” [Speech by the president of Russia at the SCO summit], Kremlin, July 4, 2024,http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74464.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>34.</sup></p><p>See, for example, Kremlin, “Speech by the president of Russia.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>35.</sup></p><p>“ВОмскевсерединеапреляпройдетпервыйфорумустойчивогоразвитияШОС” [ThefirstSCOsustainabledevelopmentforumwillbeheldinOmskinmid-April], TASS, March 26, 2025,https://tass.ru/obschestvo/23504019.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>36.</sup></p><p>“Joint Anti-terrorism Drill of the SCO and CIS: Eurasia-Antiterror—2023,” SCO, September 22, 2023,https://eng.sectsco.org/20230922/-Joint-anti-terrorism-drill-of-the-SCO-and-CIS-Eurasia-Antiterror---2023-959008.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>37.</sup></p><p>Sergey Mikhnevich, “‘Globalise It’: The SCO and the Future of the Economic Agenda in the Organisation’s Globalisation,” Valdai Discussion Club, August 11, 2024,https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/globalise-it-the-sco-and-the-future/.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>38.</sup></p><p>“Ороссийско-иранскихмежмидовскихконсультацияхпоевропейскойирегиональнойпроблематике”[On the Russian-Iranian ministerial consultations on European and regional issues], Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 17, 2025,https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_plicy/rso/sanhajskaa-organizacia-sotrudnicestva-sos-/2003567.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>39.</sup></p><p>Yu Sui, “Summit Showcases SCO’s Evolving Development and Maturity,” China-US Focus, June 22, 2017,http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/2017/0622/15135.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>40.</sup></p><p>Nectar Gan, “China’s Xi Urges Regional Leaders to Resist ‘External Interference’ as Security Bloc Grows to Counter US,” CNN, July 4, 2024,https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/04/asia/putin-xi-russia-china-alignment-sco-astana-intl-hnk/index.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>41.</sup></p><p>“Chinese Defense Minister to Attend SCO Meeting in Kazakhstan,” China Daily, April 25, 2025,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16303444.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>42.</sup></p><p>Wang Jin and Kong Dehang, “Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Between China and Central Asian States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies5, no. 1 (2019): 65–79,https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S2377740019500027?srsltid=AfmBOoo7HX3O8KsQGG9wApxUSb6M1R74ASjbAq0qijuaaQZcgPPyWNY3.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>43.</sup></p><p>Matthew Southerland, Will Green, and Sierra Janik, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Testbed for Chinese Power Projection,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 12, 2020,https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization-Testbed_for_Chinese_Power_Projection.pdf.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>44.</sup></p><p>Arran Hope, “PRC Advances New International Order in Astana,” China Brief 24, no. 14 (July 2024),https://jamestown.org/program/prc-advances-new-international-order-in-astana.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>45.</sup></p><p>Erica Marat, “China’s Expanding Military Education Diplomacy in Central Asia,” PONARS Eurasia, April 19, 2021,https://www.ponarseurasia.org/chinas-expanding-military-education-diplomacy-in-central-asia.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>46.</sup></p><p>Yang Cheng, “China-SCO Trade Hits Record $890 Billion,” China Daily, April 10, 2025,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202504/10/WS67f7b872a3104d9fd381ea07.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>47.</sup></p><p>Temur Umarov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Is Ineffective and Irrelevant,”Carnegie Politika, July 5, 2024,https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/07/sco-summit-china-russia.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>48.</sup></p><p>Eldaniz Gusseinov, “Central Asian Leaders Advocate for Enhanced Cooperation and Project Implementation at SCO Summit,” Daryo, June 10, 2024,https://daryo.uz/en/2024/06/10/central-asian-leaders-advocate-for-enhanced-cooperation-and-project-implementation-at-sco-summit.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>49.</sup></p><p>Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: SCO Summit Doesn’t Put Much Meat on Organization’s Bones,” EurasiaNet, July 5, 2024,https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-sco-summit-doesnt-put-much-meat-on-organizations-bones.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>50.</sup></p><p>“SCO Vital for Peace, Security and Prosperity,” CGTN, July 5, 2024,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/OPINIONS_209196/Opinions_209197/16321959.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>51.</sup></p><p>“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun’s Regular Press Conference on February 21, 2025,” transcript, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202502/t20250221_11560194.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>52.</sup></p><p>Zhang Xiaogang, “Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of National Defense on October 31,” transcript, Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, published November 13, 2024,http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16351553.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>53.</sup></p><p>“SCO in 2025: China Unveils SCO Emblem and Plans for 2025,” CGTN, January 3, 2025,https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-01-02/VHJhbnNjcmlwdDgyNjEz/index.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>54.</sup></p><p>“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds a Briefing on China’s Rotating Presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, September 9, 2024,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202409/t20240910_11488270.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>55.</sup></p><p>“China, SCO Partners Expand AI Cooperation,” China Daily, June 3, 2025,</p><p>https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202506/03/WS683e4f51a310a04af22c2d7b.ht….</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>56.</sup></p><p>Chinese Premier Calls for Deepening SCO Cooperation,” Xinhua, October 16, 2024,https://english.news.cn/20241016/0b69688122b44ed7b272147f0c1daa95/c.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>57.</sup></p><p>Xinhua, “China Intensifies Work as SCO Rotating Chair: Spokesperson,” State Council of the PRC, February 21, 2025,https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202502/21/content_WS67b88070c6d0868f4e8efdd5.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>58.</sup></p><p>Liu, “SCO’s Anti-Terror Body.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>59.</sup></p><p>Zhang Yunbi, “Li Unveils Proposal on Deepening SCO Cooperation,” China Daily, October 17, 2024,https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202410/17/WS67105280a310f1265a1c7ff5.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>60.</sup></p><p>“Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to Adopt 10-Year Development Plan in 2025,” Sputnik India, January 3, 2025,https://sputniknews.in/20250103/shanghai-cooperation-organization-to-adopt-10-year-developm ent-plan-in-2025-8626177.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>61.</sup></p><p>Umarov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Is Ineffective.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>62.</sup></p><p>Marcel de Haas, “The ‘Peace Mission 2007’ Exercises: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Advances,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2007,http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070900_cscp_paper_haas.pdf.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>63.</sup></p><p>Guan Guihai, “SCO Needs to Coordinate Disparate Views,” China-US Focus, July 9, 2024,https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/sco-needs-to-coordinate-disparate-views.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>64.</sup></p><p>“Remarks SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev at ISSI on ‘The SCO’s Role in the Changing Global Order,’” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, April 25, 2025,https://issi.org.pk/remarks-sco-secretary-general-nurlan-yermekbayev-at-issi-on-the-scos-role-in-the-changing-global-order.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>65.</sup></p><p>“АстанинскаядекларацияСоветаглавгосударств –членовШанхайскойорганизациисотрудничества”[Astana Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], Kremlin, July 4, 2024,http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/6163.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>66.</sup></p><p>“SCO Member States Oppose Protectionism, Unilateral Sanctions,” People’s Daily (SCO China), October 16, 2024,https://www.scochina2025.org.cn/en/n3/2025/0313/c518818-20289130.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>67.</sup></p><p>Jeremy Garlick, “Beyond Central Asia: The Ever-Expanding Influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” European Hub for Contemporary China, February 21, 2025,https://eh4s.eu/publication/beyond-central-asia-the-ever-expanding-influence-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>68.</sup></p><p>See, for example, Kremlin, “Samarkand Declaration.”</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>69.</sup></p><p>Vladimir Norov, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Is Playing an Important Role in Ensuring Regional Security and Stability,” China Daily, January 25, 2024,https://eng.sectsco.org/20240125/1244550.html.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>70.</sup></p><p>Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, “No Limits? The China-Russia Relationship and US Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 2024,https://www.cfr.org/report/no-limits-china-russia-relationship-and-us-foreign-policy.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>71.</sup></p><p>Rustam Khaidarzoda and Marina Dmitriyeva, “Таджикистан и Китай в ШОС: от двустороннего взаимодействия до общего глобального видения”[Tajikistan and China in the SCO: From bilateral interaction to a common global vision], Russian International Affairs Council, November 8, 2024,https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/postsoviet/tadzhikistan-i-kitay-v-shos-ot-dvustoronnego-vzaimodeystviya-do-obshchego-globalnogo-videniya.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>72.</sup></p><p>Nicholas Olczak, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): An Evolving Platform That Should Not Be Overlooked,” Swedish Institute of International Affairs, March 2025,https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2025/final-ui-report-no.-3-2025.pdf.</p><p>↝</p> </p><p> <p><sup>73.</sup></p><p>Eva Seiwert, “SCO Expansion: A Double-Edged Sword,” The Diplomat 116 (July 2024),https://magazine.thediplomat.com/2024-07/sco-expansion-a-double-edged-sword.</p><p>↝</p> </p> </p> Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization \| Hudson Institute	查看 64444	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215564	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>On The Defense and Aerospace Report, Patrick Cronin discusses the de-escalation of tensions with China, a Japanese defense white paper, President Donald Trump’s potential trips to Pakistan and India, and how Beijing views the United States’ approach to Ukraine.</p><p>Defense & Aerospace Report · Defense & Aerospace Report Podcast [Washington Roundtable Jul 18, ’25]</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Politics and Government National Security and Defense </p> De-escalation with China, Japanese White Paper, and China’s Views on US Ukraine Policy \| Hudson Institute	查看 3209	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215563	有图 <nav> <p> Toggle Table of Contents <svg></svg> <p> Contents </p> <p> <p> Contents </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><svg> <defs> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> <symbol> </symbol> </defs></svg></p><p> <p> <p> Share to Twitter <svg><circle></circle></svg> <p> <p> Twitter </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to Facebook <svg></svg> <p> <p> Facebook </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to LinkedIn <svg></svg> <p> <p> LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> Share to E-mail <svg> </svg> <p> <p> E-mail </p> </p> </p> <p> Print <svg></svg> <p> <p> Print </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> <p> <p>Supporters of Nvidia’s Jensen Huang such as Aaron Ginn insist that selling Nvidia H20 AI chips to China will make Beijing reliant on Washington for this century’s most critical technologies (“Don’t Surrender China’s AI Market,” op-ed, July 18). They ignore decades of reality: in telecommunications, self-driving cars, cranes, and semiconductors, U.S. companies have accused Chinese firms of stealing their technology. These firms then sell the allegedly stolen tech abroad at below-market prices. This pattern, repeated in multiple industries over decades, has trapped America in a dependency on the Chinese Communist Party for some of the 21st century’s most critical technologies.</p><p>The Trump administration is rightfully enacting policies to break Chinese leverage over the U.S. Especially notable was the Pentagon’s recent investment in MP Materials to support America’s only active rare earth mineral mine that sells to the commercial market. It is an early but critical step toward eliminating Beijing’s control of elements on which civilian and military technology rely. This strategic challenge didn’t develop overnight. It is the product of decades of economic engagement with China, informed by the belief that trade would reform Beijing and reinforced by U.S. companies that cared more about accessing China’s market than the risks of equipping the People’s Liberation Army.</p><p>Read the full article in The Wall Street Journal.</p> <p><form> <p> <img src="https://www.hudson.org/themes/custom/hudson_2022/dist/images/events-search-hero-bg.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> Enjoyed this analysis?<p>Subscribe to Hudson’s newsletters to stay up to date with our latest content.</p> </p><p> <label>Email</label> </p> <p> <p>See more subscription options</p> </p> </p> </p> </form></p> </p> </p><p> Supply Chains Trade </p> Giving China Chips Derails Trump Decoupling \| Hudson Institute	查看 4246	美国哈德逊研究所(Hudson)	2025-06-30 20:00:00 2025-07-23 14:42:26	word
3215562	无图 <p>Con el domo de la Kings League como escenario y la asistencia de padres de familia, autoridades, niñas y niños, se disputaron las grandes finales de la 61ª edición de Futbolito Bimbo. En la rama femenil se enfrentaron los equipos de las escuelas Anexa La Normal del estado de Durango y Colegio El Arca de Baja California; en la rama varonil jugaron el Colegio Valladolid Cancún de Quintana Roo y Playas Elementary School de Baja California.</p><p>El equipo femenil del Colegio El Arca del estado de Baja California, se coronó campeón tras vencer 3-2 a Anexa La Normal de Durango. Por su parte, en la rama varonil, Playas Elementary School, también de Baja California, se impuso con el mismo marcador de 3-2 al Colegio Valladolid Cancún de Quintana Roo. Ambos equipos levantaron el trofeo que los acredita como los mejores del torneo 2025, después de tres meses de competencia.</p><p>Además del título, los equipos ganadores celebraron con entusiasmo el premio: un viaje con todos los gastos pagados a los parques temáticos de Orlando, Florida, en Estados Unidos.</p><p>Georgina Rodríguez, Líder de Patrocinios de Grupo Bimbo, expresó: "Esta edición ha sido un reflejo de esfuerzo, pasión y compromiso. Futbolito Bimbo sigue consolidándose como uno de los programas de responsabilidad social más grande de Grupo Bimbo en México. A través de este torneo, reiteramos nuestro compromiso con un estilo de vida activo, saludable y lleno de valores para niñas, niños y sus familias, teniendo en mente lo fundamentales que son para que esto sea posible."</p><p>Durante esta 61ª edición participaron más de 63,008 niñas y niños, conformando 5,530 equipos de 3,553 escuelas públicas y privadas. Del total, 1,749 equipos fueron femeniles, una categoría que continúa fortaleciéndose desde su instauración en 2003, promoviendo la igualdad y la equidad en el deporte.</p><p>Como ya es tradición, durante el torneo se entregaron tarjetas verdes, promovidas por Proyecto Cantera Entrenando por la vida®, las cuales reconocen el juego limpio y la sana convivencia, dentro y fuera de las canchas. Esta acción refuerza que el deporte es una herramienta poderosa para formar mejores personas desde edades tempranas.</p><p>Futbolito Bimbo concluyó una vez más con éxito, reflejando el compromiso de Grupo Bimbo con el deporte y la promoción de estilos de vida saludables. Más allá de la competencia, el torneo impulsa valores como el trabajo en equipo, la tolerancia, el compromiso, el respeto y el compañerismo, no solo entre niñas y niños, sino también en los padres de familia, quienes desempeñan un rol clave en la creación de entornos de bienestar compartido.</p><p>Para conocer más sobre el torneo, visita: www.futbolitobimbo.com.mx</p> Colegio El Arca y Playas Elementary School campeones de Futbolito Bimbo 2025 \| Grupo Bimbo	查看 2724	宾堡集团	2025-07-15 00:27:08 2025-07-23 14:41:23	word
3215561	无图 <p>Grupo Bimbo comunica con profunda pena el fallecimiento de Don Roberto Servitje Sendra (1928–2025), a los 97 años de edad en la Ciudad de México. Fue uno de nuestros fundadores, primer colaborador de Grupo Bimbo y un referente fundamental en la historia de nuestra empresa.</p><p>Don Roberto deja un legado invaluable. Fue un hombre de valores, profundas convicciones, generoso en el trato y firme en el propósito. Con calidez humana y disciplina empresarial, supo inspirar y liderar a miles de colaboradores en la construcción de una empresa que siempre concibió como una gran familia.</p><p>Austero, cercano y comprometido con el bien común, fue formador de equipos, mentor de líderes y sembrador de valores. En cada paso nos recordó que el verdadero éxito se mide en el impacto positivo que generamos en las personas y en las comunidades donde tenemos presencia. Su liderazgo discreto pero contundente dejó una huella imborrable.</p><p>Fue un autodidacta con vocación de servicio, apasionado por la mecánica, la pintura y la formación continua. Gracias a su liderazgo, la empresa fortaleció su capacidad tecnológica, profesionalizó sus procesos y definió principios de gestión que siguen vigentes hasta hoy. Su visión trascendió nuestra organización, participando en consejos empresariales de gran relevancia en México y el extranjero.</p><p>Don Roberto inició su trayectoria en Grupo Bimbo como Supervisor de Ventas, luego se convirtió en cajero y más adelante creó el Departamento de Vehículos, del cual fue su principal impulsor. Ocupó diversos puestos dentro de la empresa, fue Gerente General en Guadalajara (1956), en Monterrey (1961) y en la Ciudad de México (1963), así como Subdirector General (1969), Director General (1978) y Presidente del Consejo de Administración (1994 – 2013).</p><p>En nombre de toda la familia de Grupo Bimbo, extendemos nuestras más sinceras condolencias a sus hijos, nietos, bisnietos, familiares y amigos.</p><p>El recuerdo de Don Roberto permanecerá como el de un hombre íntegro, visionario y generoso, cuya vida fue inspiración para miles. Hoy celebramos su legado y honraremos su memoria continuando con su ejemplo, con el mismo compromiso y dedicación con los que trabajó siempre por el bienestar de los demás. </p><p>¡Misión Cumplida!</p> Grupo Bimbo comunica con profunda pena la pérdida de Don Roberto Servitje Sendra \| Grupo Bimbo	查看 2286	宾堡集团	2025-07-18 05:12:03 2025-07-23 14:41:23	word
3215560	无图 <p> <p> <p> <p> A record number of more than 850 students across 69 educational institutions participated in this year"s "Script it Right" Chinese Radio Drama Competition ("与声剧来"中文广播剧创作比赛). Minister of State for Education and Chairperson of the Committee to Promote Chinese Language Learning (CPCLL), Ms Jasmin Lau, was the Guest-of-Honour at the competition"s award ceremony, which recognised student winners for their strong creative writing skills, storytelling abilities and Chinese language proficiency. The competition was jointly organised by CPCLL, UFM100.3 and Holy Innocents" High School to foster students" passion for Chinese language and storytelling. See Annexfor the list of winners.</p><p>2 Into its 11th edition, the competition continues to challenge participants by stretching their creativity with narratives that are original and contemporary. These included the theme "60" (特定主题：60) in conjunction with Singapore"s SG60 celebrations, the dialogue "AI really did it" (预设对白：AI真的做到了), and the sound effect of "footsteps" (特选音效：脚步声). This is also the first year where the competition was opened to upper primary schools to nurture early interest for scriptwriting and storytelling in the Chinese Language. 149 primary school students from 28 schools took part in the competition.</p><p>3 Five teams from the Primary School category (Category A) earned the Merit Awards for their outstanding scripts, while seven teams from the Secondary School, Junior College/Millennia Institute, and Polytechnic category (Category B) clinched the Top 3 and Merit Awards. As an additional highlight, UFM100.3 will bring winning Category B scripts to life as radio dramas, to be broadcast between July and August on the radio station.</p><p>4 In the lead up to the competition, notable theatre practitioners Mr Tung Ka Wai and Mr Chong Tze Chien conducted eight scriptwriting workshops between January and March 2025, which were attended by around 1,180 students. A further 44 students participated in the Voice Talent Training Camp, receiving professional voice acting guidance from UFM100.3 personalities Andrew, Cheng Yao, Kemin, Xavier and Xin Ying. In addition, 54 educators enhanced their teaching capabilities through an online workshop on radio drama and scriptwriting pedagogy, led by Mr Tung Ka Wai.</p><p>5 For more details about CPCLL"s initiatives, please visit www.cpcll.sg.</p> </p> </p> </p> Record Turnout as Chinese Radio Drama Contest Opens to Primary Schools \| MOE	查看 2494	新加坡教育局	2025-07-04 00:00:00 2025-07-23 14:28:02	word

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