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3215925	有图 <p><p> <p>Telangana, India (18 June 2025) – To help combat zinc deficiency and improve nutrition through staple foods, a new high-zinc rice variety, Spoorthi (GNV 1906), is being distributed to farmers in India following its official release for commercial cultivation.</p><p>IRRI, ICAR–Indian Institute of Rice Research (IIRR), and University of Agricultural Sciences, Raichur, conducted a training/seed distribution program in Raichur, Karnataka, and Marrigudem village, Nalgonda District, Telangana. Held at the University of Agricultural Sciences and in a local farming village, the events marked the beginning of Spoorthi’s deployment, with 50 quintals of seed provided to selected farmers for multiplication and scale-up.</p><p>Spoorthi was officially released in 2023 through a collaborative effort involving IRRI, IIRR, the University of Agricultural Sciences, Raichur, as well as partners from IRRI’s zinc biofortification breeding network in India. It was approved for commercial cultivation by the All India Coordinated Rice Improvement Program (AICRIP) and is the only zinc-biofortified rice variety to pass AICRIP testing in the last three years.</p><p>Zinc deficiency affects 30 to 40 percent of India’s population, especially women, children, and the elderly. Spoorthi was developed to help address this challenge by enriching a widely consumed staple with higher nutritional value. Spoorthi contains 26ppm of zinc in polished grain, which is significantly higher than presently grown rice varieties (which contain around 12-16ppm).</p><p>Moreover, it delivers yields comparable to popular varieties like IR64 and MTU1010, which typically yield 4.5 to 6.5 tons per hectare. This makes Spoorthi a practical and promising alternative that improves nutrition without compromising farm productivity.</p><p>While many rice varieties are approved annually, few reach widespread cultivation without timely seed multiplication and farmer awareness. For Spoorthi, early seed production is being carried out near seed production hubs established in Hyderabad, Telangana, and Raichur, Karnataka to enable faster scaling and farmer access.</p><p>The rollout also includes training and awareness programs to educate farmers on the health and economic benefits of cultivating biofortified rice. Traditionally, farmers have prioritized yield and pest resistance when choosing varieties. Partners hope Spoorthi will shift perceptions by showing how nutrition can also add value.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/new-zinc-rich-rice-variety-spoorthi-rolled-out-in-india-story1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>“Many farmers still associate value with yield or pest resistance, not nutrition,” said Dr. B.P. Mallikarjuna Swamy, IRRI Senior Scientist. “That’s why we’re working to create more awareness about the health benefits of zinc.”</p><p>Looking ahead, the focus will be on expanding seed supply and integrating Spoorthi into nutrition-sensitive programs. This includes partnerships with government departments and agencies supporting school meals and public health initiatives.</p><p>“We’re also exploring collaborations with the Department of Women and Child Welfare, school meal programs, and public-private partnerships to add value and expand reach,” said Dr. Swamy.</p></p></p> New Zinc-Rich Rice Variety “Spoorthi” Rolled Out in India \| International Rice Research Institute	查看 3318	东亚发展网络	2025-07-07 17:11:58 2025-07-23 21:43:57	word
3215924	有图 <p><p> <p>Seed supply planning in Bangladesh has faced several challenges over the years, including reliance on manual processes, fragmented data, and a tendency for reactive decision-making. These factors can often lead to mismatches between the availability of seeds and the actual demand from farmers, resulting in shortages of quality seeds or the distribution of varieties that may not be ideal for local conditions. Furthermore, the growing risks associated with climate change add additional pressure on productivity and resilience for farmers.</p><p>To effectively address these challenges, it’s important to consider innovative approaches to seed distribution. We recognize the need for systems that prioritize anticipation over reaction, utilizing real-time data while taking into account the changing varietal preferences of farmers, diverse agroecological zones, and the effects of climate variability. This calls for the development of tools that can accurately gather location-specific insights and incorporate them into national seed planning frameworks.</p><p>In a spirit of collaboration, the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC), the World Bank, the Agency Program Coordination Unit (APCU), and the Program on Agricultural and Rural Transformation for Nutrition Entrepreneurship and Resilience (PARTNER) are working together with IRRI to launch a digital seed demand forecasting initiative. This initiative aims to shift from traditional paper-based forecasting methods to a more data-driven and participatory system that can enhance timely, demand-aligned, and climate-smart seed supply.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/irri-badc-launches-digital-tool-to-improve-rice-supply-in-bangladesh-story1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Caption: IRRI and BADC officials in the MoU signing ceremony at IRRI Bangladesh office</p><p>This partnership between IRRI and BADC is focused on creating an innovative digital platform designed to collect feedback from farmers, seed dealers, and other stakeholders. By integrating this feedback with agro-climatic data, the aim is to produce predictive insights that align ground realities with institutional planning. Through this collaboration, IRRI and BADC are working together to ensure that the right seeds are delivered to the appropriate locations at the right time. This initiative is intended to empower farmers and enhance the overall resilience of Bangladesh"s rice production system.</p><p>Dr. Swati Nayak, South Asia Lead for Seed Systems and Product Management and Global Nodal for Inclusive Delivery at IRRI, stated, "Digitizing seed demand forecasting represents more than just a technical enhancement; it signifies a transformation in how Bangladesh approaches the planning, production, and delivery of seeds to farmers. With this tool, we aspire to establish a transparent, efficient, and inclusive seed system that genuinely addresses the evolving needs and demands of farmers while supporting food security."</p><p>The strategic objectives were further solidified during an inception workshop held in Dhaka on June 26, 2025, where over 50 experts, policymakers, and stakeholders came together to collaborate on strategies for building and scaling the platform. The event prioritized co-creation and consensus-building, with valuable contributions from participants representing the Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI), the Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE), seed companies, millers, and farmer groups, all offering essential insights to guide the initiative.</p><p>Highlighting the essential objectives of the project, Md. Ruhul Amin Khan, Director General of BADC, shared, "With this tool, our goal is to create resilient systems that effectively address the needs of farmers and align with our national food security objectives. This tool allows us to accurately capture real demand by considering factors such as location, climate, probability, and farmer preferences. By including informal seed actors and taking a grassroots approach, we can enhance our planning accuracy and respond more effectively during climate shocks."</p><p>The project will be implemented in phases. The first phase encompasses conducting gap assessments, engaging in stakeholder consultations, and collaboratively developing a working prototype. IRRI will extend technical support to ensure the tool meets the needs of Bangladesh’s evolving seed system and serves as a vital platform that links field-level realities with national policy.</p></p></p> IRRI-BADC launches digital tool to improve rice supply in Bangladesh \| International Rice Research Institute	查看 4566	东亚发展网络	2025-07-10 09:38:47 2025-07-23 21:43:57	word
3215923	无图 <p><p> <p>Bushra Humaira</p><p>Dhaka, Bangladesh – In collaboration with CGIAR’s Scaling for Impact (S4I) Program, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is dedicated to fostering strong partnerships that promote the widespread adoption of rice-based innovations in Bangladesh. This includes initiatives such as the Cluster-based Farmer Field School model, Wife Husband Model, Dry-direct Seeded Rice, Nature-based soil fertility management, and Improved Fodder.</p><p>IRRI is actively engaging in a series of technical workshops and strategic meetings with crucial partners, including the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), Agricultural Information Services (AIS), and the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF). This collaborative effort is aimed at laying a solid foundation for transforming agricultural systems in Bangladesh, particularly in one of the world"s most climate-vulnerable regions.</p><p>These initiatives are part of IRRI’s broader mission to identify effective pathways for scaling innovations. By demonstrating technologies and aligning with national development priorities, building institutional capacity, and shaping inclusive policies, we hope to address the pressing challenges of climate change. As these challenges intensify, especially in the vulnerable coastal areas of Bangladesh, the timely scaling of appropriate innovations is becoming increasingly critical.</p>Strategic Partnerships to Unlock Systemic Change<p>As Bangladesh continues to grapple with the pressures of climate change and eco-system degradation, coastal region of the country has seen an increase in salinity and natural disasters. To tackle this, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is extending its efforts to ensure that agricultural innovations and reach the fields where they are needed most.</p><p>In Bangladesh, IRRI is a part of Scaling for Impact, CGIAR’s program fully dedicated to scaling food, land, and water innovations, is driving this change by linking science to systemic, inclusive impact.</p>IRRI and PKSF: Building a Pathway for Scalable Innovation<p>In a recent knowledge-sharing workshop held in Dhaka, IRRI, in collaboration with PKSF, a national institution dedicated to poverty alleviation and sustainable development, brought together researchers from CGIAR centers under Scaling for Impact Program, including IRRI, CIMMYT, and CIP, to present a portfolio of scalable agricultural innovations.</p><p>The workshop aimed to explore collaborative avenues to integrate innovations into PKSF’s existing and planned projects, particularly those in climate-affected southern regions of Bangladesh.</p><p>“We see significant potential in these innovations,” noted Mr. Md. Habibur Rahman, Deputy General Manager (Program), PKSF. “There is scope to integrate them into our projects like Rural Microenterprise Transformation Project (RMTP), Sustainable Microenterprise and Resilient Transformation (SMART), especially in the coastal belt.”</p><p>Presentations showcased a diverse array of technologies and approaches, including:</p>Community-coordinated agronomic innovations for coastal polders from Dr. Manoranjan Mondal, IRRIDigital agriculture solutions tailored for Bangladesh from T.S. Amjath Babu, CIMMYTDiversified cropping systems and compost-based soil improvement from Dr. Sharif Ahmed, IRRIZero-tillage potato cultivation in the south from Ebna Rahaman, CIPPolicy recommendations for climate-smart water management from Dr. Ahmad Salahuddin, IRRI<p>Discussions led to several key outcomes such as renewed commitment to develop a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between IRRI and PKSF and exploration of a joint project proposal aligned with PKSF’s development goals.</p><p>“To achieve durable and inclusive change, we must go beyond research and engage deeply with national actors,” said Dr. Ahmad Salahuddin, IRRI. “These platforms allow us to co-develop scalable models aligned with policy, infrastructure, and local needs.”</p>Aligning Science with Systems: Workshops with DAE<p>IRRI also organized a technical workshop with the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) Khulna, focusing on critical challenges such as soil degradation, salinity, and water management in coastal polders. The event featured valuable insights from DAE Additional Secretary Mr. Md Zakir Hossain and Deputy Commissioner Ms. Sharmin Akter Jahan.</p><p>The workshop was inaugurated by Md. Rafiqul Islam, Additional Director of DAE, Khulna Region. Technical sessions began with a presentation outlining the historical and current conditions of polders, rivers, canals, and sluice gates in the Khulna region.</p><p>The IRRI team, Dr. Manoranjan Mondal, Dr. Sharif Ahmed, and Dr. Ahmad Salahuddin, presented rice-based innovations tailored to the coastal context.</p><p>Following their presentations, sessions explored the integration of oilseed crops, maize, pulses, spices, and horticultural crops into sustainable cropping patterns suited to the region. Regional representatives from DAE, the Soil Resources Development Institute (SRDI), and the Horticulture Department also shared various innovative practices relevant to local conditions.</p><p>Discussions throughout the workshop highlighted the importance of crop diversification, building resilience to climate stressors, and maximizing land productivity through strategic and adaptive crop planning.</p>Leveraging AIS to Drive National-Level Dissemination<p>Recognizing the power of information, IRRI also convened a planning meeting with the Agricultural Information Services (AIS) to discuss leveraging AIS’s digital and print platforms for national-level dissemination of rice-based innovations. The focus was on aligning IRRI’s scaling ambitions with AIS’s outreach infrastructure, ensuring that research-backed practices can reach farmers in a language and format they understand.</p><p>Participants from both institutions discussed building a collaborative roadmap, co-creating digital content, and providing capacity-building workshops for AIS extension agents. There was strong agreement to jointly publish a special edition of Krishi Katha which has a readership of 80,000 farmers and extension officers featuring IRRI’s innovations and to formalize the partnership through an MoU.</p>Toward a Transformative Vision<p>IRRI is partnering with institutions to drive science-based, systemic change that will improve farmers’ livelihoods, boost food security, and advance Bangladesh’s climate resilience goals. By connecting innovations to policy, digital tools, and extension services, IRRI will create stronger, more coordinated efforts that deliver impact at scale.</p><p>Through the Scaling for Impact program, IRRI is reaching millions, strengthening local institutions, and enabling institutional environment to pursue policies that are inclusive, practical, and transformative. These partnerships are expected to give IRRI Bangladesh an opportunity to be prepared for a long-term program for scaling innovation with support from a community of leading actors in agricultural research and development.</p></p></p> IRRI Drives Efforts to Scale up Agricultural Innovations in Bangladesh \| International Rice Research Institute	查看 7127	东亚发展网络	2025-07-10 14:32:50 2025-07-23 21:43:57	word
3215922	有图 <p><p> <p>28 June 2025 (BUJUMBURA, Burundi) — IRRI joins Burundi’s Diplomatic Week, bringing together over 200 diplomats representing the Burundian Government and diplomatic missions in the country. A major highlight of the engagement is a tour of IRRI’s regional crop improvement hub, where guests witnessed how IRRI significantly contributed to the vision of Burundi to become an emerging country by 2040 and a developed country by 2060. With the theme “Fruitful Partnership for an Emerging Burundi: Economic Diplomacy, the Driving Force of Sustainable and Inclusive Development”, IRRI was invited by Burundi’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation as a key partner, signaling the renewal of an even stronger partnership between the two institutions.</p><p>“Burundi, which aspires to become an emerging country by 2040 and a developed one by 2060, anchors this national vision largely on the modernization of agriculture, the development of human capital, and scientific innovation. IRRI plays a key role in this dynamic move by addressing the major challenges facing rice farming.”, stated Audace Manirambona, the Rector of the University of Burundi. “In partnership with the University of Burundi, where it is hosted, IRRI also contributes to training the next generation of scientists by supervising students during their internships and final year projects, thereby strengthening national capacities for sustainable and inclusive development.”, he added.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/irri-joins-burundis-diplomatic-week-leads-facility-tour-story1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>“Being a part of this year’s Diplomatic Week shows the alignment of IRRI and Burundi’s goals which is to achieve food, nutrition, and income security.”, said IRRI Regional Breeding Lead and Seed System and Product Management Lead for East and Southern Africa Dr. Ajay Panchbhai. He also highlighted the importance of the Host Country Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Burundi signed back in 2018. “This allowed us to position our Burundi Office as the regional crop improvement hub, which will significantly help us in our joint goal of transforming the future of rice-based agri-food systems in Africa.”</p><p>After the opening session, the delegation visited IRRI’s facilities at the Regional Crop Improvement Office located at the University of Burundi’s Faculty of Agronomy and Bio - Engineering (FABI). Herein, the visitors were introduced to IRRI’s ongoing works about breeding, agronomy, mechanization, plant pathology, capacity building and variety development with rapid generation enhancement systems as well as corporate services.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/irri-joins-burundis-diplomatic-week-leads-facility-tour-story2.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Burundi’s rice sector is facing challenges such as lack of high-performance varieties, low production, biotic and abiotic stresses, and overexploitation of available small land areas. “To address these challenges, IRRI-Burundi is developing approximately 50 rice elite breeding lines each year, including high-yielding lines that are resilient to the effects of climate change. Furthermore, from 2008 to the present day, 47,224 rice farmers have been trained in rice production and quality seed production technologies. In collaboration with the Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Burundi (ISABU), 19 new rice varieties have been released in Burundi and 17 others have been released in other African countries from the IRRI regional hub in Bujumbura”, shared IRRI Country Representative for Burundi, Dr. Ir. Joseph Bigirimana.</p><p>Bigirimana also mentioned that IRRI’s ongoing projects in Burundi such as Projet d’Appui au Développement des Chaînes de valeur de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage au Burundi [Project Supporting the Development of Agricultural and Livestock Value Chains in Burundi], which is funded by the African Development Bank and the Projet d’Appui à l’Amélioration de la Riziculture en République du Burundi [Project Supporting the Improvement of Rice Cultivation in the Republic of Burundi], which is funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are all manifestations of fruitful diplomatic partnerships and IRRI’s commitment to supporting the country’s development goals.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/irri-joins-burundis-diplomatic-week-leads-facility-tour-story3.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation Ferdinand Bashikako, Ambassador of Belgium in Burundi (who represented the Diplomatic Corps) Michael Wimmer, and Dr. Ajay Panchbhai signed the IRRI – Burundi Office’s Livre d"Or [guestbook]. The full delegation consisted of members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Honorary Consuls of Burundi abroad, Representatives of Regional and International Organizations, and Heads of Cooperation Offices. The 2-day affair ended with a celebration of the 63rd Anniversary of the Republic of Burundi’s Independence.</p></p></p> IRRI joins Burundi’s Diplomatic Week, leads facility tour of Regional Crop Improvement Hub \| International Rice Research Institute	查看 5167	东亚发展网络	2025-07-11 13:31:50 2025-07-23 21:43:57	word
3215921	无图 <p><p> <p>LAGUNA, Philippines (13 May 2025) — IRRI emphasizes prevention and suppression at the recent International Technology Cooperation Center of the Rural Development Administration – Korea (ITCC- RDA) and IRRI training on Integrated Pest Management (IPM). The 5-day training course aimed to introduce recent paradigm shifts in rice pest management, update participants on recent advances in management technologies, and assist them in the preparation and implementation of their localized IPM research plans.</p><p>Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is a sustainable and effective management approach to controlling pests in agriculture by implementing a combination of scientific techniques and ecological knowledge such as pest biology and behavior. IPM was first introduced in the 1970’s to address the growing negative effects of pesticides in agriculture. “Rice will have to be produced, processed, and marketed in a more sustainable way.”, IRRI Scientist and Country Representative for Cambodia Dr. Nurmi Pangesti said as she explained how climate change is shaping ecosystems involved in global rice production.</p><p>Click here to read the full story</p></p></p> RDA-IRRI champions climate-smart pest management for sustainable rice production \| International Rice Research Institute	查看 1177	东亚发展网络	2025-07-15 11:35:11 2025-07-23 21:43:57	word
3215920	有图 <p><p> <p>14 JULY 2025 (LAGUNA, Philippines) -- “Bundling agricultural credit with crop insurance has the potential to expand rural financial markets for smallholder and marginalized farmers in Odisha," stated Dr. Patrick Ward of the University of Florida during the SIRS Seminar on the “Impacts of an innovative credit + insurance bundle for marginalized farmers: Evidence from a cluster randomized trial in Odisha, India.”</p><p>Their research team partnered with Dvara E-Registry (DER), an award-winning social enterprise in India, to offer a bundle consisting of a KhetScore loan and insurance to enable smallholder rice farmers to invest in their crop production while protecting them from loss of collateral or defaulting on loan repayment in the event of crop failure. DER pioneered KhetScore, a platform that assesses smallholder farmers’ production or profitability potential using a 3-year historical index of land analytics through remote-sensing data, artificial intelligence, and in-house algorithms. Aside from this, the team provided product trainings and informational sessions to the primary client and the co-signatory, which is another member of the opposite sex from their respective households.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/bundled-agriculturl-loans-and-insurance-unlock-financial-story1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>“Financial inclusion and risk management are imperative for smallholder farmers to be able to invest in their agricultural production,” explained Ward. By bundling the loan with insurance, the initiative aims to alleviate credit constraints, such as a lack of a formal credit report, collateral, or documented land rights. In this case, the insurance payout is triggered when the farmer’s crops are affected by catastrophic disasters, enabling farmers to repay lenders. Cyclones and flooding frequently devastate smallholder farmers’ plots of land, particularly in the Jajpur district, a low-lying coastal plain. This is why smallholder farmers who reside there lack access to credit due to the high risks involved in farming within the district.</p><p>In India, the lack of land rights and proper documentation is a common challenge for female farmers. Intrahousehold decision-making between the male and female members of the family significantly affects how the family finances are managed. KhetScore aims to eliminate this barrier by assessing the production and profitability potential of the land using satellite data, picture-based monitoring, and machine learning, regardless of who owns the land. KhetScore can also be used in place of a formal credit score for individuals who do not have any credit reports from formal accreditors.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/bundled-agriculturl-loans-and-insurance-unlock-financial-story2.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>“In terms of the impacts on agricultural outcomes, we observed this increase in rice production during the Rabi (dry) season, which suggests that there is potential for a product like this to expand agricultural production along the extensive margin”, Ward discussed. Specifically, the insurance bundle helped increase smallholder farmers’ profits, improve rice production, and increase cultivated area by improving financial literacy, credit and insurance uptake, women’s empowerment, and alleviating the stress of near-subsistence farming.</p><p>The results also showed a decrease in informal borrowing and an increase in formal lending. “This is beneficial from a societal perspective because informal borrowing tends to be a bit harsher on borrowers. They tend to charge higher interest rates, they are not subject to regulations by banking authorities. In contrast, formal lenders are subject to regulatory oversight.” The farmers shared that the repayment terms were easier on them because of the low interest rate, which DER can offer because the loan was bundled with a crop insurance, which lowers the default risk that the lender bears. Also, since the farmers can pay the loans in installments, it lowers the barrier to transactions.</p><p><img src="https://dev-static.irri.org/public/images/bundled-agriculturl-loans-and-insurance-unlock-financial-story3.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>The team observed a significant increase in overall take-up of credit among women, particularly, with much of this coming in the form of formal credit rather than from informal sources. Intrahousehold surveys showed that other members of the household, like wives of those who availed the bundled insurance, stated that they witnessed improvement in their livelihoods and asset management, even though they are not the direct beneficiaries of the project.</p><p>This study also shows the potential of delivering technology-finance packages that lower the production and adoption risk and the cost of insurance so that farmers are more motivated to adopt better technology or improved rice varieties. Ward concluded that intrahousehold surveys greatly informed the results of the study, showing that by interviewing the head male and female members of the household, there are impacts that cannot be observed with a survey alone. “This just provides more evidence that, as development practitioners, we should be more holistic in our approach in trying to ascertain outcomes through these kinds of impact evaluations.”</p><p>---</p><p>READ MORE about the study at</p><p>Kramer, Berber; Pattnaik, Subhransu; Ward, Patrick S.; and Xu, Yingchen. 2023. Impacts of a digital credit-insurance bundle for landless farmers: Evidence from a cluster randomized trial in Odisha, India. Presented at the 2024 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2024, San Antonio, Texas. https://cgspace.cgiar.org/items/8769581e-712d-45b5-9514-b4a856e34704 </p></p></p> Bundled agricultural loans and insurance unlock financial inclusion for Odisha’s farmers \| International Rice Research Institute	查看 5861	东亚发展网络	2025-07-15 11:41:19 2025-07-23 21:43:57	word
3215919	有图 <img src="https://content.presspage.com/uploads/2864/a6f32710-94bb-4ad2-874c-0208d5472e7f/1920_nnvolunteerweekinfographic2024.png?10000" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> NN Volunteer Week infographic 2024 </p> <p>Social impact is the main driver of NN Group’s community investment programme and according to Jeroen Koks, who works in the Community Investment (CI) team and is himself a volunteer, there is nothing like volunteering to bring it alive. ‘It is the best way to engage colleagues in community investment,’ he says. ‘They really become part of the impact we have on society.’</p><p>Company-wide</p><p>In 2024, there were over 7,000 participations in our company-wide volunteering programme (some colleagues took part more than once). The programme has been running since 2014 and this year the number of volunteer hours over the year reached an all-time high of 42,049.</p><p>‘During NN Volunteer week, we spread the word across the organisation with flyers and online campaigns, about how great it is to get involved. And it’s not just great for our communities. It really gives me a sense of pride and connectedness to our values.’</p><p>Battling loneliness</p><p>Colleagues can sign up either as individuals or as part of a team. Last year, in the Netherlands, team participation was more popular than ever, with 1,300 colleagues signing up with their team. Activities ranged from walking, gardening and playing games with the elderly, who often battle loneliness, to giving children in poverty a birthday like never before. NN Group Management Board members also rallied round, packing 500 of some 6,000 gifts and birthday boxes for children.</p><p>Social connection is an important theme for community investment, says Jeroen: ‘I visit 98-year-old Mientje regularly, taking her out in her wheelchair for a breath of fresh air.Connecting multiple times really deepens the connection.’</p><p>NN Charity Run</p><p>Perhaps the biggest event in the volunteering year is the NN Charity Run. This year over 1,000 enthusiastic colleagues ran over 20,000 km, raising EUR 122,530 for local charities to spend on making a positive impact in our communities. Those who ran in Belgium for example, supported Pinocchio, a non-profit organisation helping children suffering from serious burns as well as their families. In Romania, employees ran for the Association Inima Copiilor, which supports the expansion of the cardiac surgery department at the Marie Curie Hospital in Bucharest, improving the chance of survival for children with heart disease.</p><p>In 2024, during NN Volunteer week, we contributed to the financial, physical and mental well-being of 8,827 people in our communities.</p> NN Volunteer week – bringing community investment to life	查看 2779	NN集团	2025-07-23 21:43:29 2025-07-23 21:43:37	word
3215918	无图 <p> <p>Amsterdam, June 19, 2025 - As dementia care remains reactive, Spanish startup Punto Health demonstrates how AI can transform crisis management into proactive family support. The company won the second edition of the NN Social Innovation Startup Award at The Next Web Conference in Amsterdam, receiving €100,000 plus a year-long mentorship program from NN Group and Rubio Impact Ventures.</p><p>Transforming dementia care</p><p>Punto Health emerged when dementia hit Anna Muñoz Farré"s grandfather, showing the gaps within the healthcare system. With 78 million people facing diagnosis by 2030, she and Jack Eckersley transform dementia care by empowering patients, families and healthcare providers with AI-driven personalized support throughout Spain. </p><p>"One in two people will be affected by dementia during their lifetime, and women are impacted, both as patients and as carers," says Anna Muñoz Farré, co-founder and CEO of Punto Health. "This €100,000 grant from NN Group, combined with Rubio"s network and expertise in scaling impact startups, gives us everything we need to transform dementia care and help families better manage their challenges."</p><p>Personal stories driving change</p><p>The most powerful innovations come from founders who experienced the problems they are solving, as this year"s finalists demonstrate. During the second edition of the NN Social Innovation Startup Award, six startups had the opportunity to pitch their solutions to solving social challenges that positively impact well-being. Startup Punto Health won the award, receiving a grant of receiving €100,000 plus a year-long mentorship program from NN Group and Rubio Impact Ventures.</p><p>Runner-up is the Belgium startup The Hacking Games that received €50,000 for their mission to turn cybercriminals into cyber defenders. Fergus Hay and his co-founders actively seek out digital talent in gaming communities and online forums, redirecting their skills toward protecting our world across the Netherlands and Belgium.</p><p>The other four finalists also received supporting grants:</p><p>1) iYoni App was born when Katarzyna Goch and Professor Krzysztof Jan Łukaszuk witnessed couples struggle with fertility in silence. With 186 million affected by infertility yet 70% going undiagnosed, they created AI that detects conditions years earlier across 176 countries.</p><p>2) Juvoly was founded by software developer Thomas Kluiters and practicing GP Maarten Timmers. The platform transcribes doctor-patient consultations in real-time and transforms them into structured summaries for electronic health records. As administrative burden adds to the workload of healthcare professionals, the company proves their solution addresses a real problem in Dutch healthcare.</p><p>3) Morphoses Skillsis an innovative EdTech platform dedicated to developing soft skills in children ages 6 to 17. Through live, activity-based classes, the team offers a gamified learning experience that empowers children to build soft skills. Founders Anna Natsvlishvili and Alexandros Pithamitsis teach emotional intelligence through game-like experiences across Greece and Romania.</p><p>4) naext tackles how for millions with sensory disabilities, public transport feels like an impossible maze. Victor van Dinten and Lukas van Delft are changing that with AI navigation offering voice guidance, tactile paths, and low-stimulus routes across the Netherlands.</p><p>Become the norm, not the exception</p><p>"We designed this award to champion early-stage social enterprises that provide innovative solutions for improving financial, physical and mental well-being. Developing products and services that create solutions for people at scale, is still a challenge for many social entrepreneurs to make the impact that they envision. The diversity of solutions this year shows that technology can truly be a force for good," says Lonneke Roza, Head of Community Investment at NN Group. "From AI transforming dementia care to platforms redirecting digital talent toward cybersecurity—these are the innovations that make a difference for people who need it most."</p><p>Ilonka Jankovich, Venture Partner at Rubio Impact Ventures, adds: "Some of the most impactful startups are built by people with deep personal insight into the problems they"re solving. But turning that into a scalable business—especially in sectors like mental health, healthcare access, or financial resilience—is incredibly hard without the right kind of support. This award was created to fill that gap. Not just with funding, but with the guidance from NN Group and Rubio and the support of the community of innovators we"ve created with this competition. Each and every one is committed to changing the system, so that tech-driven solutions for well-being become the norm, not the exception."</p> </p> Punto Health wins €100K for families facing dementia	查看 4891	NN集团	2025-07-23 21:43:27 2025-07-23 21:43:37	word
3215917	无图 <p> <p>Today, NN Group announces the publication of its semi-annual pre close note for the first half of 2025. The note does not contain inside information or current trading information.</p><p>The note is primarily intended to assist the sell side analyst community covering NN Group, and may be useful for their analysis.The note is available on the Financial Results page of the Investors section on NN Group’s website.</p><p>NN Group will publish its 1H25 results on 8 August 2025.</p> </p> NN Group publishes 1H25 semi-annual pre close note	查看 532	NN集团	2025-07-23 21:43:24 2025-07-23 21:43:37	word
3215916	无图 <p> <p>At NN Group, our purpose is to help people care for what matters most to them. In order to do this effectively we are committed to respecting human rights. As a large financial services company, we believe we have a role to play in addressing societal challenges in our various roles (employer, investor, financial services provider, business partner and corporate citizen). We also believe issues such as inequality, discrimination, and labour rights violations not only impact the well-being of individuals and communities but also the potential for creating sustainable long-term value for all our stakeholders.</p><p>As investors who take an active role in influencing and engaging with the companies we invest in, we aim to encourage them to improve their performance when it comes to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. Human rights is a key engagement area for us, and by asking investee companies to align their practices with human rights standards, we hope we can help make a positive impact. We also work together with other investors to address specific human rights issues. One focus area where we collaborate with others is living wage.</p><p>Catalyst for broader improvements</p><p>A living wage is a level of pay that allows workers and their families to provide for their basic needs – food, shelter and healthcare, for example. According to the UN Global Compact Business & Human Rights Navigator, over a billion working people worldwide – one third of all workers – are estimated to earn less than they need to afford a decent standard of living. The issue of living wage is more prevalent in certain industries, for example, the food and agricultural sector and the clothing industry. Successfully addressing the issue of a living wage can act as a catalyst for improvement in other areas where human rights are at risk. For instance, there is less likelihood of child labour and children are more likely to be able to attend school and receive a proper education if parents earn enough to support their families.</p><p>Enabling living wages in global supply chains</p><p>The Platform Living Wage Financials (PLWF) is a group of 23 financial institutions managing over EUR 7 trillion of assets under management and advice. It focuses on encouraging and monitoring companies to provide living wages and incomes in their global supply chains. The coalition uses its influence and leverage to engage with more than 50 companies in the garment and footwear, and food sectors. It is difficult for individual companies to tackle a systemic issue such as living wage and income on their own, which is why the PLWF takes a sector-wide approach.</p><p>NN Group’s role</p><p>In 2023, NN Group became a direct member, having been represented by our asset manager prior to that. By early 2024, as a member of the Food Agri and Food Retail Working Group, we had taken on engagements with more food retail companies. The PLWF evaluates companies using an assessment methodology aligned with the UN Global Compact reporting framework. This scores companies in five categories (embryonic, developing, maturing, advanced and leading). The leaders give valuable insights into best practice that can be shared with other companies. The results and findings of the platform’s work are published in its annual report. In early 2025, NN Group hosted the annual PLWF conference.</p><p>Leveraging climate engagements to further social aspects</p><p>In 2024, we conducted a review of our climate-related active ownership activities with a view to increasing our focus on the social angle of the transition. Since then, we have been encouraging companies to integrate social aspects into their transition plans where relevant. Most were willing to engage in a dialogue and open about the challenges they face, ranging from finding alignment among stakeholders to the absence of a global framework on how to communicate their just transition efforts. We are also trying to identify ways to better embed the just transition in our responsible investment activities and this topic aligns with our work within the PLWF and our collaborative climate engagements.</p><p>You can read more about our engagement work in our Active Ownership Report and our climate activities and ambitions for all areas of our business in our Climate Action Plan. For more information, visit the sustainability section on our website.</p> </p> A living wage is a fundamental human right	查看 4475	NN集团	2025-07-23 21:43:21 2025-07-23 21:43:37	word
3215915	无图 Center for Advanced Computing (CAC)FY25 Research & Education ImpactResearch Impact• 443 research projects• 1,522 faculty and student users from Cornell’s colleges,schools, research centers, institutes, and labs• 9,975,192 hours computing on Red Cloud (+16% compared to FY24).Virtual clusters in the cloud are available. Trial accounts are freefor Cornell faculty, staff, and students.• 31 private faculty compute clusters hosted and maintainedfor Anthropology, Applied Physics, Astronomy, BEE, BioHPC,CCSS, CCB, CS, Economics, Human Ecology, Johnson, MAE,MSE, Nutrition, Physics, Plant Science, Praxis, Weill CornellMedicine• 11,912 hours of research consulting provided (+8%)• 685TBs cloud storage/984TBs archival storage utilized (+17%)Grant Impact• Current grants: I-WRF Weather Research & Forecasting Model ($2M PI),Pollinator-Pathogen Dynamics ($433K PI), HPC-ED Pilot ($360K PI),AI for Civil and Environmental Engineers ($7M Co-PI), Orchestrationof Multi-Messenger Astrophysical Observations ($3.6M Co-PI),Pathways to Equity in Cyberinfrastructure Utilization for ScientificDiscovery ($283K Co-PI)• Subawards: Multi-Host Parasites (Entomology PI McArt/CAC Co-PI),NANOGrav (Astronomy Co-PI Cordes/CAC Cyberinfrastructure Lead),IRIS-HEP Software Innovations (Physics Lead Wittich/CAC Software),NSF Leadership-Class Computing Facility (TACC Training Partner),Jetstream2 Regional Cloud• Leadership: Chair, Coalition for Academic Scientific Computation(CASC), Empire AI Technical Advisory CommitteeEducation Impact• 13 research computing webinars; 1,096 total attendees• 8 Cornell Virtual Workshop topics created/updated, including AI/GPU• 38 instructional videos available on demand via CAC YouTube• 3 Data Science/Visualization Certificates created by CAC generatedmore than $13M eCornell revenue since launch• Classroom teaching (e.g., ASTRO 6531); postdoc/student mentoringThe Center for Advanced Computing (CAC) is a core facility of the Office of the Vice Provost for Research.CAC services impact Cornell researchers by accelerating insights and discovery, strengthening grantproposals, and helping researchers meet grant deliverables faster and more effectively. Contact CACtoday to explore how we can assist you: Rich Knepper, PhD, CAC Director, 607-255-0313,rich.knepper@cornell.edu. Learn more at www.cac.cornell.edu.CAC is training partner for the NSFLeadership-Class Computing Facilitythat when deployed in 2026 will have10x today’s performance (100x AI).Cornell-wide research breakthroughsare powered by Red Cloud’s 4,140CPUs, plus GPUs. Trial accounts areavailable from CAC.CAC is creating the data managementsystem for the Fred YoungSubmillimeter Telescope that’s beingdeployed at 18,400 feet in Chile.CAC’s I-WRF project ($2M PI) supportsfaculty research on the effects ofurbanization on the atmosphere andfunds EAS postdocs. _ CAC FY25 Research & Education Impact Report	查看 2842	康奈尔大学高级计算中心	2025-07-23 21:42:14 2025-07-23 21:42:41	word
3215914	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">The FfD4 Sevilla Commitment: Boosting hopes, if not finance<p>Commentary02 July 2025</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/9/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-c00b11f9.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-194d7722.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-4ab7ff16.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-c740c0d6.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-2cb8e5ea.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-3b6e560a.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/taisia-karaseva-eMYb8oRS9s0-unsplash-522b55f0.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Taisia Karaseva via Unsplash </p><p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/ECDPM-San-Bilal-d2204282.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>San Bilal </p><p><i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p><p><p>The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Seville is a ray of hope in a gloomy world. Coming out of my Brussels bubble, where development cooperation funding, principles and even raison d’être are questioned every day – even more so since Trump dismantled USAID – it is somewhat comforting to see over 4,000 people assembled in Seville to argue in favour of development finance and greater solidarity around common goals.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p><p>Heads of states approved the outcome document at the opening of the conference without discussion. Despite reservations from some countries (for instance, referring to the UN for discussing debt issues is definitely not to everyone’s liking), the so-called Compromiso de Sevilla– or Sevilla Commitment – held up. No one wanted to challenge the hard-won consensus.</p><p>Trump has probably been of great help. By withdrawing from the process after already isolating itself in opposing the Sustainable Development Goals, gender, trade, tax and financial regulations, among others, the US has provided the final impetus to all other members to ensure a comprehensive outcome.</p><p>And comprehensive it is. The 42-page outcome document covers a wide range of issues, including domestic resource mobilisation, international trade, debt, private sector mobilisation, corruption, illicit financial flows, finance regulations, reform of the international financial architecture, development cooperation, and south-south and triangular cooperation, to mention a few issues.</p><p>In the heat of Seville, the Commitment looks like a Christmas tree. Everybody can find some elements to please them, while complaining about weak or missing items (see IDOS, Afrodad and ourselves at ECDPM, for instance).</p><p>In the heat of Seville, the Commitment looks like a Christmas tree. Everybody can find some elements to please them, while complaining about weak or missing items. </p><p>While the lack of focus is certainly a weakness, it has the advantage of preventing a strong antagonism between the Global South and Global North (although neither is truly global but increasingly fragmented).</p><p>My initial fear was that the south would mainly ask for legitimate systemic reforms and a significant scaling up of finance, which the north would struggle to respond to in a geopolitically fragmented international landscape and fiscally constrained environment. While the north would make some efforts to advance a more pragmatic development agenda, this would lead to a mismatch of expectations and frustration on both sides due to the lack of recognition and common ground. The outcome document mainly avoids this pitfall… for the time being.</p><p>This might explain Seville’s rather good mood and dynamic spirit. Spare for the standstill traffic jams caused by security roadblocks across town and the conference compound, one session after the other highlighted positive initiatives and goodwill.</p><p>We all seemed happy to be together, re-energised by our sense that narrow self-interest and conflictual approaches might not be overriding international relations, and that the common good, the sense of common destiny and ‘common decency’ (no longer so common these days, even among world leaders and in diplomatic circles) would prevail after all.</p><p>Yet, the Seville outcome document is just that – a document. Rather than focusing on what’s missing and how it could have been even better, the focus should be on how to implement at least some of its recommendations. The platform of action initiatives is expected to play a key role in this regard.</p></p></p><p><p> <p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/Seville-Financing-for-Development-Conference-Photo-by-Marcelo-Del-Pozo-FEPS-Europe-via-Flickr-54624565758_b57ddba19f_k-3a6e30a0.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/7/Seville-Financing-for-Development-Conference-Photo-by-Marcelo-Del-Pozo-FEPS-Europe-via-Flickr-54624565758_b57ddba19f_k-33f66e77.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/Seville-Financing-for-Development-Conference-Photo-by-Marcelo-Del-Pozo-FEPS-Europe-via-Flickr-54624565758_b57ddba19f_k-4ad1be76.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> San Bilal at an FfD4 side event hosted by FEPS and the UN Brussels Office – © Marcelo Del Pozo / FEPS Europe via Flickr. </p></p><p><p> <p><p>A cynical European financier ironically suggested that while ‘the billion to trillion’ agenda was dead, we are instead moving from ‘billion to million’, revealing the fear of many development actors. Another dismissed the false hopes of the current mantra of “doing more with less” and lamented that, while NATO leaders commit to 5% of GDP spending on defence, the world is unable to gather a fraction of this to save our planet and humanity. The Sevilla Commitment should serve as a reminder of our ambitions and help hold leaders more accountable.</p><p>A cynical European financier ironically suggested that while ‘the billion to trillion’ agenda was dead, we are instead moving from ‘billion to million’, revealing the fear of many development actors. </p><p>As a pragmatist, I see three immediate major takeaways that could be derived from Seville, from both the FfD4 process and outcome.</p><p>First, development finance is not about developing countries; it concerns everyone. The donor-recipient relationship and divide are fast eroding. This is not to say that development cooperation and dominant relationships will cease.</p><p>However, the balance of power is shifting, traditional models are becoming obsolete, and co-creation is increasingly needed. Donors have to reinvent themselves fast. Development financiers have to up their game, building on numerous innovative initiatives, many of which originate from the South and their institutions. These include debt swaps, local currency, securitisation and special drawing rights, to mention just a few. These efforts should align with countries’ national strategies and priorities.</p><p>Second, economic interests, social justice, equity, gender and sustainable development are closely related and cannot be disentangled. Yet, appropriate instruments should be developed for each. For Europe, this implies adopting the appropriate policies and tools, better combining its domestic and international agenda (for example, around competitiveness, sustainability and the twin – digital and green – transition), and the priorities and institutions of its partner countries and international institutions.</p><p>To be concrete, the Global Gateway strategy must better engage and support the European private sector – via export credit agencies under the forthcoming European Competitiveness Fund, for example – and at the same time engage and support European, international, regional and national financial institutions for development and beyond. It should promote locally-owned initiatives and project origination, while supporting transformative dynamics through pipelines and portfolios of intervention approaches.</p><p>This investment approach should be complemented, when appropriate, by macro-financial assistance, policy-based lending and support for domestic public finance management and resource mobilisation, including gender-responsive budgeting, as outlined in the outcome document.</p><p>Third, greater attention should be devoted to governance reforms of the international architecture. In practice, Europe should actively pursue coalitions of the willing with like-minded partner countries, in both the south and north, through plurilateral initiatives and agreements, and adopt common positions in international fora whenever possible. The motto should be co-creation and partnerships. Europe should act now to show goodwill and strengthen relationships, rather than wait until it’s too late and the system totally collapses.</p><p>Europe should act now to show goodwill and strengthen relationships, rather than wait until it’s too late and the system totally collapses. </p><p>In doing so, the EU should adopt more pragmatic and tailored approaches, engaging with thematic and geographic priorities with its counterparts. Take the example of China. The EU characterised it as a systemic rival. Yet, cooperation with China can be fruitful in many specific areas and geographies, from critical raw minerals to solar energy and hydrogen development, where China has a clear dominance in producing solar panels and electrolysers, which is beneficial for many EU partner countries.</p><p>Back in Brussels, Europe should be inspired by the Sevilla Commitment to further elaborate on its comparative advantage and soft power in strengthening its dynamics among EU member states and institutions, as well as with its partners. You can count on ECDPM to facilitate, stimulate, support and help bridge that process.</p><p>The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of ECDPM.</p>Our work on FfD4<p>Explore our dossier featuring ECDPM’s work around the fourth International Conference on Financing for Development.</p></p></p><p><p> <p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/pexels-javierdiazg-1143416-1b85658c.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/9/pexels-javierdiazg-1143416-e9d3b679.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/9/pexels-javierdiazg-1143416-c43a5bd9.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> </p><p>Financing for development: How can the EU make the best of FfD4?</p><p>With the fresh disappointment of COP29 and abject failure of their previous meeting in 2015 to raise development finance “from billions to trillions” still lingering, state representatives are to meet in Seville for the fourth Financing for Development conference. It will take a great strategic effort not only to save the conference from the fate of its predecessors, but to correct the direction of development aid itself, which appears otherwise doomed to accelerating decline.</p> <p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/1/Karim_karaki-303505d1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/Jonathan_Hunter_web-d036819b.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p>18 March 2025</p></p></p><p>Economic recovery and transformation </p><p><p>Economic recovery and transformation Economy and trade Finance and investment Geopolitics and development Multilateralism </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> The FfD4 Sevilla Commitment: Boosting hopes, if not finance - ECDPM	查看 11879	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:42:00 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215913	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">Environmental peacebuilding as a climate-security priority for the EU – Examples from the Sahel<p>Brief09 July 2025</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-f0879230.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/8/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-5d2c3d78.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/f/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-4ff0960f.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/7/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-28d1ef67.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/3/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-2e4ecc93.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-97375902.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/daniel-kawed-9f_eJeULtSY-unsplash-abe78de2.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Daniel Kawed via Unsplash </p><p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/ECDPM-Sara-Gianesello-4110a7ac.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/ECDPM-Sophie-Desmidt-b562ca1b.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Sara Gianesello Sophie Desmidt </p><p><i></i>Download<i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p><p><p>Environmental peacebuilding can help address the Sahel’s interlinked crises of conflict, climate change and fragility. Drawing on practical examples and offering recommendations, Sara Gianesello and Sophie Desmidt argue that the EU must prioritise environmental peacebuilding to strengthen its climate-security agenda and safeguard its own security, development and economic interests.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p>Summary<p>The Central Sahel faces interlinked crises of conflict, climate change and fragility, but responses have been fragmented. Environmental peacebuilding offers opportunities to promote cooperation between conflicting groups through climate-sensitive and mutually beneficial projects around natural resources.</p><p>In this brief, we explore what the EU’s agenda means for environmental peacebuilding by sharing practical experiences from the Sahel and offering recommendations for the EU to promote climate-sensitive peacebuilding. Analysis shows that investing in environmental peacebuilding is crucial to safeguarding Europe’s security, development and economic interests.</p><p>We find that discussions at the EU policy level largely focus on the climate-security nexus, with environmental peacebuilding often implicitly understood but not explicitly named. Recent policy developments, particularly the EU’s 2023 Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, prioritise security and defence, reducing attention and funding for peace-focused activities outside the EU’s borders. This raises concerns among civil society about shrinking support for climate-sensitive peacebuilding actions.</p><p>While there is space for continued dialogue with EU policymakers and member state representatives, new entry points are urgently needed. For example, the Global Gateway’s 360-degree approach and the green transition could open up venues for policy dialogue. The EU should remain sensitive to peacebuilding, promote cross-institutional coordination, and draw on peacebuilding expertise. It should also integrate climate action, fragility and peacebuilding into negotiations on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034.</p><p>Download the brief <i></i></p>Introduction<p>The Central Sahel is grappling with the compounded effects of protracted crises, violent conflict and climate change, all intensified by environmental, institutional and social fragility. Despite growing recognition of the interconnections between conflict, climate change and environmental degradation in the region, current responses remain fragmented, limiting efforts to effectively promote climate-sensitive environmental peacebuilding and conflict-responsive climate strategies.</p><p>Impacts of climate change are often described as a ‘threat multiplier’ or ‘conflict accelerant’, as the availability and quality of natural resources are significantly undermined by direct climate effects, such as extreme heat and reduced rainfall. The Central Sahel confronts significant climate change threats, with a projected temperature rise from 2.0 to 4.3 °C by 2080 and increasingly frequent, severe weather extremes, putting in peril its predominantly rain-fed agricultural sector, the livelihood base for 60-80% of its population.</p><p>Climate change is significantly disrupting agro-pastoralism and cattle herding, with shifting rainfall patterns altering herd migration schedules. Degraded soil and water resources, and diminished available agricultural land intensify competition over natural resources, particularly between herders and farmers, but also involving other resource-dependent groups. This competition is further exacerbated by existing issues such as land degradation from deforestation and poor farming practices, rapid population growth (with Niger’s population projected to increase by 140% by 2050), and weak conflict resolution mechanisms for resource disputes.</p><p>However, research increasingly highlights that while environmental challenges are barriers to peace and resilience, they can also serve as entry points for mediation, dialogue and conflict resolution among and between communities. ‘Environmental peacebuilding’ has therefore emerged as a field focused on fostering peaceful intercommunity relations through a climate-sensitive approach to peacebuilding and is based on the assumption that conflicting groups can be encouraged to collaborate on environmental projects with mutual benefits.</p><p>The European Union (EU) has sought to link climate change, peace and security, creating entry points for policy dialogue and targeted support. However, recent policy developments have highlighted how the approach of the EU is increasingly becoming more centred around (hard) security and defence, with a focus on Europe itself and severely diminishing policy attention and funding for peace-focused activities.</p><p>According to the 2025 OECD States of Fragility report, peace-related official development assistance (ODA) to the Sahel has dropped. In 2023, only 10.4% of DAC members’ ODA was allocated to peacebuilding, down from previous years, despite a record number of violent conflicts globally, which is a mismatch between growing needs and declining peace financing. Moreover, while the international community has increased development finance for climate-related objectives in the last decade, the majority of this funding has been directed toward countries outside the identified fragile contexts.</p><p>This briefing note is the first of two notes (1). It highlights the current EU policy landscape that peacebuilding organisations have to navigate, examining what it means to engage in environmental peacebuilding and bringing forward practical experiences from the ground, ending with some concrete steps on how to put environmental peacebuilding higher on the EU agenda.</p>1. Understanding environmental peacebuilding<p>Central to the approaches of environmental peacebuilding is natural resource management (NRM), and in particular, how natural resources can be managed more responsibly, thereby helping to prevent conflict recurrence, achieve sustainable peace and development, and foster social cohesion, mediation and dialogue (Interviews 2025).</p><p>Although the concept of environmental peacebuilding is not new, its structured approach as a field of practice and research has emerged more recently. Our research highlights that in the Sahel, communities have engaged in practices that align with environmental peacebuilding for decades, even if they have not necessarily been labeled or perceived as such. This may relate to the challenges of linking slow-onset climate change impacts with immediate political priorities (i.e. security and countering violent terrorism in the Central Sahel). Interviews with peacebuilding organisations, as well as European agencies for international cooperation working on the ground have revealed that, until recently, they struggled to help the local population understand the link between climate change and conflict. This is, however, changing as communities are increasingly affected by extreme weather events, such as the 2024 floods in Mali. These events are sparking broader discussions about the concrete impacts of recent climatic hazards and fostering a growing awareness of the link between climate change and conflicts (Interviews 2025).</p><p>The potential of NRM as a pathway to peace, resilience, and social cohesion is gaining more prominence at the policy-level too. The UN has recently published a ‘tip sheet’ recognising that environmental peacebuilding includes broader interventions than climate, peace and security approaches, which principally refer to climate-related risks affecting peace and the need for conflict-sensitive climate action. While climate, peace and security actions mostly focus on climate-informed peacebuilding and peace-positive climate action, environmental peacebuilding includes “interventions involving natural resource management, conservation, and land use, serving as entry points to foster cohesion and resilience”.</p><p>At the European policy level, discussions primarily focus on the climate-security nexus, as well as the concepts and practices of climate adaptation and resilience (2)(Interviews 2025). The concept of environmental peacebuilding is implicitly understood under the umbrella of the climate-security nexus. While the term as such is never used in the text, the 2023 Joint Communication on the climate-security nexus and its 2025 Progress report mention how “natural resources can also offer opportunities for mediation”. The following sections delve more into the climate-security nexus agenda of the EU and its external action on climate and security.</p>2. The climate-security nexus in a shifting EU policy landscape</p><p>2.1 The EU’s climate-security nexus<p>The EU’s external action on climate and security is guided by the 2023 Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, which adopts a comprehensive approach to the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence. The 2023 Joint Communication builds on earlier frameworks, including the 2020 Climate Change and Defence Roadmap and the 2021 Integrated Approach on Climate and Security. But it should also be considered closely with strategic documents like the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and the European Green Deal, which recognised climate change as a driver of instability, although it does not explicitly frame climate change as a conflict driver.</p><p>Structured around four pillars (evidence-based policy making, operationalisation, capabilities and partnerships) (3) the 2023 Joint Communication presents operational actions that different EU services and agencies, (such as the Directorate-General (DG) for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), the DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), the European External Action Service (EEAS), the DG for Environment (DG ENV), the DG for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), the European Defense Agency), as well as EU delegations and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions can take.</p><p>At the policy level, the implementation of the Joint Communication is overseen by different EU services, mostly led by the EEAS, but that include the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), DG INTPA, DG ECHO and lately DG CLIMA and DG ENV. At the moment, it is not clear if the newly established DG for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) will have dedicated climate units or components as well (Interviews 2025).</p><p>In February 2025, the European Commission published the Progress Report on the implementation of the 2023 Joint Communication in which it underlines that “natural resources can also offer opportunities for mediation and become entry points to initiate cooperation and resolve conflict”. Despite describing what is understood as "environmental peacebuilding," neither the Joint Communication nor the Progress Report explicitly mention the term. Interviews with policy makers revealed limited uptake of the term in international policy circles and at the local level, where the term is hardly applied. Some nuance is needed: an international expert on climate security noted greater uptake of the term in the Horn of Africa compared to the Sahel (Interviews 2025).</p><p>Whether or not explicitly framed under the environmental peacebuilding label, there are already examples of actions and initiatives supported by the EU that reflect the underlying principles of environmental peacebuilding, such as cross-border water management projects (see box 1 for other examples).</p><p>However, a conflict-sensitive approach seems to be lacking in other key EU climate policies and related initiatives. For example, the European Green Deal promotes resilience-building initiatives, including sustainable agriculture or developing sustainable transports and infrastructures. However, a well-intentioned green project can inadvertently worsen local tensions if it creates new competition over land or resources without considering the existing social dynamics. The key opportunity is to make this approach systematic: the Green Deal could become a powerful tool for peace if its climate projects were intentionally designed to not only meet environmental goals but also to constructively manage conflicts and turn them into opportunities for cooperation. Yet, the EU Green Deal has been losing political momentum, as the narrative has shifted from a focus on green transformation to prioritising competitiveness and regulatory simplification over its original ecological ambition.</p><p>The same goes for the EU’s efforts to secure resources for the green transition, which, without conflict-sensitive strategies in place, risk perpetuating harmful practices. A key example is the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which was adopted in 2024, but does not explicitly address conflict sensitivity in its text. However, many of the natural resources needed for the green transition to be successful are located in areas that are already suffering from the environmental, social and economic consequences of extractive activities, which are both a driver and a symptom of fragility and conflict. With extractive activity expected to accelerate significantly over the next 15 years, the risk of deeper ecological and socio-economic impacts will only grow.</p><p>Box 1. Some examples of EU actions</p><p>EU-funded initiatives most directly focused on environmental peacebuilding are supported by FPI, notably through its strategic partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Now in its second phase (2022–2026), the partnership aims, among other things, to develop analyses at the policy level that integrate both climate and conflict dynamics, and implements actions to mitigate climate-related security risks. Initially piloted in Sudan and Nepal, projects now span across African regions, with a focus on borderlands. The partnership is widely seen as effective by EU and UNEP representatives since its launch in 2017 (Interviews 2025).</p><p>There are other examples showing a growing intersection of the EU’s work on climate change and peacebuilding, beyond FPI. One of them is the support to disaster risk reduction mechanisms, where the EU, among other things, helps communities to (re)build resilience to natural hazards and food security, which is where the intersection is particularly evident. Further, the Environment and Sustainable Natural Resources Unit of DG INTPA has increasingly integrated attention for people-centred approaches into its work, evolving from a more narrow ecological and environmental focus to one that recognises the centrality of people. In fragile ecosystems such as the Central Sahel, Central Africa and parts of Southern and Eastern Africa, biodiversity hotspots often overlap with zones of conflict and insecurity, underlining the necessity to prioritise a human dimension to environmental protection and sustainable development.</p><p>DG INTPA has provided technical assistance to EU delegations to improve the integration of climate and environmental goals into broader development and peacebuilding strategies. Cross-departmental coordination, including under the Joint Communication on Climate-Security Nexus, is ongoing to more effectively link environment and climate programming to peace and security objectives – a key step towards supporting biodiversity, climate adaptation, peacebuilding and livelihoods – and achieving long-term impact.</p><p>Sources: European Union 2021; Interviews 2025; ECDPM and Search for Common Ground event of 19 June 2025 “Climate, peace and security in the Sahel: What role for the EU?”.</p>2.2 Shifting EU priorities and their impact on conflict-sensitive peacebuilding<p>Evolving geopolitical and geoeconomic priorities are leading the EU to increasingly focus on strategic investments – notably through the Global Gateway initiative – to ensure its competitiveness, alongside a stronger focus on security, defence and migration. While the green transition still remains central, the new geoeconomic interests are shedding a much brighter light on energy security and access to critical raw materials. This highlights the growing importance of the climate-energy-security nexus in the EU’s external engagement and the impact of these critical transitions as well as the possible spill-over effects of cascading climate risks, including on the EU.</p><p>Some interviewees considered this shift as an opportunity to better understand the role of (climate-sensitive) peacebuilding, particularly how it can play a stronger role in contexts where tensions may emerge around mining, resource extraction and the expansion of green energy (Interviews 2025). However, they were also conscious about the fact that the EU’s emphasis on its own resilience, further reflected in the 2025 Joint Communication on the European Preparedness Union Strategy, risks narrowing the space (and interest) to implement (climate-sensitive) peacebuilding actions through the EU’s external action.</p><p>This is partially reflected in the 2023 Joint Communication, which gives comparatively little attention to the peacebuilding component(4).The Joint Communication sees climate change as a security threat, which has led to responses focusing on defence, risk control and the traditional security paradigm, with little focus on peacebuilding approaches that tackle the deeper causes of conflict exacerbated by climate impacts. Interviews with civil society organisations (CSOs) have expressed their criticism about the focus and prioritisation of security and defence under the 2023 Joint Communication, noting that the preparation and publication of this Communication were carried out in a tight timeline, allowing minimal consultation with CSOs (Interviews 2025). At the same time, the 2025 Climate and Security Trend Analysis, released as part of the Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, outlines five key pathways through which climate change might heighten security risks for Europe: natural resource governance, migration and livelihoods, the energy transition, environmental degradation and global governance. The importance of peacebuilding and conflict mediation is underscored in all these five pathways.</p><p>Yet, amid shifting priorities and proposed budget cuts in development cooperation at both EU and member state levels, there is growing concern that the window created by the climate-security nexus Joint Communication is closing, with donors turning their focus inward and deprioritising external (conflict-sensitive) peacebuilding efforts (Interviews 2025). Civil society has also expressed concerns that outreach and engagement across various components of the European Commission, at least in direct relations to the EU’s policy framework, has proven challenging, in particular for several smaller peacebuilding organisations (Interviews 2025). Nevertheless, interviewees from both civil society and EU institutions still noted the opportunity that the 2023 Joint Communication offers to integrate and maintain wider considerations of peace and security related to climate change. There is a space for continued dialogue with EU policy makers as well as EU member state representatives, allowing stakeholders to share concerns, exchange lessons and explore joint solutions. However, there is also an urgent need to identify new entry points.</p><p>But other avenues for policy dialogue were also flagged. The Global Gateway, a strategic initiative launched by the European Commission in 2021 to promote infrastructure development in partner countries and “win-win” partnerships(5), and in particular its 360-degree approach (see Figure 1) could open avenues. The 360-degree approach includes the 6 key principles of the Global Gateway, including: green and clean, equal partnerships, democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, security-focused and catalysing the private sector - see inner green circle of Figure 1. The 360-degree approach aims to look beyond physical infrastructure and also to strengthen the broader “enabling environment" for sustainable development (the outer blue circle of Figure 1), which includes employment and youth, gender equality and regulatory frameworks. Yet, critical questions remain about how inclusive the Global Gateway approach will be or how existing initiatives (such as the push to promote conflict sensitivity and the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus) will be integrated under the 360-degree approach. Other entry points could be offered by the intention to promote ‘green and lean’ initiatives under the Global Gateway, which will include green energy investments that will need to be conflict sensitive and based on just resource governance, especially when extraction of critical raw materials is involved. As mentioned, existing initiatives geared towards promoting a green transition have not been found to pay much attention to conflict-sensitivity.</p><p>Figure 1. 360-degree approach of the Global Gateway</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/4/360-Degree-Approach-Global-Gateway-by-HellenicAid-MFA-Powerpoint-Presentation-6e7b73d4.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/360-Degree-Approach-Global-Gateway-by-HellenicAid-MFA-Powerpoint-Presentation-395bc156.png"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/9/360-Degree-Approach-Global-Gateway-by-HellenicAid-MFA-Powerpoint-Presentation-b4316c39.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Source: HellenicAid, MFA, Power point presentation <p>To conclude, while the EU’s increasing emphasis on its geostrategic interests risks further marginalising conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches, the EU’s existing instruments (such as the Global Gateway and broader green transition agenda) hold the potential to better integrate environmental peacebuilding, provided they adopt inclusive, locally grounded, and conflict-aware strategies. Translating this potential into practice requires drawing on the experience of those already working at the intersection of climate, conflict, and peace on the ground. The following section explores how European organisations are already working at this intersection.</p></p></p><p><p> <p>3. Learning from the ground</p><p>3.1. The ongoing work of (European) organisations in the Sahel<p>Several (European) organisations working across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors are actively engaged in the Sahel and increasingly recognising the linkages between climate change and conflict. Impacts of climate change alter agro-pastoralism and herding practices, change traditional transhumance migration routes and reduce access to and/or availability of shared natural resources (like land or water), leading to heightened tensions between and within communities. Many organisations are adopting strategies and roadmaps that increasingly highlight the need for conflict-sensitive approaches to climate resilience, sending the message that addressing climate change impacts on conflict is no longer optional but essential.</p><p>Some examples of climate-sensitive strategies that promote the peaceful management of natural resources and strengthen social cohesion include the development of toolkits for conflict-sensitive natural resource management (6);initiatives that facilitate dialogues between diverse ethnic and religious groups to build trust, promote understanding and prevent violence; and nature-based solutions to restore degraded landscapes (Interviews 2025). These initiatives frequently prioritise the engagement of women and youth, empowering them as agents of change through leadership training and capacity building. This is because NRM practices are not immune to social norms and traditionally have been fertile ground for gender inequalities, especially for access to and control over natural resources (see box 2). Young people, especially young women, often face age-related exclusion and inequalities. When compounded by climate and security crises, these issues can lead to increased marginalisation, unemployment, rural-urban migration and even involvement in criminal activities.</p><p>Box 2. Women’s underrepresentation in decision-making processes related to natural resource management</p><p>Women account for over 70% of West Africa"s agricultural workforce, playing vital roles across the entire value chain, from production to processing and marketing. They are integral to farming, collecting fodder, caring for small ruminants and sick animals, processing milk and marketing dairy products. Additionally, they manage crop production and perform household care labour, which often depends on natural resources like wood and water for tasks such as cooking and cleaning. In contrast, men are primarily responsible for herding cattle, making decisions related to herding practices and maintaining cash crops. They are also traditionally the head of the household and owners of the agricultural land.</p><p>Despite the increasing recognition of their critical roles, women remain significantly underrepresented in decision-making processes related to peacebuilding, climate adaptation and natural resource management. Even when they participate in these processes, they rarely hold leading roles and often remain silent. This underrepresentation is even more pronounced for young women, who face both gender-based discrimination (such as limited access to land, credit and insurance) and age-related constraints. Interviews with local officials and agricultural stakeholders highlight this imbalance, despite the community-level recognition of women’s expertise in managing natural resources.</p><p>Sources: McOmber 2020; Salzinger and Desmidt 2023; UNDP 2024; Interviews 2025.</p><p>Organisations working across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors are adopting a range of promising practices while seeking to strengthen their positioning on emerging priorities and enhance collaboration. The following sections outline key examples and insights from these efforts.</p>3.2 Collaborating with local actors: a common approach among organisations<p>Organisations in the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors across the region are increasingly adopting climate-sensitive approaches. A common thread among them is the strong emphasis on fostering close collaboration with local and national authorities, which is seen as essential for legitimising interventions and ensuring that external support complements, rather than replaces, existing local structures. A robust community-based approach and empowering local actors to identify their own solutions and to take ownership of initiatives is crucial, as local actors (including teachers, religious and ethnic leaders, local authorities, etc.) are those who remain engaged during difficult times (Interviews 2025). The box below discusses several examples in more detail (box 3).</p><p>Box 3. Some examples of what (European) organisations are doing</p><p>The Danish Refugee Council</p><p>The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is increasingly recognising the nexus between climate change, conflict and displacement. While mostly focusing on supporting vulnerable people, in particular refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), DRC has been working on peacebuilding, mediation in conflict, climate change and natural resource management in the Central Sahel. In Mali, for example, they have recently implemented a project on economic recovery and protection, which included peacebuilding and the impact of climate change. In their peacebuilding activities, they have used community mechanisms to prevent, manage and reduce conflict. Involving local authorities is seen as a key aspect of their work, as it lends legitimacy to the organisation"s work and demonstrates that they are not there to replace existing structures but to support and collaborate with local actors, which in turn can foster a more cooperative environment (Interviews, February 2025).</p><p>The Belgian Agency for international cooperation (Enabel)</p><p>In the Central Sahel, Enabel’s main entry point for environmental peacebuilding has been primarily food security, support to agriculture and livestock and support to (economic) livelihoods. In its work on agriculture and pastoralism, Enabel has integrated attention to natural resource management and governance, also for example the management and governance of natural areas and natural parks (Interview, March 2025). Enabel has also deployed a number of activities and actions relating to land tenure security, as well as to the improvement of climate-sensitive territorial planning and territorial governance.</p><p>Search for Common Ground</p><p>In 2021, Search for Common Ground adopted a dedicated Sahel Strategy for 2020-2028, which lays out Search’s 10-year strategy for its engagement in the West African Sahel, particularly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Search for Common Ground has facilitated dialogues between different ethnic and religious groups to build trust, promote understanding and prevent violence. In the Mopti region, in Mali – a region historically marked by deep communal tensions between Fulani herders and Dogon farmers intensified by climate change – Search for Common Ground’s local team established a two-year community dialogue, bringing together Fulani and Dogon leaders, men and women, to explore the link between climate stress and conflict, and to identify and agree on a shared, locally owned solution. It has also valued women and youth engagement, empowering women and young people to become peacebuilders and agents of change in their communities by providing leadership training, supporting youth-led initiatives and creating platforms for youth voices to be heard.</p><p>Sources: Interviews 2025.</p>3.3 Building comparative expertise<p>While some organisations have historically focused on farmer-herder conflicts and/or land disputes, others are trying to craft their own niche, focusing for example on providing access to shared land plots and water systems for gardening and agriculture to both displaced populations and host communities (sometimes intentionally empowering women to manage these resources); strengthening livelihoods and building resilience to food and nutrition insecurity; or shifting towards regional strategies aimed at promoting the integrated, sustainable management of natural resources to counter the effects of climate change and bolster resilience across the Sahel.</p><p>Shifting priorities among European actors and others, alongside growing resource scarcity, are pushing issues like the extraction of critical raw materials and mining to the forefront of natural resources and conflict management in the Sahel. For example, in countries like Burkina Faso, mining-related disputes – especially those involving land – are increasingly surpassing farmer-herder tensions, calling for conflict-sensitive approaches and peacebuilding initiatives (Interviews 2025). In response, organisations are placing greater emphasis on developing climate-resilient infrastructures(7).</p>3.4 Bolstering collaboration<p>Collaboration and coordination among actors working on the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors are increasingly recognised as crucial, especially given limited resources and decreasing funding opportunities. In particular, there is a growing emphasis on more effective collaboration between actors operating in the same regions and on similar topics. There are instances of (timid) conversations to establish broader coordination mechanisms with (European) actors operating in the region to avoid duplication and ensure synergies. However, a persistent challenge remains the limited integration of peacebuilding actors within existing humanitarian and development coordination platforms in some areas (Interviews 2025).</p><p>Vice-versa, interviewees also expressed a perceived necessity for peacebuilding organisations to go beyond their traditional ‘entry points’ and engage with new interlocutors to amplify their expertise, and make the case for the integration of peacebuilding across sectors such as investments, green transitions, etc. (Interviews 2025).</p>4. Conclusions and ways forward</p><p>Environmental peacebuilding interventions are crucial to ensure conflicts revolving around the management of natural resources are peacefully solved, and with resources becoming increasingly scarce (like water) or in demand (like critical raw materials), new conflicts are likely to emerge, calling for peacebuilding activities to be implemented.</p><p>At the same time, declining donor support is affecting the operations of some organisations active in the Sahel. Several European donors (i.e. France, Norway, Sweden and more recently the Netherlands) have withdrawn or scaled back, while major donors like the EU and USAID have reduced or suspended development aid. However, key EU strategic initiatives, in particular the Green Deal, are increasingly framing climate ambitions through an economic and geopolitical lens. This is evident, for example, in the push for critical raw materials extraction which often requires access to resources located in fragile and conflict-prone areas. Without conflict-sensitive strategies, efforts launched under these EU strategies risk perpetuating existing tensions and ultimately undermining the EU’s strategic objectives. Investing in environmental peacebuilding ensures that EU engagements are conflict and climate-sensitive, build "mutual resilience", and contribute to sustainable outcomes, thereby safeguarding the EU"s broader economic, development, and security interests in a volatile global landscape. In this context, there is a case to be made for European policymakers and actors to invest in efforts to promote climate-sensitive peacebuilding and international cooperation.</p><p>A number of concrete steps that can be taken include:</p><p>European policymakers should safeguard policy space to discuss peacebuilding as a key vector for continued engagement under the climate - security nexus work, in ongoing and upcoming policy processes, and seeking linkages between EU internal and external policy objectives. While the EU’s shift toward hard security is understandable from a European perspective, it should not come completely at the expense of continued support for peacebuilding. As mentioned before, the five key pathways identified in the Climate and Security Trend Analysis, in which climate change might heighten security risks for Europe, all offer key avenues for continued peacebuilding. The recent EU Preparedness Union Strategy highlights the strong links between climate, environment and security, stressing the need to embed ‘mutual resilience’ in EU economic and development policies. Sustained dialogue with peacebuilders, with experience from a diverse set of contexts, around these issues will therefore be essential. This requires committed EU engagement and an approach focused on harnessing expertise and cross-sectoral mutual learning and exchange, bridging security, economic and environment sectors. Another opportunity will emerge with the expected Communication on Fragility (in 2026), which is supposed to build on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, should harness collaboration across the HDP nexus and include climate resilience and climate sensitivity given the centrality of negative climate change impacts and environmental degradation in fragility.</p><p>At the policy level, there is a need to bridge cross-sectoral perspectives on how to ensure climate and conflict sensitivity approaches to peacebuilding in EU external action. Addressing climate change across sectors demands strong cross-institutional coordination. Some EU institutions have closer ties to peacebuilding actors than others, particularly in areas like natural resource management. However, this is less true in fields such as displacement, urbanisation, environmental degradation or the energy transition, where conflict-sensitive approaches remain limited. EU interlocutors can help bridge these gaps, promoting collaboration that includes peacebuilding perspectives.</p><p>At the operational level, EU actors on the ground, notably EU delegations, should continue harnessing effective collaboration and partnerships with peace actors, to ensure that context and conflict analysis, but also programming take into account the existing expertise on climate-sensitive peacebuilding. At the operational level, there is a wealth of expertise and knowledge that local and international peacebuilding organisations actors can offer the EU to make the implementation of the Joint Communication across the EU’s actions on the ground a success. This expertise and access on the ground is not just limited to mediation around natural resources, but also around environmental crime and justice, the possible implications of the energy transition and the mining sector. Ensuring diverse partnerships and engaging with a broad range of actors is also critical for EU actions to ensure sustainable outcomes. Locally-led initiatives and co-design are vital for identifying solutions that reflect local realities and build on existing governance structures and best practices. But bottom-up approaches must be complemented with efforts to reinforce and sustain space for institutional dialogue, locally grounded policy design and implementation focused on sustainability. Without institutionalisation and scalability, even the most successful community-level efforts risk remaining isolated and lacking ownership. This is especially crucial given the limited financial resources available in this space.</p><p>Secure closer involvement in MFF discussions to highlight the need for conflict and climate-sensitive approaches. Upcoming negotiations on the future of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) will include discussions on the design of future instruments to promote the EU’s external engagement. While the Global Gateway will remain a key priority, the 360º approach, as well as the understanding that investments need to be both climate-resilient and security-focused, are gaining more traction – even if there will be less funding for peace, (soft) security and resilience-related initiatives. Despite their key roles in designing and implementing EU engagement in fragile settings, FPI and parts of the EEAS are too far removed from current discussions on the Global Gateway and its flagship projects. This should be rectified to make sure the experience of these EU institutions is better leveraged. DG INTPA, FPI and the EEAS have made significant strides to mainstream conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis and the HDP nexus in ongoing programmes. Further incorporating and strengthening the linkages with climate action, climate resilience and assessing the linkages between the environment, climate change and peace should build on those efforts.</p><p>EU policymakers should closely consider the funding gap for fragile settings affected by conflict but also climate change, and consider how the EU can deliver on its stated commitments. Figures clearly show that fragile settings affected by climate change continue to face the biggest hurdles to access climate adaptation finance. The current context of shifting priorities and withdrawal of key actors such as the US means there will be a great demand for EU funding and leadership. While tough choices will need to be made, the EU cannot hide from making them.</p><p>Beyond shaping policy and approaches, such as the upcoming Fragility Communication, the EU must ensure its financial instruments continue to integrate climate action, fragility, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This requires dedicated allocations in the next MFF and would align with the Joint Communication’s call to treat climate and environmental investments as investments in peace and security.</p><p>In addition to the EU budget, the EU should also consider how to fulfil its endorsement of the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace, which calls for increased funding for climate resilience in conflict-affected and fragile settings. COP30 will be a key moment to demonstrate concrete progress on this commitment.</p><p>The EU operates in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape –marked by conflicts and wars, pressure to increase its defence spending and military posture, and a growing emphasis on industrial competitiveness amid global power rivalries. However, research and analysis show that investing in environmental peacebuilding pays off and remains strategically important. As the EU recalibrates its external engagement, it is vital not to lose sight of the stabilising role that conflict- and climate-sensitive initiatives can play, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected regions. Environmental peacebuilding can support mutual resilience, prevent conflict, and promote inclusive and sustainable development. These are key priorities, not just for partner countries and local communities, but also to safeguard Europe’s long-term security, development, and economic interests.</p>Endnotes<p>1. The second briefing note will be published towards November 2025.</p><p>2. According to the UN, “climate change adaptation refers to actions that help reduce vulnerability to the current or expected impacts of climate change”, while “climate resilience is the capacity of a community or environment to anticipate and manage climate impacts, minimise their damage, and recover and transform as needed after the initial shock.” Source: UNDP 2023.</p><p>3. The four pillars are: 1) Strengthening planning and decision-making by enhancing evidence-based analysis on the climate-security nexus to inform better planning and implementation; 2) Operationalising responses by integrating climate and security considerations into EU external actions, including regional and national conflict analyses; 3) Enhancing climate adaptation and mitigation by improving member states" civilian and military operations to reduce costs and carbon footprints while maintaining operational effectiveness; and 4) Reinforcing international partnerships by collaborating with multilateral organisations and partners like NATO to align with the EU"s climate and environment agenda.</p><p>4. Peacebuilding is mentioned five times in the Joint Communication text, compared to ‘Defence’ being mentioned 60 times.</p><p>5. More information is available at: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en</p><p>6. For example, Search for Common Ground has developed a toolkit to prevent, respond and design interventions to manage conflict related to cross-border pastoralism.</p><p>7. This topic will be explored further in ECDPM’s second policy brief (to be published).</p>Acknowledgements and references<p>This briefing note is the result of a broader research collaboration between Search for Common Ground and ECDPM, funded by the Directorate General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD) of Belgium. It builds on research carried out by ECDPM and partners between September 2024 and April 2025. It focuses on the Central Sahel, in particular Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. This research project included in-depth desk-based analysis and research, and over 30 interviews with EU policymakers, INGOs, EU agencies, experts and Central Sahel NGOs.</p><p>The authors would like to thank their partners, Groupe ODYSSEE and Amagoin Keita in Mali, and Brigitte Ardo Dia in Niger. They would also like to thank Search for Common Ground for their support and inputs in this research and our colleagues Pauline Veron and Hanne Knaepen for the review. The authors would also like to thank the Communications team for the support towards the event held on 19 June 2025 and the outreach and dissemination of this report.</p><p>The views expressed in this note are those of the authors and do not represent those of ECDPM or any other institution. Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. For comments and feedback, please contact Sara Gianesello or Sophie Desmidt.</p><p>A full reference list is available in the PDF version of this brief.</p><p>Download the brief <i></i></p></p></p><p>EU foreign and development policy Peace, security and resilience Climate change and green transition </p><p><p>Climate change and green transition Climate crisis Climate, energy and food Conflict, fragility and resilience EU foreign and development policy EU foreign and development policy Geopolitics and development Peace and security Peace, security and resilience Sahel </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> Environmental peacebuilding as a climate-security priority for the EU – Examples from the Sahel - ECDPM	查看 46615	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:57 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215912	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">Perceptions de la coopération internationale de l’UE : une navigation en eaux troubles<p>Paper09 July 2025</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-a1cf3e36.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-568641ac.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/9/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-d9d62739.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/8/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-bd268f38.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-6cfff87e.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/3/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-ec8a5ce3.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/Photo-by-Christophe-Licoppe-European-Union-2024-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P064955-702503-03df8266.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Christophe Licoppe / European Union, 2024 via EC - Audiovisual Service </p><p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/7/Pauline_Veron-d01f8eb7.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Pauline Veron </p><p><i></i>Download<i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p><p><p>Dans un contexte d’instabilité mondiale croissante, l’UE se positionne comme un partenaire stable, guidé par ses valeurs, tout en poursuivant de manière plus affirmée ses intérêts stratégiques. Sur la base d’entretiens sincères avec des diplomates de haut rang et des experts d’Afrique, d’Asie et d’Amérique latine, Pauline Veron explore de quelle manière la coopération internationale de l’UE est perçue par ses partenaires du Sud.</p><p>Ce document est également disponible en anglais.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p>Résumé<p>L"UE est confrontée à un ordre mondial en mutation rapide, marqué par la rivalité géopolitique, l"incertitude économique, les risques climatiques et un retour de la politique des grandes puissances. La position qu’elle adopte dans ce contexte est celle d’un partenaire stable, attaché à ses valeurs, mais qui promeut en même temps ses intérêts stratégiques de manière plus affirmée. Sur la base d’entretiens sincères avec des diplomates de haut rang et des experts d"Afrique, d"Asie et d"Amérique latine, ce document analyse de quelle manière la coopération internationale de l"UE est perçue par ses partenaires du Sud. Il révèle une tension manifeste entre la perception que l’Europe a d’elle-même et celle qu’en ont les autres.</p><p>Nombreux sont ceux qui voient encore en l"UE un acteur mondial éminemment pertinent, apprécié pour sa défense des droits humains et du développement durable, surtout depuis le retrait des États-Unis sous le deuxième mandat de Trump. La crédibilité de l’UE est toutefois en train de s"effriter. Un sentiment d"hypocrisie, de deux poids, deux mesures et d"attitudes post-coloniales persiste, et l’on reproche à des initiatives telles que la stratégie Global Gateway sa verticalité et son manque de concertation oude résultats tangibles.</p><p>En ces temps où les pays partenaires diversifient leurs alliances et revendiquent davantage d"autonomie, l"UE doit s"adapter. Elle a besoin d’une approche plus pragmatique et plus honnête, qui laisse la place au compromis, à une écoute par-delà les gouvernements et au « désaccord constructif ». L"UE doit par ailleurs instiller davantage de cohérence entre ses valeurs et ses intérêts, ainsi qu"entre la rhétorique et les résultats. À l"approche de sommets importants et d"un nouveau cycle financier, l"UE a l"occasion de se redéfinir en tant que partenaire géopolitique crédible. Mais pour ce faire, elle doit passer de la projection à la réflexion, et des déclarations à des actions concrètes.</p><p>Télélecharger le document de réflexion <i></i></p></p></p><p><p> </p></p><p>EU foreign and development policy </p><p><p>EU foreign and development policy EU foreign and development policy Geopolitics and development </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> Perceptions de la coopération internationale de l’UE : une navigation en eaux troubles - ECDPM	查看 4582	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:54 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215911	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">Europolis: The global Europe podcast<p>Podcast09 July 2025</p><p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/europolis_logo_800_x_529_px_8-4d50ab8c.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/europolis_logo_800_x_529_px_8-518e7870.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/europolis_logo_800_x_529_px_8-3df3cac0.png"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/europolis_logo_800_x_529_px_8-5ba2f372.png"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/f/europolis_logo_800_x_529_px_8-87c4816f.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/Jonathan_Hunter_web-d036819b.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/Chloe-web-ee9d07d2.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/Gautam_Kamath-220a93b6.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Jonathan Hunter Chloe Teevan Gautam Kamath </p><p><i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p></p><p><p>Faced with geopolitical and economic turbulence, Europe needs new and better partners to secure its prosperity. This podcast looks at how new dynamics are reshaping relations between the EU and the wider world and how Europe might navigate this new terrain. </p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p><p>Join us as we break down EU policy through insightful conversations with leading policymakers, industry leaders and experts. Discover how the EU could drive innovation, competitiveness, and progress in the global arena, and understand how policymakers are thinking about shaping our sovereign future.</p><p>Listen onApple Podcasts\|Spotify\|Youtube</p></p></p><p><p> <p>Season 1Episode 1<p>Europe has experienced a sense of losing control over its digital ecosystem and economic considerations, coupled with a perception that its innovation in the technology world is lagging.In this foundational episode, Chloe Teevan and Gautam Kamath explore the critical concept of digital sovereignty with Robin Berjon and why it demands attention from policymakers worldwide. Find more information about this episodehere.</p>Episode 2<p>A paradigm shift in transatlantic relations is forcing Europe to realize that it"s "now or never" for significant changes in digital policy. Chloe Teevan and Gautam Kamath interview Kai Zenner, Head of Office for MEP Axel Voss (European People"s Party) and Senior Fellow at the Technical University of Munich, to discuss the EuroStack and strategic global partnerships for tech.Find more information about this episodehere.</p></p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> Europolis: The global Europe podcast - ECDPM	查看 2929	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:52 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215910	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">What is digital sovereignty and how can Europe achieve it?<p>Podcast09 July 2025</p><p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/ep_1_banner-6ad84f3a.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/ep_1_banner-3bda516a.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/ep_1_banner-a389ce8c.png"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/ep_1_banner-0ce3c086.png"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/ep_1_banner-2514adcc.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/Chloe-web-ee9d07d2.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/Gautam_Kamath-220a93b6.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/Jonathan_Hunter_web-d036819b.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Chloe Teevan Gautam Kamath Jonathan Hunter </p><p><i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p></p><p><p>Europe has experienced a sense of losing control over its digital ecosystem and economic considerations, coupled with a perception that its innovation in the technology world is lagging.In this foundational episode, we explore the critical concept of digital sovereignty and why it demands attention from policymakers worldwide.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p><p>Listen onApple Podcasts\|Spotify\|Youtube</p><p>Chloe Teevan and Gautam Kamath interviewRobin Berjon, French-Australian technologist, Deputy Director of the IPFS Foundation, and a major thinker on technology sovereignty and the tech stack.</p><p>Robin Berjon explains that power in technology stems from operating infrastructures and that thecurrent governance model for these infrastructural systems is largely autocratic, controlled by monopolies or duopolies. This autocratic power, which sets rules for users, can seep into society, potentially making society itself autocratic. The rules set by these digital monopolies can even become more important to businesses, like publishers, than state laws, leading to a loss of self-governance for collectives.</p><p>He argues that the problem isn"t a lack of innovation; it"s the capture of architectural control points (e.g., how revenue flows, system defaults) by a tiny number of actors, leading to high power concentration. Breaking these monopolies requires intervention at the infrastructural level to liberate these control points, not just more innovation.</p><p>Instead of trying to replicate Silicon Valley"s model, which could lead to similar problems with European companies, the solution lies in breaking down digital problems into components and rebuilding them as governance infrastructure.</p><p>The India Stack is presented as an interesting example of this approach: by allowing users on both sides of two-sided markets like ride-hailing to jointly control the network, it enables innovation and works better for both providers and consumers, unlike systems controlled by singular monopolies like Uber or Amazon.</p></p></p><p><p> <p>About the podcast series<p>Faced with geopolitical and economic turbulence, Europe needs new and better partners to secure its prosperity. Europolis: the global Europe podcast looks at how new dynamics are reshaping relations between the EU and the wider world and how Europe might navigate this new terrain.</p><p>Join us as we break down EU policy through insightful conversations with leading policymakers, industry leaders and experts. Discover how the EU could drive innovation, competitiveness, and progress in the global arena, and understand how policymakers are thinking about shaping our sovereign future.</p></p></p><p><p>Digital cooperation European Union Infrastructure </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> What is digital sovereignty and how can Europe achieve it? - ECDPM	查看 4062	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:49 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215909	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">Can Europe build its digital infrastructure alone?<p>Podcast09 July 2025</p><p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/3/ep_2_banner-13b416b3.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/ep_2_banner-6a6705ab.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/ep_2_banner-dbedb2ee.png"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/4/ep_2_banner-728d47e4.png"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/ep_2_banner-5e4ed8f2.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/Chloe-web-ee9d07d2.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/Gautam_Kamath-220a93b6.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/Jonathan_Hunter_web-d036819b.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Chloe Teevan Gautam Kamath Jonathan Hunter </p><p><i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p></p><p><p>It"s "now or never" for EU technology, and this episode delves deeper into EU digital policy, current geopolitical shifts, and the evolving understanding of technological sovereignty as Europe looks to global partners for cooperation and inspiration.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p><p>Listen onApple Podcasts\|Spotify\|Youtube</p><p>Chloe Teevan and Gautam Kamath interview Kai Zenner, Head of Office for MEP Axel Voss (European People"s Party) and Senior Fellow at the Technical University of Munich. Kai was instrumental in the finalization of the AI Act and is a well-known commentator on European tech policy.</p><p>A paradigm shift in transatlantic relations is forcing Europe to realize that it"s "now or never" for significant changes in digital policy. Concerns about potential foreign control over critical data are pushing EU policymakers to act.</p><p>Kai Zenner discusses his role in theEuroStack initiative: a grassroots movement uniting diverse individuals who feel Europe has become a "digital colony" dependent in critical areas. He describes the biggest hurdle is a lack of political leadership willing to make the necessary hard, strategic investment choices, rather than fragmented small investments.</p><p>Gautam Kamath concludes by discussing Europe"s strategic interdependencies, noting a divide between those advocating for purely European solutions and those recognizing Europe"s need for openness and partnerships. Europe"s historical strengths lie in being an open trading bloc and fostering consensus andneeds to forge mutual partnerships with countries like Brazil (green technologies), South Africa (AI), and India (skills and tech stack): moving beyond the "Brussels effect" and focusing on what Europe can learn from its global partners in a multipolar world.</p></p></p><p><p> <p>About the podcast series<p>Faced with geopolitical and economic turbulence, Europe needs new and better partners to secure its prosperity. Europolis: the global Europe podcast looks at how new dynamics are reshaping relations between the EU and the wider world and how Europe might navigate this new terrain.</p><p>Join us as we break down EU policy through insightful conversations with leading policymakers, industry leaders and experts. Discover how the EU could drive innovation, competitiveness, and progress in the global arena, and understand how policymakers are thinking about shaping our sovereign future.</p></p></p><p><p>Digital cooperation European Union </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> Can Europe build its digital infrastructure alone? - ECDPM	查看 3787	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:46 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215908	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">The smartest move: Why the EU must invest in every child, everywhere<p>Report09 July 2025</p><p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/pexels-liliana-drew-8501581-990a2466.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/9/pexels-liliana-drew-8501581-a0ff5699.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/pexels-liliana-drew-8501581-fa872aec.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/pexels-liliana-drew-8501581-681d0130.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/pexels-liliana-drew-8501581-3790371a.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Photo by Liliana Drew via Pexels. </p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/1/Katja_website-7aaeedc1.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Katja van der Meer </p><p><i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p></p><p><p>In a brief for Save the Children, Katja van der Meer examines the political and funding challenges in prioritising children’s rights in EU external action. She argues that the negotiations on the next MFF present an opportunity to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to children’s rights.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p>Summary<p>Despite a strong policy framework, the EU allocates a disproportionately small share of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to child-related initiatives, even though children make up nearly half the population in many partner countries. This paper argues that investing in children is not only a moral duty but a strategic necessity that supports EU priorities in stability, security, and sustainable development. Drawing on Save the Children’s case studies, it shows how investments in health, education in emergencies, and child protection strengthen societies and align with Europe’s long-term interests. As the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations approach, the EU must recognise the value of child-focused ODA and embed it across all external action, including within the Global Gateway initiative, to reinforce its leadership in human development and global influence.</p>Read the report</p></p></p><p><p> </p></p><p><p>EU foreign and development policy Education European Union Human development </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> The smartest move: Why the EU must invest in every child, everywhere - ECDPM	查看 2547	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:43 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215907	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">Effective aid programming in the next MFF (Part 2): Simplification and governance<p>Brief09 July 2025</p><p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/P065390-691066-e81b3afb.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/8/P065390-691066-88e707c8.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/8/P065390-691066-1fa1ee38.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/P065390-691066-bc8e291e.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/P065390-691066-62ee956c.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Bogdan Hoyaux via EC Audiovisual Services </p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/Phillippe_van_Dam-55171c0e.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Philippe Van Damme </p><p><i></i>Download<i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p></p><p><p>In the second of a two-part brief, Philippe Van Damme outlines a vision for a more coherent, flexible and impactful EU budget for external action under the 2028-2034 MFF. He proposes a three-layered model that prioritises poverty reduction, strategic partnerships and swift crisis response – ensuring the EU remains a credible and principled global actor.</p><p>Read part one on graduation and differentiation here.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p>Summary<p>As the European Union (EU) prepares its multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034, it aims to create a more impactful and flexible budget, particularly for external actions.</p><p>The primary objective of the EU’s development cooperation remains the reduction of poverty. This can be ensured by the consistent application of the graduation and differentiation principles, allowing for the concentration of grant-based programmable development aid in those partner countries most in need and committed to pro-poor policies. The EU’s broader external policy priorities can then be promoted through various types of public diplomacy as well as through demand-driven global facilities.</p><p>A ‘mutually beneficial partnership’ requires the integration of both those objectives in one single – further simplified and more flexible – new instrument that ensures the necessary complementarity and coherence between the various external actions. This brief proposes a three-layered approach to achieving this goal: firstly, preserving and increasing humanitarian and emergency aid as unconditional support; secondly, protecting programmable grants for fragile and reform-oriented partners; and thirdly, expanding demand-driven global facilities to advance the EU’s strategic interests through blended finance and guarantees. Increased reserves must provide the necessary capacity to respond swiftly to crises and new needs, while clear reallocation decision-making processes must guarantee the appropriate political steer and democratic accountability.</p><p>This model concentrates scarce grant funding where it is most needed and most impactful while using investment tools to build strategic partnerships. Such a rationalised structure would enhance the EU’s international credibility, ensuring the use of its limited resources preserves its image as an effective but principled global actor.</p><p>Download the brief <i></i></p></p></p><p>There is an increasing temptation from an EU self-interested perspective to return to tied aid, in order to protect EU companies against Chinese or other emerging country competitors when financing large Global Gateway infrastructure projects. But this would be disastrous both in terms of aid effectiveness and of EU credibility. </p><p><p> <p>Introduction<p>In view of its next multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028-2034, the European Commission has called for a more impactful budget, focused on performance, which requires a simpler, more flexible, yet also more accountable budget structure. This also holds true for the EU’s external action budget.</p><p>The consequent use of the graduation and differentiation principles help organise the way the EU can engage with its partners from the Global South in a more targeted and impactful way, reconciling a more interest-driven external policy with developmental priorities in mutually beneficial partnerships. The EU’s external policy priorities can be promoted through various types of public diplomacy as well as through demand-driven global facilities, blending limited grant funding with concessional and commercial loans and investments, while developmental priorities of the low-income, least developed or highly fragile partner countries can be met through continued grant-based national indicative programmes.</p><p>This assumes that the EU’s strategic interests and priorities are clearly spelled out in order to be able to translate them into a balanced set of thematic global facilities. While the Global Gateway strategy has become the dominant framework for the EU’s external actions, its strategic objectives and capacity to operationalise the EU’s interests need to be further clarified. It then becomes easier to structure the EU’s external actions in a new, consolidated NDICI 2.0 instrument, increasing the requested flexibility while at the same time enhancing its political steer, in line with the European Parliament’s request for accountability and full transparency.</p>How to overcome the EU’s trilemma<p>Since the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy, the world has dramatically changed and become more chaotic and dangerous. There haven’t been any consolidated strategic updates adopted by the EU since then, but numerous development cooperation documents have been adopted, including the NDICI regulation (2021), followed shortly afterwards by the Global Gateway strategy (2021) and the call for building sustainable international partnerships as Team Europe (2024). There have also been some updates to thematic strategies and to the regional partnerships, including, for example, the EU-AU joint vision for 2030 (2022). Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also formulated her priorities for her second mandate.</p><p>Based on the above documents, and moving beyond the aspirational objectives of the EU’s development and investment priorities, some of the EU’s main strategic short-term interests in the Global South can be distilled: peace and security concerns – including cybersecurity and strategic communication, but also energy security (and clean energy transition) – and access to critical raw materials, restrictive migration management, climate change mitigation (and adaptation). Adherence to a rules- and values-based multilateral order is another central strategic interest that distinguishes the EU from most other global players, but this requires less hardware investment and much more soft power investment through public diplomacy.</p><p>The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) is, for now, the EU’s best-known demand-driven facility. It is the main implementing tool of the Global Gateway strategy and aims at mobilising €300 billion by 2027, of which 50% is for Africa, through blending mechanisms and guarantee schemes. By mutualising risks and reducing capital costs of investments in risky environments, EFSD+ hopes to stimulate growth and enhance decent job creation, thereby contributing indirectly to the EU’s strategic interests of peace and security as well as reducing the root causes of migration to the EU. As stated in the Global Strategy, investing in African peace and development should be considered as an investment in our own security and prosperity.</p><p>The main focus of the Global Gateway strategy seems to be shifting from development to geostrategic interests. To meet wider EU concerns and objectives, it can subdivide the EFSD+ at will or create additional facilities along thematic lines. EFSD+ is already compartmentalised along the Global Gateway investment priorities (digital, climate and energy, transport, health and education, and research), but nothing prevents it from going further and, for example, to have a subdivision or to create a separate fund targeting highly fragile regions such as the Sahel as prime source of instability and migration, or socially and environmentally responsible mining of critical raw materials. But it is perfectly possible also to have facilities that do not focus on hard investments but on governance reforms. Examples include: supporting a more conducive business environment; regional integration and trade facilitation; or the further formalisation of the economy in order to widen the fiscal basis for domestic resource mobilisation; statistical capacity for informed decision-making; or for judiciary or electoral reforms and capacity-building.</p><p>Such demand-driven global facilities, accessible to the willing, should not be seen as contradictory but as complementary to the remaining programmable national envelopes for least developed countries (LDCs) and countries facing situations of fragility. </p><p>Such demand-driven global facilities, accessible to the willing, should not be seen as contradictory but as complementary to the remaining programmable national envelopes for least developed countries (LDCs) and countries facing situations of fragility, which can then focus more directly on poverty alleviation and sustainable development goals.</p><p>The national – grant-based – envelopes should stop diluting EU’s development efforts through a multiplication of cost-inefficient stand-alone projects in agriculture, social infrastructure or (green) industrialisation, substituting for government actions or market forces and therefore often unsustainable and with limited long-term impact, but focus on eliminating or correcting market distortions and other governance challenges impeding productive investments and economic diversification. This implies investing in human capital and – where possible – institutional capacity building, including the creation of a conducive business environment. The Council conclusions of 26 May already made this distinction, emphasising that investment is the engine of growth and employment creation and that official development assiatance (ODA) should not be directed towards actions that can be financed by the private sector but help create the conditions for the private sector to thrive and contribute to pro-poor sustainable development through initiatives which may not be commercially viable but that have important long-term positive political, social or economic externalities.</p><p>The priorities of the African citizens as expressed in multiple opinion surveys – job creation (and related employable education and vocational training), peace and security, with continued support for effective democratic governance and increased awareness of the impact of climate change – are perfectly compatible with the EU’s interests through this two-prong approach to the EU’s development policy and with its values, investing in human capital where it can under the principle ‘do no harm’, avoiding aid mechanisms that could indirectly legitimise or strengthen unconstitutional and repressive regimes through budget fungibility or substitution effects.</p>Demand-driven facilities and governance<p>Demand-driven facilities are the ideal answer to the differentiation challenge. They are accessible to all partner countries subject to compliance with stringent selection criteria, thereby benefiting the reform-minded countries striving to achieve an inclusive and sustainable growth path. But they also have their own problems, notably when they are driven primarily by the EU’s short-term self-interests. In such a perspective, one major concern is how to promote and protect the EU’s commercial interests and enterprises against ‘unfair’ competition by sometimes subsidised public or semi-public enterprises from other partners with lower investment standards. Another is how to ensure that the facilitated investments meet their stated development goals.</p><p>In fact, both challenges are interrelated. It is because some enterprises are less sensitive to reputational risks, neglect the developmental goals and undercut the technical quality norms and human-rights, social and environmental standards imposed on EU companies that they manage to crowd out those EU enterprises in competitive tenders.</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/7/Photo-by-Bogdan_Hoyaux-via-EC-Audiovisual-Services-0baa3e87.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/Photo-by-Bogdan_Hoyaux-via-EC-Audiovisual-Services-e7b12e62.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/Photo-by-Bogdan_Hoyaux-via-EC-Audiovisual-Services-eff3243e.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Photo by Bogdan Hoyaux via EC Audiovisual Services <p>There is, therefore, an increasing temptation from an EU self-interested perspective to return to tied aid, in order to protect EU companies against Chinese or other emerging country competitors when financing large Global Gateway infrastructure projects. But this would be disastrous both in terms of aid effectiveness and of EU credibility. Although the EU political and strategic interests do not coincide with the commercial interests of the EU enterprises, they should be able to compete on a level playing field, while partner countries should be allowed to access the best price-quality services.</p><p>To create this level playing field, the demand-driven facilities need to develop detailed selection criteria as well as strict ex ante and ex post evaluation and monitoring tools. The selection criteria have to include policy as well as corporate social responsibility conditionalities.</p><p>The Nachtigal hydroelectric dam just finished in Cameroon is a perfect example of a project that fits into the (not so new) Global Gateway philosophy. But the investment partners are reluctant to invest in a similar new dam project because of governance issues: the energy distribution network remains challenging and faces multiple leakages, while energy pricing, invoicing and collection remain problematic, undermining the financial viability of the project. In parallel with the construction of the dam, the World Bank has been working with the government on the reform of the energy sector, but the dam construction advanced far more quickly than the required reforms, compromising the future.</p><p>Similar problems, including, for example, lack of road maintenance policies and axle weight controls have hampered the EU’s commitment to road infrastructure investments in Africa over the last 30 years. Minimal sector-wide policy reforms therefore need to be in place and/or a time-bound reform path agreed before being able to access the related facilities. Currently under the EFSD+, each facility therefore needs to have an institutional capacity-building pillar to support the design and implementation of those reforms in parallel with the envisaged infrastructure investments.</p><p>Similarly, minimal human rights, social and environmental norms have to be respected. Investment projects submitted to the facilities must undergo a prior identification phase, including an inclusive consultation process and impact assessments. Where distortion of competition is suspected, tender and procurement documents can introduce specific technical criteria to ensure inclusivity in the identification and implementation phases of the projects, social and environmental sustainability and high-quality standards, including in view of future maintenance. While elaborating the selection criteria, particular attention should be given to the potential of the investments to contribute to green industrialisation, growth and decent job creation. The much-publicised Global Gateway involvement in the Lobito train corridor, for example, cannot be based on a purely extractive mining logic but must include local development opportunities.</p><p>The amount of ODA put in the blending and guarantee schemes should be proportional to its market-creating or correcting impact and avoid unduly subsidising private actors in their commercial investment endeavours. The identification phase, therefore, needs to clarify the major market distortions and failures to overcome, as well as the financial, economic and social internal returns on investment, justifying the level of concessionality required to make the investment. This will contribute to developing a more coherent methodology to calculate the additionality and multiplier effect of the ODA invested in those facilities, as requested by the European Court of Auditors. It will also limit undesired redistributive effects of concessional funding concentrated in upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) that have access to a wider variety of alternative financing sources.</p>The impact of aid differentiation and graduation on the aid instruments<p>The question is now how to translate the various strategic objectives and programming orientations for effectiveness in the EU’s development toolbox. The NDICI was a first important step in the simplification and flexibilisation of the development and international cooperation instruments. The mid-term evaluation and the preliminary documents for the next MFF, both from the European Commission and the European Parliament, ask to continue the simplification exercise, with increased flexibility to adapt to a rapidly evolving international context, counterbalanced by increased political steer.</p><p>This briefing note, therefore, propose one single consolidated cooperation and international cooperation instrument for all funds managed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission according to harmonised decision-making processes, but keeping the non-DACable (i.e. non-ODA eligible according to the OECD Development Assistance Committee), security-related, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) activities and the European Peace Facility under a separate instrument that follows an intergovernmental logic.</p><p>Bringing all concerns under one umbrella brings more flexibility but also requires enhanced safeguards and clear criteria and decision-making processes for fund reallocations, but without legal frameworks blocking decision-making.</p><p>Figure 1: Towards a further simplification and flexibilisation of the EU’s development and international cooperation instruments</p></p></p><p><p> <p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/6917/5204/7949/BN2_Philippe_figure_design.svg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/6917/5204/7949/BN2_Philippe_figure_design.svg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/6917/5204/7949/BN2_Philippe_figure_design.svg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> </p></p></p><p><p> <p><p>Translating the programming orientations into instruments, we can distinguish three broad chapters under the new instrument: 1) programmable national envelopes, 2) a global envelope with thematic facilities accessible upon demand of the EU’s partner countries based on pre-identified criteria, or programmed by the EU in response to various cross-border initiatives and global challenges, and 3) reserves for humanitarian needs, and rapid responses to crises and new needs (including for ‘reform and democratic dividends’ after a democratic transition). The pre-accession countries deserve an additional, dedicated envelope to support them in meeting the convergence criteria under the various accession chapters.</p><p>The programmable national envelopes would only be available for the least developed countries or countries in complex settings, facing situations of high or extreme fragility (all low-income countries except North Korea and Syria happen to also be least developed or in situations of high or severe fragility). However, all EU delegations, regardless of the level of development and fragility, should also have at their disposal a non-programmable budget for support measures which include the capacity to take initiatives in support of the national political and policy dialogue, as well as an indispensable public diplomacy budget. Similar funding must also be made available under the global envelopes for thematic or (sub)regional support measures and public diplomacy actions.</p><p>A larger share of funding will pass through global envelopes under different forms.</p><p>A first large component will consist of demand-driven facilities broadly falling under the Global Gateway strategy, combining concessional and non-concessional public and private funding for interconnecting infrastructure investments (EFSD+).</p><p>To meet more specific EU strategic interests and objectives, additional facilities can also be conceived to support partners willing to engage in climate adaptation or mitigation programmes, fighting irregular migration or facilitating the reintegration of returning migrants, promoting regional integration and trade facilitation, or pandemic and crisis preparedness for example.</p><p>Each time partner countries, individually or jointly, will have to prepare a pipeline of projects meeting the selection criteria of those thematic facilities, including commitments to strengthen an enabling institutional environment for the set objectives. This form of positive conditionalities will increase competition and peer group pressure among willing reformers.</p><p>The facilities can be integrated into a graduation logic, limiting the share of grant-funding captured by UMICs based on strict additionality criteria, but does not require geographic earmarking. The more developed and diversified an economy, the less concessional funding is required - if any - to unlock large-scale investment projects.</p><p>It will be the role of the national envelopes to help those willing countries with limited institutional capacities, in meeting the selection criteria, being institutional, regulatory or policy-oriented, and requiring thorough prior identification and impact assessments for the preparation of a bankable pipeline of projects eligible under these facilities.</p><p>A second component of the global envelopes will consist of a programmable part to contribute to global initiatives and multi-country or regional institutions and institutional initiatives in support of the goals set out for the demand-driven facilities. This includes support for regional integration processes.</p><p>A third component will consist of thematic envelopes in response to global goals but implemented through initiatives at the national level in a coordinated multi-country way or where actions through the national envelopes are not possible. More than in the past, these actions should strictly adhere to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity and be further rationalised. They include actions in support of civil society, human rights defenders and peace and security, which cannot be covered through national envelopes in inimical contexts or where programmable national envelopes are missing.</p><p>In light of a more unpredictable and chaotic world and increasing natural and man-made disasters, the relative share of reserves should be further increased. </p><p>In light of a more unpredictable and chaotic world and increasing natural and man-made disasters, the relative share of reserves should be further increased. They can be further subdivided into broadly three sub-groups. The first sub-group is the funds dedicated to life-saving humanitarian assistance in response to natural or man-made disasters. With the phasing out of the critically important US contribution to humanitarian aid and the increased needs, this envelope should unfortunately be significantly increased. The second sub-group of reserves coincides with the existing rapid response mechanisms for crisis prevention or to respond to new needs (including for ‘reform and democratic dividends’ in situations of successful political transitions). The third sub-group is the overall ‘cushion’ which can feed the other envelopes in light of performance and evolving needs and priorities. The transfer of funds from any of these three reserve funds to another reserve fund or to the national or global envelopes should be conditioned by a clear political decision-making process, involving the European Parliament beyond an agreed relative or absolute scale.</p>Institutional impact<p>The Commission is presently discussing possible rationalisations in its worldwide network of delegations. The efficiency of project management can and must indeed be improved through more concentrated and larger-scale actions under programmable envelopes, while the digital revolution allows the re-centralisation of some back-office tasks. Similarly, the negotiation and management of the demand-driven facilities will be done centrally. But it should be clear that the preparation of bankable project pipelines under the global facilities – including in their policy and institutional dimensions – and project implementation monitoring, as well as political and policy dialogue, support measures, public diplomacy and communication activities, can only be done in a cost-efficient and effective way through expertise available on the ground on a continuous basis.</p><p>In an increasingly competitive, multipolar world, winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of people and convincing them that the EU international cooperation and development policies effectively deliver and are mutually beneficial, are at the core of the EU’s external actions. The EU therefore has to invest more, not less, in experienced staff in the delegations, but changing profiles from technical project managers to full-fledged diplomats, expert policy advisors, monitors and communicators.</p><p>This implies that the interinstitutional arrangements between the Commission and the EEAS may have to be revised, to ensure a greater unity of action in the delegations, with a flexible use of human resources, whether originating from the Commission, the EEAS or the member states. It also implies that public diplomacy funds should be managed under the control of EEAS, which is mandated to ensure coordination and consistency of the EU’s external actions and between these and its other policies, as well as the promotion of its strategic interests and objectives (article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union). And these funds need to be managed at a decentralised level to be able to respond swiftly to emerging local needs and opportunities and to be able to customise actions to the local context. Headquarters may provide global directives and expertise and share good practices but cannot manage such funding in a centralised way.</p>Aid effectiveness, simplification and concentration<p>The required responses to the multiplication of challenges (such as security, climate change or trade relations) in an increasingly multipolar world puts enormous pressure on the budgets of the EU’s member states and ultimately also on that of the EU itself. ODA budgets do not escape those constraints and cannot be expected to increase over the next years, despite the EU’s public opinion’s continued support on ethical grounds, expecting a focus on poverty reduction and the sustainable development goals (SDGs). At the political level, (shrinking) ODA is increasingly justified on self-interested political and economic grounds. While ODA is often criticised for its inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, nobody wants a brutal cut like that operated by the US.</p><p>But whatever the perspective on ODA, the continued support for it rests on the assumption of its effectiveness. On the fundamental question of why large parts of Africa are lagging behind despite relatively huge amounts of ODA invested over the last few decades, while other countries – who had started with very similar economic conditions – took off, the answer must be clear: governance and governments committed to pro-poor development are crucial.</p><p>While aid effectiveness can be defined in different ways, the impact of ODA on sustainable growth and development depends highly on ownership and governance. </p><p>While aid effectiveness can be defined in different ways, the impact of ODA on sustainable growth and development depends highly on ownership and governance. As the well-known African blogger Ken Opalo explained recently, “it’s patently absurd to outsource goal-setting (and developmental ambitions)”, but also “you can’t help people who, for whatever reasons, aren’t interested in developing the capacity to help them”. ODA, therefore, needs radical simplification and concentration.</p><p>Simplification can be achieved notably by getting rid of distinct geographic instruments and by rationalising and ‘flexibilising’ the toolbox, bringing all funds together under one single instrument with flexible but politically controlled ‘gateways’ between the various (national, global and reserve) envelopes.</p><p>Concentration can be achieved by following through the graduation and differentiation principles. The EU should phase out programmable funding for non-fragile middle-income countries, while providing them with the opportunity to access a limited number of demand-driven global facilities aiming at promoting the EU’s external action priorities compatible with their domestic interests. The EU should also review its cooperation with least-developed and fragile countries unwilling to address the economic and political governance challenges that hamper their long-term development and concentrate their programmable grant aid on those countries ‘gambling on development’, providing them with the support required to enhance their institutional capacity to seize the economic opportunities their respective comparative advantages and the demand-driven facilities offer them. In order to avoid penalising twice the citizens victim of governments uninterested in pro-poor growth, programmable funding in these countries should be concentrated exclusively on investments in ‘human capital’, ‘gambling’ on their future and their future capacity to change governments and governance for the better, and no longer try to substitute for failed government policies in various social or productive sectors of the economy. Investing in human capital through capacity building in health and education, civil society, and exchange programmes can never ‘do harm’ and be abused.</p>Conclusion<p>The 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Sevilla confirmed once more that we have to face shrinking grant-based ODA over the coming years. Funding therefore will have to be used in the most effective way possible. Rationalisation of development instruments and division of labour among donors in order to preserve economies of scale will be unavoidable. Rather than continue promoting geographic approaches, we propose a strict application of graduation and differentiation principles to ensure the concentration of grant-based programmable development aid.</p><p>We distinguish three layers of support: unconditional humanitarian and emergency aid, programmable envelopes at national and global levels, and demand-driven global facilities.</p><p>Considering the expected increase in – notably climate change induced or exacerbated – natural and man-made disasters, and the withdrawal of the USA, the global envelope earmarked for humanitarian aid, stabilisation efforts and Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) needs to be increased, as well as the global reserves to be reallocated in light of emerging needs through a well-defined political decision-making process.</p><p>Least-developed countries or countries in complex settings, facing high or severe levels of fragility but with governments willing to address their development challenges and to introduce economic and political reforms to ensure inclusive and sustainable growth, the ’transformers’, can not be penalised by the shrinking availability of grant-based ODA. Their aid allocations should be preserved, with the possibility for further ‘reform or democratic dividends’ funded from the unallocated reserves.</p><p>These programmable, grant-based envelopes at national level should be complemented by programmed funding for specific thematic or geographic commitments made at (sub)regional and global level and which are more efficiently addressed at a supranational level on the basis of the subsidiarity principle.</p><p>These programmable national and global envelopes should include funding for public diplomacy and support measures to underpin the political and policy dialogue in the EU’s partner countries. This funding is critically important to defend the rules- and values-based multilateral order in an intensifying competition for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the citizens in the EU’s partner countries. If the graduation principle is strictly applied, the 93% DACability of the existing NDICI instrument may not have to be relaxed further, but the new instrument may have to foresee the possibility to do so under strict political steer, including prior approval by the European Parliament, if further deteriorating geostrategic circumstances so require.</p><p>The third layer consists of demand-driven global facilities to promote the EU"s strategic interests. These facilities will consist of a mixture of limited - catalytic - grant funding blended by more or less concessional loans and private sector investments and may benefit from investment guarantee mechanisms. They should be accessible to all countries identified by the EU as ODA-eligible. To ensure that those facilities are compatible with and complementary to the two other layers of intervention, they will be submitted to stringent governance, policy and political selection criteria. We can therefore assume that they will primarily benefit reform-minded emerging countries that will no longer access programmable funding at the national level.</p><p>For over half a century, the EU and its member states have repeated their commitment to spend 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) on ODA. This is no longer a credible commitment. But the EU and member states also made further commitments to spend 0.2% of their GNI on LDCs, or roughly one-third of their total ODA, and to spend 20% at least of their total ODA on social inclusion and human development. These commitments should stand, which implies that the size of the demand-driven facilities and their level of concessionality should be treated as variables of adjustment after the envelopes for humanitarian aid and the ‘transformers’ have been fixed and safeguarded at levels at least equal to those under the existing budget and increased funding has been earmarked for human capital investment, broader institutional support measures and public diplomacy.</p><p>Rebranding shrinking ODA under the Global Gateway flag will not be enough to preserve the EU"s international credibility. For that, a strong, more effective external action budget is required, upholding its identity as a principled global actor.</p>Acknowledgements<p>The views expressed in this note are those of the author and do not represent those of ECDPM or any other institution. Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the author. 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Maastricht: ECDPM.</p></p></p><p>EU foreign and development policy </p><p><p>Aid EU foreign and development policy EU foreign and development policy European Union Finance and investment Geopolitics and development High-income countries Humanitarian aid Low- and middle-income countries Multiannual financial framework </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> Effective aid programming in the next MFF (Part 2): Simplification and governance – ECDPM	查看 41600	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:40 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215906	有图 <p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/themes/ztheme/images/ecdpm_logo_no_payoff.svg?v=3" rel="noopener noreferrer">A companion guide to the Global Europe instrument proposal<p>Brief21 July 2025</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-098cb3f0.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-8d96abf2.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/3/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-4e696573.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/7/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-53dfd257.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-5a69608a.jpg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-9f68a8be.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/2/Global-Europe-MFF-Photo-by-European-Union-2025-Lukasz-Kobus-via-EC-Audiovisual-Service-P067586-155161-18aa3762.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> European Union 2025 / Lukasz Kobus via EC - Audiovisual Service </p><p><p>Authors<p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/Alexei_Jones_300x300-1d1a6c4a.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p>Alexei Jones </p><p><i></i>Download<i></i>Print<i></i>ShareShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on XShare on Bluesky</p><p><p>On 16 July 2025, the European Commission unveiled its eagerly anticipated proposal for the next EU long-term budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-3034 – introducing a new Global Europe instrument. In this guide, Alexei Jones unpacks the core features of the instrument, highlighting what is new, what is at stake and what to watch for in the upcoming negotiations on the 2028-2034 MFF.</p><p><p><p><i></i> </p><p>% Complete</p><p>table of contents <i></i></p><p></p></p></p><p><p> <p>Summary<p>On 16 July 2025, the European Commission unveiled its eagerly anticipated proposal for the next EU long-term budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-3034 – introducing a new Global Europe instrument. This guide provides a structured guide to the proposed instrument, unpacking its core features and raising key dilemmas for the negotiations ahead.</p><p>The Global Europe instrument consolidates existing instruments into a single, more flexible architecture, with a greater focus on EU geopolitical and economic interests. It includes new support for European competitiveness and a hardening of migration conditionality. The proposal aims for greater EU agility, notably by removing many binding spending targets, increasing non-programmable funding and expanding the financial toolbox. But these changes raise significant concerns about predictability, oversight, the dilution of specific mandates and the politicisation of humanitarian aid.</p><p>This guide offers early analysis of what is new, what is at stake and what to watch for in the upcoming negotiations. It highlights four central dilemmas – architectural, governance, strategic and implementation – that will shape the future of EU external action.</p><p>Download the guide <i></i></p>1. Introduction<p>On 16 July 2025, the European Commission unveiled proposals for the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), a seven-year budget of €1.98 trillion. The budget is centred on priorities like security and defence, economic competitiveness, and Europe’s strategic autonomy, with a central theme of greater agility and flexibility. The overall architecture of the MFF is thus simplified, with four main headings: 1) Economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture, rural and maritime prosperity and security; 2) Competitiveness, prosperity and security; 3) Global Europe; and 4) Administration.</p><p>Among the main proposals is a new €200.3 billion Global Europe instrument, signalling a notable rise in ambition for the EU’s external action at a time when the US and several EU member states are cutting back on international spending. While this represents a 75% increase compared to current levels (1), the increase is significantly less generous than it appears once inflation is factored in. This opening bid faces a difficult negotiation process, where it will have to compete with pressing domestic priorities and remains at high risk of being cut. Crucially, these proposals form part of a broader package and the external action heading must be understood as mutually reinforcing with other MFF priorities, notably security and competitiveness.</p><p>This brief provides a quick, early analysis of the Commission"s proposal for the Global Europe instrument, unpacking its key features and identifying the major issues for the contentious negotiations ahead.</p>2. Why this new instrument?<p>The proposal for the Global Europe instrument is driven by a drastically changed geopolitical setting and significant economic and political challenges within Europe, compelling the EU to equip itself with a more agile and flexible budget. This evolution is part of a broader and controversial MFF overhaul aimed at creating fewer, more agile instruments with a greater share of unprogrammed funds to give the Commission more leeway, faster and better crisis response, and ultimately, stronger impact.</p><p>This logic of flexibility through consolidation is the primary driver behind the new instrument"s design. It builds on the previous consolidation that created the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – GlobalEurope (NDICI-Global Europe) for 2021-2027. The new proposal goes further by consolidating existing external financing instruments, including pre-accession and humanitarian aid funds, into a single instrument(2).</p><p>The proposal also explicitly calls for greater coherence and more effective leveraging of resources between the EU"s external action and its internal priorities, such as competitiveness and migration.</p>3. What’s new in the proposal?</p><p>3.1. Overall objectives and policy framework<p>The proposal reaffirms the EU’s commitment to its foundational values, multilateralism, the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement. At the same time, it reflects a sharpened focus on security and geopolitics, adding new thematic priorities such as combating “foreign information manipulation and interference” and addressing hybrid threats.</p><p>The core evolution is the articulation of a new ‘dual objective’: to foster partnerships that contribute “simultaneously to the sustainable development of partner countries and to the strategic interests of the Union” (Article 5). This represents a deliberate pivot towards a more assertive geoeconomic approach, explicitly positioning the Global Europe instrument as a tool to advance EU competitiveness, economic security, and open strategic autonomy. The Global Gateway strategy is now formally designated as the main vehicle of this economic foreign policy.</p><p>Tailor-made partnerships are presented as the central means of delivering this dual agenda, aligning EU interests with partner country needs. Yet this new framing introduces a fundamental strategic dilemma: how to reconcile the pursuit of short-term geopolitical and economic interests with the EU’s long-standing, treaty-based commitment to sustainable development, human rights and democratic governance.</p><p>Critically, this recalibration unfolds in the absence of a coherent strategic policy framework. The proposal contains no reference to the 2016 EU Global Strategy or the 2017 European Consensus on Development – foundational documents that previously anchored EU external action. Instead, implementation is to be steered by a fragmented set of high-level political inputs: strategic agendas of the European Council, political guidelines of the European Commission, Council conclusions, communications and summit outcomes (Article 8). While now formally embedded into the Global Europe instrument, the Global Gateway is not a comprehensive strategy in itself and cannot replace a broader policy framework.</p><p>Without a clear, overarching framework, the instrument risks being driven by short-term political priorities and institutional bargaining, resulting in a fragmented mosaic of priorities. In such a vacuum, the EU’s strategic interests may increasingly override long-term development and value-led commitments.</p><p>Without a clear, overarching framework, the instrument risks being driven by short-term political priorities and institutional bargaining, resulting in a fragmented mosaic of priorities. </p>3.2. Structure and instrument scope<p>The main structural novelty is the consolidation of NDICI-Global Europe, the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA III), and the Humanitarian Aid instrument (HUMA) into a single instrument. The integration of IPA III reflects the new reality of an accelerated accession process for countries like Moldova and Ukraine. Humanitarian aid, while now drawing its budget from the merged Global Europe instrument, will continue to be governed by its own separate regulation to preserve its unique principles and operating procedures. This consolidation creates an architectural dilemma: how to gain flexibility without diluting the distinct purpose and principles of each component?</p><p>The instrument is built on six core pillars, with a clear emphasis on geography (Article 3 and 6):</p>Five geographic pillars:</p><p>1. Europe(€43.17 billion)(3)</p><p>2. Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf(€42.93 billion)(4)</p><p>3. Sub-Saharan Africa (€60.53 billion)</p><p>4. Asia and the Pacific (€17.05 billion)</p><p>5. Americas and the Caribbean (€9.14 billion)One global pillar (€12.68 billion) to address global challenges and thematic priorities. It absorbs the former standalone programmes for human rights, civil society and global public goods.<p>The ‘indicative amounts’ for these pillars are non-binding, which allows for adjustments via the annual budget procedure or other mechanisms. While this increases flexibility, it also raises concerns that funds could be shifted and that greater fungibility of funds risks blurring pillar allocations. This could deprioritise certain areas over time, making it difficult to ensure predictability and strategic clarity.</p><p>A separate Ukraine Reserve will support Ukraine’s accession and reconstruction efforts, including up to €100 billion in loans. This support will be made available through the Europe pillar of the Global Europe instrument but financed from "over and above the MFF ceilings", meaning it is separate and additional from the €200 billion for the instrument.</p><p>Each pillar consists of both programmable and non-programmable actions, but the proposal does not define a fixed amount or proportion for their allocation, which is intended to enhance strategic agility. The non-programmable actions for geographic pillars explicitly include: (1) humanitarian aid; (2) macro-financial assistance; (3) resilience; (4) competitiveness; and (5) crisis, peace, and foreign policy needs.</p><p>The ‘emerging challenges and priorities’ cushion is also significantly strengthened to €14.8 billion (up from €9.5 billion), reflecting lessons from the current NDICI-Global Europe, where the cushion was rapidly depleted in the first half of the programming period to respond to major unforeseen events such as the war in Ukraine, food and energy crises, and natural disasters.</p>3.3. From targets to flexibility<p>One of the most notable features of the proposal is its deliberate push for greater flexibility. The most significant change is the removal of all spending targets (for instance, 30% for climate, 10% for migration and 20% of official development assistance (ODA) for human development) and the replacement of minimum amounts for key regions like sub-Saharan Africa and the EU Neighbourhood by indicative financial allocations for each pillar(5).</p><p>These changes create a significant risk of deprioritisation, potentially leading to a dilution of investment and making it harder to track performance and ensure accountability. These choices will likely trigger pushback from some member states and members of the European Parliament keen to safeguard regional or thematic interests, and who may fear a dilution of development objectives, predictability more generally, and a loss of oversight. This tension presents the core governance dilemma: balancing the EU’s need for agility with the imperative for democratic oversight and predictable funding.</p><p>These choices will likely trigger pushback from some member states and members of the European Parliament. </p><p>The only remaining quantitative target is for ODA, set at “at least 90% of the expenditure”. Yet, even this can be amended by the Commission through a delegated act, without reopening the full regulation (Article 6.6). This flexibility on the fundamental ODA target risks undermining the EU"s poverty focus and credibility. Furthermore, it introduces unpredictability for partner countries, particularly least developed countries (LDCs), which depend on stable aid. Such a fluctuating benchmark could also complicate member states’ budget planning and impede the collective impact of Team Europe.</p><p>Beyond targets, the Commission also proposes to make budgetary transfers between and within pillars easier, and to increase the maximum amounts it can spend flexibly in a non-programmable way (6). Furthermore, the proposal foresees a number of derogations from standard EU financial rules, like the automatic carry-over of unused funds to the following year, the re-use of revenues and recoveries from financial instruments, and the possibility to assign surpluses from budgetary guarantees to the instrument’s budget.</p><p>This heightened level of financial discretion, combined with the removal of binding spending targets, elevates the importance of the annual budget process, transforming it into the primary arena for making strategic decisions on resource allocation.</p>3.4. Private sector and competitiveness<p>The proposal reinforces the EU’s focus on leveraging private sector investment to achieve its foreign policy goals. This aligns with the ambitions of the Global Gateway strategy, the EU’s contribution to narrowing the global investment gap worldwide, and reflects a broader shift towards using the EU budget to mitigate risk for European investments and promote European economic interests.</p><p>The proposed Global Europe instrument emphasises the external dimension of European competitiveness, and some links are made with the newly proposed, internally focussed €409-billion European Competitiveness Fund. To give this ambition institutional weight, the regulation mandates that the Global Europe instrument will ensure "consistency, coherence, synergies and complementarity" with other Union policies (Article 5), especially with trade, investment and the EU Competitiveness Fund, thus clearly embedding industrial policy goals into external action.</p><p>The regulation also provides for a better integration of budgetary guarantees and financial instruments in the toolbox of the EU, with the possibility of covering the activities of export credit agencies (mentioned for the first time in the Global Europe instrument proposal) and the European private sector. Moreover, the proposed instrument explicitly states that “budgetary guarantees authorised under this Regulation may serve as a horizontal delivery tool also for other Union programmes contributing to external action objectives”, thereby enhancing the coherence of the EU internal and external agenda, notably in terms of competitiveness objectives. This raises the challenge of balancing the instrument"s new economic diplomacy focus with the EU"s long-standing treaty-based development and humanitarian objectives.</p><p>A major innovation is the ability to award grants directly (without a call for proposals) to private EU-based companies for projects that are in the "strategic interest of the Union”, such as investments in critical raw materials, climate change resilience or digital and other infrastructure, in particular as part of integrated packages (Recital 70). This is complemented by a doubling of non-programmable funds, which allows the Commission to act faster on competitiveness-related grants without formal procedures.</p>3.5. Migration conditionality<p>Similar to NDICI-Global Europe, the draft Global Europe instrument regulation proposal balances strategic and interest-driven objectives, while keeping a developmental and rights-based language on migration. There is continuity from the NDICI-Global Europe in terms of the areas covered as part of comprehensive engagement on migration, but the proposal frames migration more explicitly as an integral element of the instrument and presents the instrument as a tool to implement EU migration agreements with third countries.</p><p>The NDICI-Global Europe"s ‘flexible incitative approach’ to migration now extends across the entire instrument, serving as leverage for diverse objectives, including migration. However, there is now a much stronger and more explicit enforcement tool and a suspension clause, granting the Commission the power to suspend support if a country fails to readmit its nationals (Article 12-3). This marks a significant hardening of conditionality, evolving from a general ‘incitative approach’ to a distinct mechanism of negative leverage directly linked to readmission cooperation.</p><p>The broader scope and lack of a migration target risk reducing visibility and predictability. Clear programming guidelines and robust reporting – such as a revised or more differentiated migration marker – will be essential to ensure accountability and demonstrate prioritisation. While such measures may help justify the absence of a dedicated target, they may not fully prevent renewed pressure from member states seeking more concrete commitments.</p>3.6. Fragility and protracted crises<p>Compared to NDICI-Global Europe, the draft regulation elevates crisis and fragility to a more central and political priority. But there is a risk of politicising international cooperation when engaging in fragile and conflict-affected settings, thereby undermining core development and humanitarian principles. The framing could also alienate partner governments and local actors, and reduce the EU’s credibility as a development partner in fragile contexts where trust and long-term engagement are essential. In the absence of a clear EU-wide strategy with guiding principles on how the EU aims to respond to fragility and fragile settings, there is a risk that fragile settings deemed not strategically interesting to the EU will be left behind.</p><p>Specific funding for peace, stability and conflict prevention (including attention to global threats such as transnational crime) are now integrated into the ‘non-programmable’ components of each pillar, which risks deprioritising attention to fragile and conflict affected areas.</p><p>Enhanced flexibility may allow the EU to respond fast to emerging crises or priorities. However, a top-down approach, which primarily serves the Commission"s management needs, risks neglecting the necessity for more tailor-made responses to prolonged crises. Addressing such crises demands a deep understanding of both country-specific and regional contexts, and this initial regulation proposal offers no guarantees in that regard.</p></p></p><p><p> <p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/d/EU-Budget-Photo-by-Andrew-Sherriff-ECDPM-2-7f374b3d.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/6/EU-Budget-Photo-by-Andrew-Sherriff-ECDPM-2-7a119646.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/e/EU-Budget-Photo-by-Andrew-Sherriff-ECDPM-2-c4285dfe.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> Photo by Andrew Sherriff / ECDPM</p></p><p><p> <p>3.7. Full mainstreaming approach<p>The proposal marks a significant shift in addressing cross-cutting priorities. Instead of specific binding targets (for areas like climate, human development and gender), the draft Global Europe instrument regulation proposes a ‘full mainstreaming’ approach that is to be implemented in accordance with a horizontal performance regulation (Article 10). As noted earlier, this shift from quantitative targets to qualitative goals creates significant risks for accountability and the potential deprioritisation of key issues.</p><p>For gender equality, the removal of the gender targets under NDICI-Global Europe represents a clear step back from the EU’s previous commitments, raising the risk that gender objectives will be diluted within broader programmes and not effectively implemented in practice. Without concrete measures and tracking mechanisms, gender equality risks being deprioritised within the EU’s external agenda.</p><p>For climate action, the removal of the 30% external spending target under NDICI-Global Europe marks a major change. While the broader multiannual financial framework includes a 35% climate and environment target, the draft Global Europe instrument relies solely on qualitative mainstreaming. Without dedicated allocations or strengthened reporting, there is a real danger that climate objectives, particularly adaptation finance, could be sidelined. This may erode the EU’s credibility as a global climate leader at a time when measurable commitments are increasingly demanded by international partners.</p><p>Other key priorities, such as democracy, human rights, peace, stability and civil society support, are no longer covered by dedicated thematic programmes, as is currently the case under NDICI-Global Europe. Although these areas remain stated priorities and are supported through both geographic and global pillars, they are now relegated to annexes rather than anchored in the core text. This change is intended to maximise impact, but without binding targets or dedicated funding, their visibility and impact risk becoming diluted.</p>3.8. Programming and implementation toolbox<p>A strategic and flexible programming approach</p><p>The Global Europe instrument introduces new programming principles that grant the European Commission considerable latitude in its decision-making, marking a distinct shift from the more rigid funding mechanisms of the past. Whereas previous instruments prioritised needs criteria (with specific mentions of poverty, human development and environmental vulnerability, and a clear prioritisation of LDCs), the new instrument pivots towards broader concepts of ‘mutual interest’ and ‘shared priorities’. This allows the EU to be more agile, with greater flexibility to start or stop spending based on evolving strategic interests, including support for multilateral alliances and cooperation on irregular migration.</p><p>This allows the EU to be more agile, with greater flexibility to start or stop spending based on evolving strategic interests, including support for multilateral alliances and cooperation on irregular migration. </p><p>The primary implementation method will be through geographic programmable actions at the country, multi-country, regional and trans-regional levels. These are to be complemented by non-programmable geographic actions and global thematic initiatives. This would allow for a more integrated policy approach within each region, enabling the EU to deploy its entire toolbox coherently to achieve strategic outcomes, rather than managing separate programmatic silos. This would make the allocation of funds an inherently more strategic and political exercise. Resources would be directed to geographic regions based on their perceived importance to the Union"s overarching foreign policy objectives.</p><p>The proposal aims for a more adaptable programming approach, tailoring actions to the specific needs of each region and allowing for easier reallocation of resources between countries and regions as new opportunities or challenges arise. The regulation allows for multiannual indicative programmes (MIPs) to be reviewed and amended. Specifically, Article 17-2 states that MIPs can be reviewed on an "ad hoc basis as necessary for effective implementation", particularly following a situation of crisis or post-crisis. On "duly justified imperative grounds of urgency", the Commission can amend these programmes through immediately applicable acts. While this grants the Commission and the EU greater flexibility, it comes at the cost of predictability for partner countries, many of whom depend on stable, multi-year financial commitments.</p><p>The precise role that the European Parliament and member states will play in overseeing this more flexible programming remains a central point of negotiation. This also raises a crucial implementation dilemma: whether the EU can shift from its top-down programming model to one of genuine co-creation with partners on the ground.</p><p>The implementation toolbox</p><p>The regulation strengthens and extends the implementation toolbox to enhance the EU"s ability to act in a more flexible, coherent and impactful manner. A central feature is the improved integration of tools which enable the development of comprehensive, tailor-made ‘partnership packages’. While it maintains core instruments, the proposal introduces new components and mechanisms:</p>Grants: These remain a key tool for a wide range of cooperation activities. The flexibility to award grants without a call for proposals is enhanced for specific urgent cases, such as supporting human rights defenders or acting in crisis situations.</p>Financial guarantees and blending: A significant simplification is the integration of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) directly into the Global Europe instrument. The budgetary guarantee is no longer a separate fund but a standard, horizontal tool in the EU’s financial architecture. This enables blending of public grants with public and private loans to de-risk and mobilise large-scale investments, particularly in support of the Global Gateway. The regulation also opens the possibility to extend guarantee coverage to export credit agencies, marking an important expansion of the EU’s external investment toolkit.</p>Policy-based loans and macro-financial assistance: The instrument formalises the use of policy-based loans as a general tool to support partner countries’ reform agendas. A specific implementation mechanism is foreseen for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood partners, based on performance-based reform plans. Macro-financial assistance, previously limited to a narrower set of countries, is now embedded more systematically into the toolbox.</p><p>3.9. Accountability and governance<p>Increased flexibility is a common thread across the entire multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034, but it must be balanced with improved accountability, governance and strategic direction. To this end, the Commission proposes a "new political steering mechanism" to provide strong interinstitutional governance for the allocation of flexible resources. This high-level process would involve an annual dialogue between the institutions, informed by an integrated strategy report, to agree on key priorities.</p><p>The Global Europe instrument, however, lacks significant governance innovation and replicates the structure that was already in place. A simple provision is included to inform the European Parliament and the Council and have exchanges of views with them (Article 8-2).</p><p>Yet, the text centralises decision-making with the Commission, as shown above with the many flexibility features (for instance, the possibility to use delegated acts and grant direct awards without competitive calls). Moreover, the Commission would still largely control the deployment of flexible funds and the emerging challenges and priorities cushion(7) , allowing it significant power to respond to crises and opportunities based on its own priorities.</p><p>The removal of binding targets strips the Parliament and Council of their most powerful tool for shaping spending priorities ex ante.Their role is fundamentally shifted towards ex-post oversight, inverting the traditional accountability model: instead of the Commission justifying its spending plans upfront, the burden now falls on the co-legislators to challenge deviations from broadly defined goals after the fact.</p><p>These choices will likely face pushback from member states and members of the European Parliament. A potential solution to this conflict lies in developing a new framework of ‘accountable flexibility’. This concept aims to balance the need for swift action with increased transparency and oversight of the Commission. Rather than returning to the rigidities of the past, accountable flexibility could introduce new oversight mechanisms, such as more dynamic forms of strategic dialogue, timely information or stricter reporting rules. These mechanisms would allow the EU to respond quickly while preserving the democratic legitimacy and political buy-in vital for successful external action. To be successful, they would also require a significant and swift agreement within the Council and Parliament on strategic direction. Achieving this will require significant efforts from the Parliament and particularly the Council.</p>4. Key dilemmas in the upcoming negotiations<p>The proposed changes to the Global Europe instrument, while primarily seen through the legal text, give rise to fundamental questions about the future of EU external action, which go beyond the regulation per se. The central challenges crystallise into four core dilemmas that will likely dominate the upcoming negotiations:</p>The architectural dilemma: Does merging the EU"s external financing instruments for more flexibility offer benefits that outweigh the risks of diluting their distinct purposes, principles and accountability frameworks?</p>The governance dilemma: How can the EU balance the Commission"s desire for maximum flexibility in a volatile world with the imperative of predictable funding and transparent oversight from the Council and Parliament, which are essential for credible partnerships?</p>The strategic dilemma: How can the EU reconcile its growing focus on geopolitical and economic interests, embodied by the Global Gateway, with its fundamental, treaty-based commitment to poverty eradication and long-term, values-based development cooperation?</p>The implementation dilemma: How can the EU move from a top-down, ‘Brussels-centric’ model to one of genuine co-creation by fundamentally changing how it programmes its resources and which implementation tools it uses?<p>Figure 1: Four core dilemmas</p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/8917/5311/7867/ECDPM-Global-Europe-Dilemmas-WEB.svg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/8917/5311/7867/ECDPM-Global-Europe-Dilemmas-WEB.svg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/8917/5311/7867/ECDPM-Global-Europe-Dilemmas-WEB.svg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> </p></p></p><p><p> <p></p></p><p><p> <p>5. Conclusion<p>The Commission’s proposal for the Global Europe instrument sheds light on a fundamental tension: a necessary quest for geopolitical flexibility and pursuit of EU interests that risks sacrificing the predictability, accountability and values-based partnerships that have long been the bedrock of the EU"s external action. As this brief has detailed, the legislative negotiations over the next two years will be the arena where the final balance between executive agility and democratic oversight is struck.</p><p>However, the instrument"s success cannot be guaranteed in isolation. The EU’s credibility as a global partner is increasingly shaped by the coherence – or lack thereof – between its internal policies and external commitments. Failing to connect the dots between the Global Europe instrument and internal agendas on competitiveness, security, migration or the green and digital transitions will not only lead to ineffective spending but actively damage trust with partner countries and multilateral institutions.</p><p>Failing to connect the dots will not only lead to ineffective spending but will actively damage trust with partner countries and multilateral institutions. </p><p>The instrument’s stated goal is to foster ‘mutually-beneficial partnerships’ that serve both the interests of the EU and of its partners, but the instrument’s strong push for flexibility and EU-driven priorities risks skewing that balance. Without meaningful involvement of partner countries, these partnerships risk becoming one-sided, which would undermine the EU’s credibility as well as the instrument’s impact and value for money.</p><p>The success of the Global Europe instrument also requires addressing the current strategic vacuum. Without a coherent overarching policy framework to guide implementation, the instrument risks being shaped by short-term political expediency rather than long-term vision. Likewise, the shift away from binding priorities towards more Commission-led discretion calls for new approaches to ‘accountable flexibility’ that safeguard transparency and political oversight.</p><p>The MFF negotiations must therefore become the place where these internal and external silos are broken down, where strategic direction is restored, and where the perspectives of international partners are not left as an afterthought. The choices made in the coming months will shape the EU’s role as a global actor for the next decade.</p><p>This guide is a first step in unpacking the proposal. ECDPM will continue to monitor and analyse these critical issues as they unfold. For all our work on the new multiannual financial framework and the budget negotiations, along with insights into current and past frameworks, explore our dedicated dossier at ecdpm.org/mff.</p>Annex 1. Main changes and implications: A summary table<p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/2917/5311/7920/ECDPM-Summary-Table-Global-Europe-WEB.svg"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/2917/5311/7920/ECDPM-Summary-Table-Global-Europe-WEB.svg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/2917/5311/7920/ECDPM-Summary-Table-Global-Europe-WEB.svg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> </p></p></p><p><p> <p></p></p><p><p> <p>Endnotes<p>1. This 75% increase is calculated based on a consolidated baseline that includes the current NDICI–Global Europe, Instrument for Pre-Acccession, Humanitarian Aid instrument, and the Western Balkans Facility, without deflators. ECDPM will provide further in-depth analysis on the figures given, as well as the thematic issues throughout the rest of 2025.</p><p>2. Proposals for smaller external spending items like the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (€3.4 billion), and support for Overseas Countries and Territories including Greenland (€1 billion) remain separate, as does the the off-budget European Peace Facility (€30.5 billion).</p><p>3. Merges the enlargement portfolio with the Eastern Neighbourhood, also incorporating the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans and the Facility for Moldova. Mirrors the Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (ENEST).</p><p>4. Combines the Southern Neighbourhood with the Gulf region. Mirrors the new European Commission Directorate-General for Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (MENA).</p><p>5. The “minimum” regional amounts (€29.18 billion for sub-Saharan Africa and €19.32 billion for the Neighbourhood) were not in the Commission’s original NDICI-Global Europe proposal in 2018, but were introduced by the Council during the negotiations. They reflect a long-standing political battle over the geographic focus of EU external action, particularly aimed at safeguarding the development and neighbourhood dimensions that were brought together under NDICI-Global Europe.</p><p>6. Article 19 raises the thresholds for bypassing comitology procedures to €10 million for individual measures, €20 million for special measures and €40 million for exceptional assistance measures; double the amounts under the NDICI-Global Europe regulation.</p><p>7. Article 7-2: “The Commission shall inform in detail the European Parliament and the Council before it mobilises the funds of the emerging challenges and priorities cushion and, where appropriate, shall take into consideration their observations on the nature, objectives and financial amounts envisaged.”</p>Acknowledgements and references<p>The author would like to thank Sophie Desmidt, Sara Gianesello, Hanne Knaepen, Anna Knoll, San Bilal, Volker Hauck and Andrew Sherriff for their valuable input and review of this paper. Special thanks also go to Nina Thijssen for communications guidance and support, and to Joyce Olders for layout. The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of ECDPM or any other institution. Any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author. Feedback on this brief can be sent to Alexei Jones.</p><p>A full reference list is available in the PDF version of this guide.</p><p>Download the guide <i></i></p>Our work on the MFF<p>Explore our dossier featuring ECDPM’s work on the new multiannual financial framework and the budget negotiations, along with insights into current and past frameworks.</p></p></p><p><p> <p><p><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/4/pexels-marco-288924445-13153479-58de8b74.webp"><source srcset="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/4/pexels-marco-288924445-13153479-608a0a04.jpg"><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/b/pexels-marco-288924445-13153479-810f2acb.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> </p><p>Inside the EU’s long-term budget: The multiannual financial framework explained</p><p>The EU’s multiannual financial framework, a seven-year budget powering policies within and beyond its borders, will enter negotiations for the post-2027 period in 2025. Building on years worth of analysis of the EU’s long-term budget, we will closely monitor the upcoming negotiations, focusing in particular on Europe’s global role and relations with its neighbourhood, Africa and the Global South. </p> <p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/c/Andrew-e2664b5c.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/a/Alexei_Jones_300x300-1d1a6c4a.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/3/ECDPM-Mariella-Di-Ciommo-300x300-5defc423.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p><img src="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/img/0/ECDPM-Amandine-Sabourin-11ae87e0.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p><p>09 January 2025</p></p></p></p><p><p> </p></p><p>EU foreign and development policy </p><p><p>EU foreign and development policy EU foreign and development policy Economy and trade Finance and investment Geopolitics and development Multiannual financial framework </p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Share this page<i></i><svg></svg><i></i><i></i><i></i></p></p> </p> A companion guide to the Global Europe instrument proposal - ECDPM	查看 39619	欧洲发展政策管理中心	2025-07-23 21:41:37 2025-07-23 21:42:02	word
3215905	无图 <small>Landwirtschaft</small> <time>07. Juli 2025</time> Totschnig zu Bilanz 30 Jahre ÖPUL: Per 1. Juli 2025 mehr als 80 Prozent aller Betriebe bei Bündnis für nachhaltige Landwirtschaft dabei <p>Zentraler Beitrag für gesunde Böden, sauberes Wasser und hohen Tierwohlstandards</p><p>Das Österreichische Agrarumweltprogramm (ÖPUL) blickt auf 30 Jahre erfolgreiche Umsetzung zurück. Seit dem EU-Beitritt im Jahr 1995 ist ÖPUL ein zentraler Bestandteil der heimischen Agrarpolitik und hat seither maßgeblich zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft beigetragen. Das Agrarumweltprogramm ist europaweit einzigartig.</p><p>Landwirtschaftsminister Norbert Totschnig stellt die Bilanz per Stichtag 1. Juli 2025 vor: „Österreichweit nehmen mit rund 89.000 Betrieben mehr als 80 Prozent der Bäuerinnen und Bauern freiwillig teil, rund 22.500 sind Biobetriebe, 240.000 Hektar sind Biodiversitäts- und Naturschutzflächen und mehr als 2 Millionen Einzelbäume wurden bisher gefördert. Diese Bilanz ist eine Erfolgsbilanz und ich danke unseren Bäuerinnen und Bauern für ihren wertvollen Beitrag zum Schutz unserer Natur. Unsere Bäuerinnen und Bauern stellen ihre Flächen zur Förderung der Biodiversität, zum Boden- und Gewässerschutz sowie der Klima- und Luftreinhaltung zur Verfügung und sorgen für hohes Tierwohl.“</p>Kraftvolle Stärkung des Programms unter Totschnig<p>Seit dem Jahr 1995 wurden rund 16 Milliarden Euro für freiwillige Umweltleistungen im Rahmen des ÖPULs investiert. Jährlich werden damit mehr als 40 Prozent des Budgets der ländlichen Entwicklung in Österreich mit dem Agrarumweltprogramm an die Bäuerinnen und Bauern zur Erhöhung der Umweltwirkung ausbezahlt. Eine wesentliche Stärkung des Agrarumweltprogramms erfolgte ab dem Jahr 2024 mit dem von Bundesminister Norbert Totschnig initiierten Impulsprogramm für die österreichische Landwirtschaft. So wurden die Prämienzahlungen gezielt attraktiver gestaltet und ab 2025 wurden weitere Maßnahmenelemente, beispielsweise zur Stärkung der biologischen Wirtschaftsweise, umgesetzt.</p><p>„Die Leistungen der Landwirtschaft für die Gesellschaft sind umfassend und nicht selbstverständlich. Das ÖPUL zeigt, wie Landwirtschaft und Umweltschutz Hand in Hand gehen. Natur- und Umweltschutz funktioniert nicht gegen, sondern nur gemeinsam mit der Landwirtschaft“, hebt Totschnig hervor.</p>ÖPUL wirkt – und das messbar<p>Das Agrarumweltprogramm zeigt Wirkung: Der Farmland Bird Index, welcher als Indikator für die Vogelvielfalt im Kulturland dient, hat sich nach Jahren des Rückgangs in den vergangenen Jahren wieder stabilisiert. Ein deutliches Zeichen dafür, dass naturschutzwirksame Bewirtschaftung funktioniert – wenn sie langfristig, flächendeckend und praxisnah umgesetzt wird. Im Jahr 2025 wurden rund 240.000 Hektar biodiversitätsrelevante Fläche von den österreichischen Bäuerinnen und Bauern als Lebens- und Rückzugsräume für Bestäuber, Insekten und Vögel zur Verfügung gestellt.</p><p>Mit den Maßnahmen des Agrarumweltprogramms ÖPUL wird weiters ein wesentlicher Beitrag zur regionalen Entwicklung geleistet. Mehr als 70 Prozent der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe bewirtschaften benachteiligte Gebiete sowie ökologisch sensible Lebensräume – darunter auch Almen, deren Erhalt nur durch die Arbeit der Bäuerinnen und Bauern gesichert werden kann. Almen erfüllen dabei nicht nur eine bedeutende Rolle im Naturschutz, sondern sind auch unverzichtbare Naherholungsräume und wichtige Säulen des heimischen Tourismus.</p>Verpflichtung zu höchsten Qualitätsstandards<p>Das ÖPUL-Programm verbindet ökologische Verantwortung mit höchsten Qualitätsstandards – die Umweltsituation im Bereich Boden- und Gewässerschutz zeigt dies eindrucksvoll auf. Die teilnehmenden Bäuerinnen und Bauern verpflichten sich zu umweltschonenden Bewirtschaftungsmethoden, die den Schutz natürlicher Ressourcen in den Mittelpunkt stellen. Die nachhaltige Produktionsweise sichert nicht nur die langfristige Verfügbarkeit fruchtbarer Böden und sauberen Wassers, sondern garantiert gleichzeitig die Erzeugung von hoch qualitativen Lebensmitteln. Diese Bewirtschaftung stellt sicher, dass auch künftige Generationen von einer intakten Umwelt und hochwertigen heimischen Lebensmitteln profitieren können.</p>Landwirtschaft wichtiger Partner im Kampf gegen Klimawandel<p>Die österreichische Landwirtschaft positioniert sich zunehmend als wichtiger Partner im Kampf gegen den Klimawandel. Eine zentrale Rolle spielt dabei der systematische Humusaufbau in den Böden. Durch gezielte Bewirtschaftungsmaßnahmen binden die Bäuerinnen und Bauern Kohlenstoff im Boden und schaffen natürliche Kohlenstoffspeicher. Diese Methode trägt nicht nur zur Verbesserung der Bodenqualität bei, sondern entzieht der Atmosphäre aktiv Kohlenstoffdioxid.</p>Festveranstaltung im Landwirtschaftsministerium<p>Um die drei Jahrzehnte Erfolgsgeschichte des Österreichischen Agarumweltprogramms gebührend zu feiern, fand am 02. Juli 2025 auf Einladung von Bundesminister Norbert Totschnig im Bundesministerium eine Jubiläumsfeier statt. Gemeinsam mit zahlreichen Wegbegleiterinnen und Wegbegleitern wurde auf die Entstehung und die bisherigen Erfolge des ÖPUL zurückgeblickt, sowie die Bedeutung und Umsetzung reflektiert und erste Impulse für die zukünftige Entwicklung gesammelt.</p><p>Norbert Totschnig: „Die Erfolgsbilanz basiert auf der Zusammenarbeit verschiedener Institutionen und dem klaren Bekenntnis der Politik zur Honorierung von Umweltleistungen. Mein Dank gilt allen, die sich seit drei Jahrzehnten für eine nachhaltige Landwirtschaft in Österreich einsetzen und damit einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Zukunft unserer Umwelt und Gesellschaft leisten.“</p>ÖPUL in Zahlen: 89.000 Betriebe, die am ÖPUL teilnehmen (über 80 Prozentaller Betriebe) 22.518 Betriebe in der Maßnahme biologische Wirtschaftsweise mit 514.269 Hektar geförderte Flächen, insgesamt über 27 Prozentder landwirtschaftlichen Flächen biologisch bewirtschaftet Landschaftselemente und Streuobst: 2 Millionen Einzelbäume gefördert, dabei 1 Millionen Streuobstbäume 46.352 Betriebe mit der Teilnahme an der Maßnahme umweltgerechte und biodiversitätsfördernde Bewirtschaftung mit 998.447 Hektar geförderter Fläche. 240.000 Hektar Biodiversitäts- und Naturschutzflächen österreichweit 112.000 Hektar Naturschutzflächen mit maßgeschneiderten Pflegekonzepten, 120.000 Hektar biodiversitätsfördernde Flächen im Rahmen biologischer und umweltgerechter Bewirtschaftung, 8.000 Hektar freiwillige Ackerbrachen 270.000 Hektar Zwischenfrüchte, 225.014 Hektar in der Maßnahme Immergrün Bekenntnis zu hohen Tierwohlstandards Artgerechte Stallhaltung von mehr als 100.000 Rinder- GVE und 60.000 Schweine-GVE gefördert Artgerechte Weidehaltung mit über 660.000 GVE Tiere gefördert (rund 50 Prozentder potentiell förderfähigen Tiere) Erhaltung und Steigerung der genetischen Vielfalt in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion 11.000 Hektar seltener Kulturpflanzen gefördert 46.000 Tiere gefährdeter Nutztierrassen erhalten Die Boden- und Gewässerschutzmaßnahmen des ÖPULs erhalten gesunde Böden und sauberes Wasser. Knapp 230.000 Hektar Acker gemäß den Vorgaben der Maßnahme „Vorbeugender Grundwasserschutz“ gefördert </p> Totschnig zu Bilanz 30 Jahre ÖPUL: Per 1. Juli 2025 mehr als 80 Prozent aller Betriebe bei Bündnis für nachhaltige Landwirtschaft dabei	查看 7282	奥地利农业、区域发展和数字化部	2025-07-07 08:00:00 2025-07-23 21:41:30	word
3215904	无图 <small>Klima und Umwelt</small> <time>10. Juli 2025</time> Klimadialog auf höchster Ebene: Totschnig empfängt Präsidenten der UN-Klimakonferenz Mukhtar Babayev in Wien <p>Umwelt- und Klimaminister Norbert Totschnig hat in Wien den Präsidenten der UN-Klimakonferenz COP29, Mukhtar Babayev, zu einem bilateralen Arbeitsgespräch empfangen. Im Zentrum des hochrangigen Austauschs standen die Umsetzung der Ergebnisse der COP29 in Baku, die Vorbereitung auf die COP30 in Brasilien sowie die europäische Debatte zu den Klimazielen für 2040.</p><p>„Umwelt und Klima sind globale Herausforderungen, die wir in Österreich nicht allein lösen können. Europa hat die Kraft und Verantwortung, international als Vorreiter zu agieren und andere Staaten zum Mitmachen zu bewegen. Der Weg zu den Klimazielen muss aber so gegangen werden, dass er gleichzeitig Chancen für Arbeitsplätze und den heimischen Standort eröffnet und auf die Bedürfnisse der Menschen Rücksicht nimmt“, soTotschnig.</p>Rückblick auf COP29: Wichtige Fortschritte bei Klimafinanzierung und Marktmechanismen<p>Totschnigwürdigte die Erfolge der letztenWeltklimakonferenz in Bakuunter der PräsidentschaftBabayevs: „Die Einigung auf ein neues globales Klimafinanzierungsziel von 300 Milliarden US-Dollar jährlich bis 2035 und der Durchbruch bei Artikel 6 – dem globalen Marktmechanismus – sind Meilensteine für mehr Klimagerechtigkeit und Umweltintegrität.“ Besonders hervorgehoben wurde auch der „Baku Climate Unity Pact“, der neben der Finanzierung zentrale Entscheidungen zur Emissionsminderung und Klimaanpassung umfasst.</p>Blick nach vorne: Vorbereitung der COP30 in Belém<p>Mit Blick auf die kommende COP30 –zehn Jahrenach demPariser Abkommen– unterstrichen beide Seiten die Dringlichkeit ambitionierter Beiträge. „Die nächste Runde der nationalen Klimapläne wird entscheidend sein, ob wir das Pariser Klimaziel noch halten können.Österreich und die EUarbeiten intensiv an einem starken gemeinsamen Klimaplan für 2035“, erklärteTotschnig.</p>Offener Austausch über nächste Schritte<p>Abschließend sagteTotschnig: „Ich bin dankbar für diesen offenen und inhaltsreichen Austausch. Wir teilen das Ziel, globalen Klimaschutz konkret voranzutreiben. Österreich steht auch weiterhin als konstruktiver Partner bereit.“</p> Klimadialog auf höchster Ebene: Totschnig empfängt Präsidenten der UN-Klimakonferenz Mukhtar Babayev in Wien	查看 2356	奥地利农业、区域发展和数字化部	2025-07-10 08:00:00 2025-07-23 21:41:30	word
3215903	无图 <small>Wald</small> <time>10. Juli 2025</time> Totschnig: Gefahrenzonenplan als Rückgrat für sichere Regionen <p>Essentieller Beitrag zur Sicherheit vor den Auswirkungen von Naturgefahren in Österreich</p><p>Sicherheit ist für unser Land und unsere Gesellschaft besonders wichtig. In einem Gebirgsland wie Österreich gehört dazu auch der Schutz von Häusern, Straßen und Infrastruktur vor Naturgefahren wie Hochwasser, Lawinen, Muren, Steinschlag oder Hangrutschungen. Damit dieser Schutz funktioniert, müssen wir wissen, wo solche Gefahren auftreten können und wie stark sie wirken. Außerdem ist es wichtig, dass die Bevölkerung gut über diese Risiken informiert wird.</p><p>Vor genau 50 Jahren (1975) wurde in Österreich mit dem Forstgesetz der Gefahrenzonenplan eingeführt. Damit konnten Naturgefahren erstmals einheitlich und übersichtlich auf Karten dargestellt und bewertet werden – nicht mehr nur in einzelnen Gutachten. Dieses Gesetz bildet die Grundlage dafür, dass jede Gemeinde in Österreich eine umfassende Einschätzung der Naturgefahren erhält. Die Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung stellt allen 1.400 betroffenen Gemeinden einen aktuellen Gefahrenzonenplan zur Verfügung. Jedes Jahr werden rund 60 bis 70 dieser Pläne überarbeitet und aktualisiert.</p><p>„Sicherheit ist eine der wichtigsten Lebensgrundlagen in unserem Land. Vor 50 Jahren haben wir mit dem Gefahrenzonenplan ein starkes Werkzeug geschaffen, das Gemeinden dabei hilft, gut und sicher zu planen. Heute ist dieser Plan die Grundlage dafür, wo in Österreich gebaut werden darf – und wie wir Menschen und Lebensräume vor Naturgefahren schützen. Viele andere Länder schauen mit Respekt auf unser System. Der Gefahrenzonenplan ist aus unseren Gemeinden nicht mehr wegzudenken“, sagt Bundesminister Norbert Totschnig. Die Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung stellt ihre überragende Expertise allen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern zur Verfügung. Der Umgang mit Naturgefahren erfordert aber die Akzeptanz der Bevölkerung, daher ist auch zukünftig die Stärkung der Gefahrenzonenplanung eines der wichtigsten Ziele für die Sicherheit in diesem Land.</p><p>Seit mittlerweile 50 Jahren legt die Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung (WLV) einen ihrer inhaltlichen und fachlichen Schwerpunkte in der Feststellung der Gefährdung durch wildbach- und/oder lawinenbezogene Naturprozesse. Gefährdungen werden im Gefahrenzonenplan, einem flächenhaften Gutachten festgehalten. Die Gefahrenzonenpläne sind so zu erstellen, dass sie für alle raumbezogenen Planungen und Sicherheitsplanungen auf kommunaler Ebene herangezogen werden können. Der Gefahrenzonenplan kann heute als das Erfolgsmodell des Schutzes vor Naturgefahren in Österreich bezeichnet werden, wenngleich die Auswirkungen auf Raumplanung, Bauwesen und die sichere Nutzung von Eigentum in der Bevölkerung teils kontrovers diskutiert werden.</p><p>Das BMLUK nimmt das Jubiläumsjahr 2025 zum Anlass, den Gefahrenzonenplan durch vielfältige Aktionen den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern vermehrt ins Bewusstsein und damit das Thema Sicherheit vor alpinen Naturgefahren näher zu bringen. Höhenpunkt war die internationale Fachenquete „Gefahrenzonenplanung“ am 3. Juli in Graz. Dabei haben Expertinnen und Experten aus dem gesamten Alpenraum den Stand und die Zukunft der Gefahrenzonenplanung diskutiert.</p> Totschnig: Gefahrenzonenplan als Rückgrat für sichere Regionen	查看 3375	奥地利农业、区域发展和数字化部	2025-07-10 08:00:00 2025-07-23 21:41:30	word
3215902	无图 <small>Klima und Umwelt</small> <time>11. Juli 2025</time> Totschnig bei Umweltrat: EU-Klimaziel bis 2040 ambitioniert aber machbar <p>Die Chancen als Vorreiter der grünen Transformation wirtschaftlich nutzen</p><p>Beim informellen EU-Umweltrat im dänischen Aalborg unterstreicht Umwelt- und Klimaminister Norbert Totschnig Österreichs Unterstützung für das neue EU-Klimaziel 2040: „Der EU-Vorschlag ist ein wichtiger Meilenstein in Richtung Klimaneutralität und eines zukunftsfitten Wirtschaftsstandortes. Europa hat die Kraft und die Möglichkeiten, international als Vorreiter zu agieren und andere Staaten zum Mitmachen zu bewegen. Das ist wichtig, weil wir das Ziel nur gemeinsam erreichen können. Der Weg dorthin muss aber so gegangen werden, dass er gleichzeitig Chancen für Arbeitsplätze und den heimischen Standort eröffnet und auf die Bedürfnisse der Menschen Rücksicht nimmt.“</p>Europäische Union auf dem Weg zur globalen COP30 Klimakonferenz<p>Zentrale Themen des Treffens in Aalborg sind die Vorbereitung auf die UN-Klimakonferenz COP30, die im November in Brasilien stattfindet, sowie die Verhandlungen zum EU-Klimaziel 2040. Mit Blick darauf betont Totschnig: „Europa hat die Stärke, geschlossen voranzugehen und andere Länder zu motivieren, den Weg mitzugehen. Die globalen Klimaziele erreichen wir nur mit globaler Zusammenarbeit.“ Österreich wolle dabei aktiv mitgestalten.</p><p>Der Weg zur Klimaneutralität müsse als wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Chance positiv genützt werden: „Den Ausstieg aus fossilen Energieträgern müssen wir nutzen, um durch Innovationen wettbewerbsfähig zu bleiben und unsere Abhängigkeit von Importen fossiler Energie schrittweise abzubauen. Allein in Österreich gibt es zahlreiche Unternehmen, die mit grünen und nachhaltigen Geschäftsmodellen international Vorbild sind. Wenn wir in diese Richtung mehr investieren, stärken wir den Wirtschaftsstandort, erhalten die bestehenden Arbeitsplätze und schaffen sogar neue – und zwar in starken Wachstumsbranchen.“</p>Starke Partnerschaft: Österreich und Dänemark kooperieren bei CO₂-Speicherung<p>Totschnig setzt vor Ort auf enge bilaterale Gespräche: „Ich nutze die Gelegenheit in Aalborg für Gespräche mit meinen Amtskollegen, u.a. aus Dänemark, um hier beim Thema Kohlenstoffmanagement von einem Vorreiter zu lernen. Dänemark ist ein Pionier bei Elektromobilität und CO₂-Speicherung. Wir wollen von ihren Erfahrungen lernen."</p><p>Daher kündigt Totschnig einen weiteren intensiven Austausch mit Dänemark an: „Wir werden über potentielle Projekte zur CO₂-Speicherung, zum Aufbau grenzüberschreitender Transportinfrastruktur und zu rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen sprechen. Von diesen Fortschritten sollen auch österreichische Unternehmen profitieren.</p> Totschnig bei Umweltrat: EU-Klimaziel bis 2040 ambitioniert aber machbar	查看 2837	奥地利农业、区域发展和数字化部	2025-07-11 08:00:00 2025-07-23 21:41:30	word
3215901	无图 <small>Landwirtschaft</small> <time>16. Juli 2025</time> Totschnig zu MFR/GAP: Gebot der Stunde lautet ausreichend Mittel für Direktzahlungen und ländliche Entwicklung <p>Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission gefährdet österreichisches Erfolgsmodell in der Landwirtschaft</p><p>Die Europäische Kommission hat heute ihre Pläne für den Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen der EU für den Zeitraum 2028-2034 vorgestellt. Der Entwurf sieht eine fundamentale Änderung für den EU-Haushalt vor. So sollen die bisher eigenständig finanzierten Politikbereiche Agrarpolitik, Regionalpolitik, Migration und Sicherheit zu einem neuen Fonds zusammengeführt werden. Dieser Fonds soll in einem einzigen Nationalen Plan (Nationaler und Regionaler Partnerschaftsplan, NRPP) verwaltet werden. Damit würde für die Mitgliedsstaaten zwar vordergründig mehr Gestaltungsfreiraum in der Mittelverwendung geschaffen werden, aber gleichzeitig würden eigenständige Politikbereiche durch mehr Konkurrenzdruck untereinander geschwächt.</p><p>Für Österreichs Landwirtschaft ist eine zentrale Gefahr enthalten: Die 2-Säulen-Struktur, mit der die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (GAP) der EU bisher finanziert wird, soll aufgelöst werden. Bei der ersten Säule erhalten Bäuerinnen und Bauern derzeit Direktzahlungen je nach Größe der bewirtschafteten Fläche. Dieses System soll auch gemäß Kommissionsvorschlag fortgeführt werden. Bei der zweiten Säule – ländliche Entwicklung genannt – erhalten Bäuerinnen und Bauern Zahlungen für erbrachte Leistungen unter anderem im Bereich Umwelt und Biodiversität. Einen Schwerpunkt in Österreich stellt dabei der Bereich Bergbauern dar. Aufgrund der besonders familiären und kleinstrukturierten Prägung der österreichischen Landwirtschaft, ist vor allem die zweite Säule für die heimische und flächendeckende Landwirtschaft besonders wichtig.</p><p>Landwirtschaftsminister Norbert Totschnig:„Die Pläne der Europäischen Kommission gefährden die Existenz unserer Bäuerinnen und Bauern, denn gerade unsere kleinstrukturierte und familienorientierte Landwirtschaft ist stark von der zweiten Säule der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik abhängig. Das Auflösen der zweiten Säule darf keinesfalls dazu führen, dass die faktischen Mittel gekürzt werden. Unsere Landwirtschaft benötigt Planungssicherheit für langfristige Investitionen. In Österreich haben wir eine flächendeckende und sehr kleinstrukturierte Landwirtschaft. Damit stellen wir eine regionale Versorgung mit Lebensmitteln aus heimischer Produktion sicher und machen uns auch gegenüber Importen unabhängiger. Ich kämpfe daher dafür, dass unsere Bäuerinnen und Bauern auch weiterhin finanzielle Planbarkeit bekommen. Das Gebot der Stunde lautet ausreichend Mittel für Direktzahlungen und ländliche Entwicklung.“</p><p>Abgesehen von der wichtigen zweiten Säule soll das Maßnahmenspektrum der bisherigen GAP laut Kommissionsvorschlag weitgehend erhalten bleiben: Direktzahlungen an Landwirte, das Agrarumweltprogramm ÖPUL, die Zahlungen für Berg- und benachteiligte Gebiete, Investitionen, Wissenstransfer oder LEADER sind im Vorschlag der Kommission weiterhin vorgesehen.</p> Totschnig zu MFR/GAP: Gebot der Stunde lautet ausreichend Mittel für Direktzahlungen und ländliche Entwicklung	查看 3189	奥地利农业、区域发展和数字化部	2025-07-16 08:00:00 2025-07-23 21:41:30	word

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